The French Force Licorne (now about 4,000 men) was augmented by a larger number of international ‘peacekeepers; theoretically to enforce the various agreements (at Linas-Marcoussis, Pretoria and Accra) and the several UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, it effectively divided the country and protected the rebels in their Northern sanctuaries.

All the agreements for restoring order were predicated on the staged disarmament of the rebels and the militias and the concomitant registration of voters for a new national election under the rules of the Constitution. To date there has been no disarmament by the rebels so it has been impossible to move freely in the country to conduct voter registration. The situation on the ground has been preserved in aspic by the “zone of confidence” created by the French and the United Nations. The French are supposed to be operating under the mandates of the United Nations, but they also operate under the secret terms of the Defence Protocols of the “Pacte Coloniale” signed at independence. It is fatuous to speak of an independent United Nations Peacekeeping presence in the Ivory Coast when most of the logistics, supply and communications is handled directly by the Force Licorne for the entire UN peacekeeping mission.

The role of the French in the creation and maintenance of the division of the Ivory Coast is well documented and flows from the Pacte Coloniale Agreement. This created a special preference for France in the political, commercial and defence processes in the Ivory Coast. On defence it agreed two types of continuing contact. The first was the open agreement on military co-operation or Technical Military Aid (AMT) agreements, which weren’t legally binding, and could be suspended according to the circumstances. They covered education, training of servicemen and African security forces. The second type, secret and binding, were defense agreements supervised and implemented by the French Ministry of Defense, which served as a legal basis for French interventions. These agreements allowed France to have predeployed troops in Africa, in other words, French army units present permanently and by rotation in bases and military facilities in Africa; run entirely by the French.

The recent record of the French role in the Ivory Coast is not inspiring. French peacekeepers have been indicted, found guilty and sentenced by French courts for murder, rape, bank robbery and general mayhem in the Ivory Coast. These French troops have never ceased to meddle in the internal affairs of the Ivory Coast. They have supported the rebels of the North from the beginning; offered them weapons and supplies; marketed and transported their stolen goods; and plotted innumerable coups and outrages. They opened fire on unarmed, peaceful demonstrators in November 2004, killing many and wounding more. In December 2006 the French forces planned and supported an attempted coup in the Ivory Coast, bent on assassinating many of the key leadership figures of the country. When that failed they spirited the coup leader out to France on French military transport. They have created and maintained the division of the country into two halves; with cross-barrier access controlled by them.

Since 2002 the French have given support to the rebels, militarily and politically, so that the rebels did not feel that it was important to disarm or perform on any of their agreements, as the French would protect them from any harm. The French defended the rebel interests in the Security Council votes; in the Economic Community of West African States and African Union meetings through their francophone toadies in Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Mali, Togo and Burkina Faso; and by installing their stooge, Banny, as the interim Prime Minister. During the same period, the rebels stole the cocoa, coffee, cotton, gold, diamonds, timber and other minerals from the areas they occupied and made themselves rich (along with African leaders like Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso) by selling these through French agents into the international market.

The Gbagbo Peace Initiative – Five Point Program

Over the last four years President Gbagbo and the Government of the Ivory Coast have complied with the various demands made by the African Union and the UN Security Council. He has allowed the UN to install a ‘Prime Minister’ of its own designation and has made the adjustments to the Constitution to allow Ouattara to stand as a candidate for the Presidency despite the fact that, under the current rules, he is not fully Ivorian. With the passage of UN Resolution 1721 it soon became apparent that the UN’s vision of reunification and peace did not reflect any reality on the ground. In short, there was no disarmament so there could not be peace or elections.

The Gbagbo Government called for a dialogue with the Ivorian people and investigated their suggestions and recommendations. The secretariat charged to review these proposals recorded 75 speeches and 202 texts, in the form of collective or individual contributions. Thee 277 documents collected, contained 1,478 proposals.  These proposals related to disarmament, the Government, the foreign relations of the Ivory Coast, the electoral process, the methods to achieve peace, the reunification of the country, the redeployment of the administration and many other proposals referring in particular to the rebuilding of the country.

Having reviewed these suggestions and, in consultation with the National Assembly and his Cabinet, President Gbagbo announced a five-point program for changing the status quo. The kernel of this proposal is that peace can be achieved internally without relying on outside assistance or interference.

The first proposal is the introduction of a direct dialogue with the rebellion for disarmament and of the reunification of the country.  The rebels claim they took up arms against their own country to achieve political rights in terms of citizenship and voting which had been denied them. Since these issues have already been resolved by signed agreements there is no reason why disarmament should not start immediately. On 5 February there will be direct talks between the Gbagbo Government and the rebels to discuss disarmament and the electoral process.

The second proposal is the elimination of the “zone of confidence”; that artificial line enforced by the French and the UN which keeps the country from reuniting and impedes safe passage from one part of the country to the other. This line of non-crossing, baptized the “zone of confidence”, became an internal border dividing the country into two.  There is no reason to continue it. All military confrontations have ended.  On both sides, the desire for a resumption of hostilities does not exist. The Ivorians are tired of war.  They want to resume a normal life, to circulate freely throughout the land. It is necessary to remove the zone of confidence because it poses more problems than it solves.

The third proposal is the creation of a National Civic Service. Since the rebellion the youth of the Ivory Coast has suffered by the suspension of the education system in the North; with the reduction in investments nationally which would normally allow new workers to join the labour force and to become good citizens by working and contributing to the national economy. The President promised that, at the end of February 2007, this program would be available to the first 40,000 young people.  As each young person is trained he will earn a regular wage.  At the end of this civic service, which will last 18 months, each trained person will be able to find an employment in the public, the private sector or to create their own company

The fourth proposal is a general amnesty. This will not cover crimes or economic misappropriations, but will create a climate where the hostility and fear of the past four years can be set aside to make a fresh start. It is not designed to permit impunity, but to eliminate thoughts of revenge or injustice where everyone is equal before the law.

The fifth proposal is the creation of a policy to restore the rights and properties of those who were displaced by the ravages of war. The creation of such a program is a precondition to the mutual forgiveness which the amnesty program will create.  Justice must march hand in hand with forgiveness; especially for those whose lives were damaged by events in which they were the victims, not the perpetrators.

The Current Political Arena

There has been a genuine outpouring of hope that this homegrown initiative will succeed. The first direct discussions start on 5 February in Burkina Faso, hosted by Blaise Campaore. The government side is led by Désiré Tagro, the legal adviser and confidant of Gbagbo and the rebel side by Louis André Dakoury-Tabley. The delegation of the Force Nouvelles (the euphemistic title of the rebels), includes Ministers Dakoury-Tabley, Koné Mamadou (Justice) as well as M. Konaté Sidiki, Cabinet Director of Soro Guillaume. The current Prime Minister, Charles Banny, leads his own delegation there but he has not been invited to the talks. This is a dialogue between the elected government and the rebels; not the foreign-appointed French satrap.

There is a great deal of optimism associated with these talks; not because either side has changed its opinions much, but primarily because the political framework has changed:

• The Chirac Government in France has done everything it could to dislodge Gbagbo, and failed. Chirac’s star is fading and he desperately wants a successful Franco-African dialogue to take place in the closing days of his reign. Neither Sarkozy nor Royal has shown the same appetite for African adventures as Chirac so francophonie is on the back burner. It is too expensive and dangerous.
• The Security Council has changed its tune. In the last debates the French found themselves opposed by Russia and China and a neutral US. Its power in the Security Council has diminished and the French are not keen to expose themselves to more pressure (especially in light of the Rwanda business and its attacks on Kagame)
• Soro and the rest of the rebel band have made lots of money in the last four years, mainly stashed in France and Burkina Faso and realise that further conflict will prevent them from enjoying the fruits of their pillages. The withdrawal of French resources has left them without much support and the rebels are deathly afraid that the Northern populations whom they have despoiled will turn on them if peace seems likely. They need to secure a lifeline (jobs, ministries, etc.) from Gbagbo to preserve them.
• There is a general dissatisfaction with the government and politics in general. There has been four years of stagnation, lack of growth and lack of opportunity to an increasingly young population. They see very rich Africans in the North and South in high political positions and they wonder why it is only they, the young, the urban poor, the farmers and the dispossessed, who suffer. There is little confidence in politicians in general and even less in the military, who are viewed as economic leeches, however necessary.

The Promise

There is a new development which has barely been recognised in the Ivory Coast; or in Africa in general. The new world economic order is changing. Africa is developing a solid foundation of private companies (banks, telecommunications companies, and oil and gas companies in particular). These have attracted interest in the international private equity funds that see in Africa a source of dramatic growth. In Nigeria, South Africa and the Ivory Coast are numbers of very successful private African companies in whose shares a proper market can be made, irrespective of government policies. Many of these companies (especially South Africa and Nigeria) are issuing ADRs and GDRs (depository receipts for domestic shares which are traded in hard currency denominations in stock exchanges internationally). There is a growing market for these overseas depository shares as well as for discounted debt and oil and gas warrants. The international financial community is focussing in on the potential for African private sector growth and is creating new vehicles and brokerages for trading in ADRs and GDRs as well as in their derivatives.

This will revolutionise African investments and growth, irrespective of the moribund and corrupt public sectors. Africa is on the cusp of a wave of private equity fund interest in its development and the neo-colonial system of the current economic climate will be swept away by this wave. The Ivory Coast has several key companies which are already of interest to these global market investors. The possibility of a serious outbreak of peace will make this even more attractive.

This is also of great interest to the African trades union movements. Until now most African unionism has been public sector unionism; that is that wages and benefits are set by politicians in the budgetary process for each public agency. As private industry expands and becomes part of the international global economy then African private sector unionism can grow with it. Contracts can be agreed which reflect profitability, productivity and responsibility for performing contractual agreements, The oil, gas, banking and telecommunications industries are the likeliest starting points; followed by transport and mining.

This is why it is crucial for the parties to come to a quick and workable agreement in Ouagadougou. The dawning economic and political future is waiting for such an agreement.