Ocnus.Net

Defence & Arms
Military Confrontation with Hamas in Gaza is Inevitable
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Ha’aretz 25/4/07
Apr 25, 2007 - 9:53:00 AM

Yet the premier must ask himself whether this would not be a mistake. Just as Hamas did in its kidnapping of Gilad Shalit last June, the organization, or parts of it, is signaling that all its promises of a cease-fire are nonbinding. Since Hamas agreed to the cease-fire in Gaza, more than 200 Qassam rockets have been fired at Israel from Gaza and some 50 bombs have been planted along the border fence. Hamas' military wing was involved in many of these attacks.

On the tactical level, the lessons of Shalit's kidnapping were learned: For instance, the army is now allowed to penetrate a few hundred meters into Gaza in order to thwart kidnappings. Yet it must be remembered that last July's kidnapping of two soldiers along the northern border by Hezbollah was preceded by many attempted kidnappings that Israel successfully foiled; it was Israel's muted response to these attempts that convinced Hezbollah that it would only pay a minimal price for a successful abduction.

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Unlike its response to previous thwarted kidnappings, the army refrained from celebrating on Monday. This was partly due to the two successful abductions that occurred last year, but also to awareness that a major escalation in Gaza is likely relatively soon.

Olmert will remain unenthusiastic about a large-scale operation in Gaza even after the Winograd report is published. But for years, Israel's response to Palestinian attacks has been based on one thing only: the attacks' results. A successful kidnapping, or a Qassam rocket that causes multiple deaths, will hasten the decision to act.

Olmert is well acquainted with the situation assessment of GOC Southern Command Yoav Galant: that a military confrontation with Hamas is inevitable. The organization's ideology, its ongoing attacks and its military buildup in Gaza all lead to this conclusion. And from Israel's perspective, Galant believes, the sooner the better, before Hamas' military might grows any further.

Meanwhile, the army is preparing, and on a scale that some liken to the preparations preceding the first Lebanon War in 1982. In Israel, such preparations tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies.

Hamas' claim of responsibility for Monday's rocket and mortar fire was unusual. Since November, it has refrained from such announcements. This time, Hamas was apparently motivated by a desire to regain its fighting image in the eyes of the Palestinian public. Its statement even exaggerated the number of rockets and missiles fired. The attack was apparently timed for Independence Day to maximize its effect.

Palestinian security officials on Monday claimed that Hamas deliberately aimed at open areas, in order to prevent a massive Israeli response, but fired enough rockets to create the impression that it is once again leading the fight and to divert attention from the failures of the new Palestinian unity government. This government has not managed to end the bloody gang wars in Gaza, nor has it ended the Hamas-Fatah rivalry: Both sides are busily arming and recruiting in preparation for renewed infighting. It seems the only thing that can save the Gazans from civil war is a large-scale Israeli military operation.

 



Source: Ocnus.net 2007