Ocnus.Net
Ahmedinejad “Wins” Battle of Wits
By Mahan Abedin, Saudi Debate 12/4/07
Apr 13, 2007, 09:00
Iran Bazi Ra Bord, or “Iran Won the Game” was the sensational headline of the hardline daily Kayhan after the release of the British marines and sailors last Wednesday. While the headline may be overstated, it did at least capture the general mood in Iran. The overwhelming feeling amongst the elites and the people is that the Islamic Republic emerged victorious in its latest stand-off with the Western powers.
Iranian perceptions of victory aside, the short and long-term implications of the 13-day standoff between Iran and Britain are more nuanced. While Iran demonstrated its ability to defend its territorial integrity and send a message of defiance to the UK and the United States, it also antagonised Western public opinion at a crucial time in Iranian-Western relations. However, the incident reinforced Iran’s fiercely independent reputation, and may have signalled the start of a new and even more assertive Iranian foreign policy. This is perhaps the most important outcome of the standoff.
A troublesome border
A lot of the analysis of the standoff has concentrated on the border dispute between Iran and Iraq regarding the Shat Al-Arab (or Arvand Rud, as the Iranians call it) waterway. But this analysis misses the forest for the trees.
First and foremost, the Iranians seized the British marines and sailors in the northern Persian Gulf, and not in the Shat (Arvand River). Second the territorial dispute over the Shat has, legally at least, been largely resolved. The breakthrough was the 1975 Algiers Accord, signed between the former Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein (then Iraqi Vice-President). This agreement was based, in large measure, on the so-called Thalweg principle (i.e. determining national boundaries on the basis of the natural direction of a watercourse – this principle has worked well in dividing the Danube River in Europe) that was introduced to the dispute by the British after the conclusion of World War Two. The British hoped to put an end to centuries of territorial disputes between the Ottoman Empire (which collapsed shortly after World War One) and successive Iranian dynasties, by keeping the waterway bi-national.
While an exhaustive analysis of the intricacies of the Thalweg principle and the Algiers Accord are beyond the scope of this article, it is broadly agreed that the Algiers Accord of 1975 was the most practical way to divide the hotly contested waterway. Of course Saddam Hussein famously tore up the Algiers Accord in 1980 and subsequently ordered his armies into Iran. But Saddam was forced to recognise the Accord in August 1990, barely a few weeks after he invaded Kuwait. In any case the Algiers Accord is still legally-binding on both parties.
However, the Accord has done little to ease both parties’ sensitivities on the ground. And here is the crux of the matter; it is not so much a technical territorial dispute but a deeply rooted sensitivity about everything that goes on there. Indeed, both the Iranians and the Iraqis (prior to the 2003 invasion) expended tremendous time and resources in surveilling everything in the Shat/Arvand and the northern Persian Gulf – from commercial traffic to the changing marine ecology of the waterway. This sensitivity was reinforced by the entry of British forces into the equation.
Although the Iranians consistently maintained that the British had been apprehended for straying into Iranian waters (and demanded an apology from Britain on this basis), most likely the underlying issue is that they do not like to see the British performing the job of Iraqi customs and maritime border control.
Not surprisingly, the British doggedly maintained that HMS Cornwall’s patrol boats had been in Iraqi waters. It is very difficult to ascertain who was telling the truth. Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan and head of the maritime section of the foreign and commonwealth office from 1989-1992, maintains that both sides could have been right since “…the maritime delimitation in the North West of the Persian Gulf, between Iraq, Kuwait and Iran, has never been resolved.” Craig Murray’s supporters also called into question the reliability of the information released by the British Ministry of Defence in its 28 March press release.
Battling Britain
Aside from the obvious humiliation of British forces carrying out maritime patrols close to, or even within Iranian maritime borders (if we are to believe Iranian claims that the British forces had strayed into Iranian waters), the Iranians are also fearful of intelligence gathering by the royal navy. There can be little doubt that royal navy patrols are performing this function and that the information will most likely be shared with the Americans. Given the high levels of tension between America and Iran (and the possibility of tensions degenerating into a shooting war) these Iranian concerns are not unreasonable.
Furthermore, the Shat Al-Arab/Arvand Rud and the northern Persian Gulf have become a flashpoint in British-Iranian relations because they link in with broader tensions in the south of Iraq. For the past four years the British have tried – largely unsuccessfully – to contain Iranian influence in Basra and the surrounding region. These efforts are deeply resented by the Iranians who use a variety of means to deter the British. These methods range from pressuring the various city councils and tribal committees to suspend cooperation with the British military authorities, to encouraging pro-Iranian political organisations (in particular the offshoots of the Sadr movement) to make life as difficult as possible for the British. The British and American governments even claim that Iran supplies technology to insurgent groups in the form of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs). The EFPs are alleged by the US and UK to be a highly “political” weapon, deployed against British and American forces whenever pro-Iranian militia and insurgent groups come under pressure from the Anglo-American occupation.
The real question is whether Iran has managed to send a strong enough signal to the UK to dissuade it from maintaining the same level of patrols in the northern Persian Gulf and the Shat Al-Arab/Arvand Rud. This is unclear at this stage since there is very little information on the secret diplomacy which finally secured the release of the British marines and sailors. The Iranians claim to have in their possession a letter from the British government which admits the UK forces had strayed into Iranian waters. The British government denies this. But whether or not this is true, the embarrassment caused to the British military, and British prestige on the world stage more generally, is likely to have an impact on royal navy patrols in the northern Persian Gulf and quite possibly in the Shat/Arvand River as well. Clearly, both sides will want to avoid a repetition of the recent stand-off.
Targeting the Arab street
Iran tried to extract as much propaganda value as possible from the 13-day standoff. The country’s leadership was targeting Iranian, Arab and Muslim and Western public opinion simultaneously. The propaganda war was played well by Iran, whose security agencies – in particular the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which had seized the British marines and sailors – were desperate for success in the face of mounting American psychological pressure.
As far as domestic Iranian public opinion is concerned, the regime was trying to assert its nationalist credentials and reassure the public that the Iranian armed forces would be able to defend the country’s territorial integrity in the event of conflict with the West. There was also a desire to humiliate the British, whose semi-colonial heritage in Iran continues to haunt the collective Iranian consciousness. Although the UK government stuck to its guns throughout the 13-day standoff, most observers agree it was made to look weak and ineffectual by the Iranian action.
The targeting of Arab and broader Muslim public opinion was arguably the most important aspect of Iran’s propaganda offensive. By confronting the UK, and forcing its government to internationalise the issue by turning to the United Nations (where the UK government managed to secure a statement expressing “grave concern” about the captives) and the European Union, the Islamic Republic was able to reinforce its reputation as a formidable bastion of resistance against Western influence and hegemony.
It is instructive that Iran first released pictures of the captured British marines and sailors on Al-Alam TV (the main Arabic language arm of Iranian state broadcasting), which is mainly targeted at an Iraqi audience. This was an indication that to key power centres in Iran, in particular the IRGC, Arab and broader Muslim public opinion was more important than domestic Iranian public opinion.
Talking at the West
The effect on Western public opinion was more complicated.
Although Iran scored points by demonstrating deft diplomacy and releasing the captives (as opposed to putting them on trial, which it had repeatedly claimed it had a perfect right to), the detention and – as no doubt many Westerners saw it – the unnecessary prolongation of the British servicemen and woman’s captivity, antagonised Western public opinion at a critical moment in Iranian-Western relations.
The alleged mistreatment of the UK personnel is another complicating factor. But it is important to be open-minded about this. Certainly, there can be little doubt that the marines and sailors who confessed on Iranian TV to “straying” into Iranian waters, did so under pressure and possibly coercion. The Iranian version of their treatment cannot be taken at face value. At the same time some of the allegations made by the British marines and sailors after their release have the trappings of exaggeration and embellishment. For their part, the Iranians claim that the UK personnel had been tasked to produce disinformation at their debriefing.
In any case it is doubtful that the UK personnel had been subjected to extreme treatment. Even the London Times was unconvinced – if not about the allegations of the marines and sailors, certainly about their decision to give in so easily to their Iranian captors, commenting: “The emotional and psychological intimidation was tough, but certainly not the worst in the history of warfare – nor dissimilar to the experience of some Iraqi and Afghan prisoners of coalition forces in the Middle East. And as some commentators noted, their treatment was positively mild compared with those abused by US forces in Abu Ghraib two years ago.”
Iran also scored points by turning sections of British public opinion against the Blair government, the Ministry of Defence and even the hallowed Royal Navy (historically, one of the most prized institutions in the United Kingdom). Michael Smith, the award-winning British investigative journalist, hit out against all three with a scathing critique, singling out the MoD for its initial decision to allow the marines and sailors to sell their stories to the press.
In summary, even though Iran’s reputation in the West deteriorated even further, the key point is that this is unlikely to trouble the Islamic Republic, which has never (throughout its 28 year history) set out to win the hearts and minds of the Western public. More specifically, the Iranians are well aware that Western public opinion is unlikely to be of any consequence if military conflict with the United States becomes inevitable. In this respect, the Iranians have probably not miscalculated.
Iran versus America
From the very outset of the crisis, Iran denied any linkage to its wide-ranging disputes with the United States, particularly in Iraq. The official Iranian version of events maintained that the British personnel were detained for trespassing into Iranian waters, and Iran had subsequently demanded an apology from the UK government and finally it had decided to release the personnel (as opposed to put them on trial) on account of its commitment to Islamic and humanitarian values.
According to this version of events the dispute was solely between Iran and the UK, with the Islamic Republic showing magnanimity and compassion by releasing the marines and sailors, even though the British government refused to issue an apology (at least in public) as the Iranians had demanded.
But unofficial Iranian analysis of the events leaves little doubt that the whole affair was ultimately tied to the Islamic Republic’s rapidly deteriorating psychological war with the United States.
Two analyses stand out in particular.
In the Ahmadinejad camp Ehsan Salehi of Rajanews provides a high-quality analysis of the 13 day stand-off, outlining and explaining Iran’s options at every turn during the incident. Generally supportive of the Iranian government’s handling of the crisis (especially the timing and manner of the release), Salehi claims that [in the psychological warfare game with the West] Iran “was able to break out of the corner of the ring – where it was receiving blow after blow – and regain the initiative.” This is no doubt a reference to limited United Nations sanctions against Iran and increasingly aggressive American actions against Iranian interests in Iraq and elsewhere.
The other high-quality analysis (which is arguably the best overview of the standoff and its different dimensions and implications) is provided by Baztab (a high-quality and reliable information portal that is owned and managed by former IRGC personnel). While critical of many aspects of the Iranian handling of the case – in particular the exaggerated media attention on the British marines and sailors – Baztab concludes that the incident signifies the beginning of a new era in Iranian foreign policy, characterised by appropriate responses to Western aggression.
Both analyses (which reflect the strategic thinking of different sections of the Iranian security establishment) strongly hint that – regardless of the origins and specifics of the standoff – the Islamic Republic used the entire incident to reverse recent losses and gain the initiative in the psychological war with the United States.
In the final analysis, the Iranians scored a “tactical” victory against the British (by warning them off intensive and aggressive patrols near Iranian maritime borders, in addition to making the UK government look weak and ineffectual on the world stage). But it remains to be seen if they also scored a “strategic” victory against the United States, by dissuading the Americans from widening and deepening the war of words and wills.
Source: Ocnus.net 2007