Africa
Ethiopia: Can Sudan use Tigray refugees as a bargaining chip?
By Anne-Marie Bissada, Africa Report, 25/11/21
Nov 27, 2021 - 12:34:35 PM

A year after the Tigray war erupted in northern Ethiopia, there’s growing fear that not only will the union of rebel forces enter the capital Addis Ababa, but the spillover effect risks weakening an already fragile region. But could the chaos within Ethiopia’s borders play into the advantage of Sudan, especially since its coup d’état has once again further destablised the country?

Prior to Khartoum’s military takeover by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country was still on shaky territory as the transitional government - headed by Abdalla Hamdok - tried to consolidate a mixed government between civilian and military. At the time of writing this, Burhan had announced that Hamdok will be allowed to return to his former position as prime minister.

Opportunity knocks

After 25 years under the government of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and 21 years under Sudan’s main party, the National Congress Party - headed by Omar al-Bashir - the two neighbours entered a new phase, almost simultaneously.

In 2018, Abiy Ahmed shone as Ethiopia’s new and modern head of state, ushering in a fresh future for the country. The Sudanese revolution in 2019 completed what was never thought possible: an end to Bashir’s grip on power and that of his Islamist affiliates.

“There was hope that the emergence of these two transitions could lead to a strong foundation in terms of the relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia and also boost broader regional stability,” says Ahmed Soliman, a Horn of Africa researcher at Chatham House. Instead, what happened was a negative shift in the bilateral relationship between the two.

Instead, what happened was a shift in the bilateral relationship between the two.

Previously, Bashir’s Sudan had aligned itself with the TPLF, but when Abiy took over as prime minister, he dissolved the EPRDF - thereby breaking up the four main parties: Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) - and created his new Prosperity Party that merged three of the four main parties, excluding the TPLF. Bashir was already weary of this new government.

However, Hamdok had lived in Addis Ababa for many years and knew the country well, so upon assuming his role as prime minister, he was “welcoming of this transition and change in Ethiopia” says Soliman. When Sudan was surprisingly elected to chair the regional bloc IGAD – a role that Ethiopia had clung to since 2008 through blocking the yearly Ordinary Summit – there was no pushback from Abiy.

In November 2020, at the start of the first offensive into Tigray, it was assumed that Khartoum would be well placed to mediate the tensions, as Addis Ababa had done in Sudan between the civilians and the military. This, however, never materialised. “Hamdok’s efforts to reach out to the Ethiopian government were pushed aside…that was detrimental for the bilateral relations of the two,” says Soliman.

Planting a flag

This is when Sudan started to take some action.

Trying to assert its power, Khartoum’s military - “with a long record of failure” outside of its citizens - seized the opportunity to mark the disputed border with Ethiopia at al-Fashqa, says Magdi al-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute.

According to the colonial-era treaties of 1902 and 1907, the international boundary runs to the east, but there is nothing to clearly mark the border. Instead, while there are cultural differences on either side of the border i.e. Christian Amhara and Sunni Muslim Sudanese. The area has always been a source of illicit trade and is where seasonal workers from Ethiopia would cross over to Sudan to work. Products from Sudan would also be sent over to Ethiopia for a better market price.

In June 2020, there was an attack - reportedly led by an Ethiopian militia group “supported by the Ethiopian army” - against the Sudanese military barracks in the border region of al-Fashqa.

By November, with the Tigray war in full force, it was time for Sudan to use the distraction to its benefit.

As Ghouzli says, nobody was interested in a cross-border war at the time, “neither side [was]”, but it was a means of Khartoum to assert its control over the area following the earlier attack. Given that the Sudanese army is not powerful, in comparison to Ethiopia’s, Khartoum could at least flex its muscle to the Amhara militia that had initiated the earlier attack.

Bargaining tool

After Ethiopia’s offensive in Tigray, tens of thousands of refugees streamed into Eastern Sudan. At the time, Khartoum was starting to break out from its isolation and was in talks with Washington to be taken off their state-sponsored terror list. This would allow Sudan to be open to debt relief and investors.

One way to secure its reentry into the international scene was to use the influx of Ethiopian refugees into its borders as a “chip in talks with the aid community about the need for funds to support the refugees”, says Ghouzli.

As the war intensifies in Ethiopia, the stream of refugees remains strong, with Khartoum promising to open two more refugee camps. This bodes well for Burhan’s charm offensive against the international community that has condemned his military coup.

If Sudan cannot control the refugee crisis within its own borders, then Europe risks being a new target, an outcome the EU is trying to avoid. It’s a way for Khartoum to ease its diplomatic pressure.

Dam of discord

Ahead of the start of the Tigray conflict, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was mainly opposed by Egypt, with Sudan remaining rather quiet, if not indirectly supportive of Ethiopia.

However, as fighting intensified, so too did Egypt’s efforts to rally more attention to its cause and that of its southern neighbour, Sudan. By December 2020, Khartoum had shifted sides and spoken up against Addis Ababa for its intention to go ahead and fill the dam in 2021, despite no binding agreement.

Its change of tune also seemed to borrow from the Fashqa seizure in November 2020.

On 12 January 2021, Addis Ababa issued a warning to Khartoum that it was running out of patience. “The Sudanese side seems to be pushing in so as to inflame the situation on the ground,” Dina Mufti, an Ethiopian foreign ministry spokesperson, said at the time.

As Sudan and Egypt grew closer over the GERD, so did the influence of Cairo in Khartoum. Egypt has remained relatively neutral, with bouts of support of the recent military coup.

Going back to its former ties under Bashir with the TPLF, Khartoum could potentially use this as a means to improve its position at the negotiating table on GERD. As Ghouzli points out, if there is an administration change the TPLF could find itself in the central government again. As such, they may end up “softening its position regarding the GERD” thereby taking it away from Egypt.

However, for the time being, especially in the aftermath of the coup, Sudan can’t get away from Egypt. And it's unlikely it will make any significant gains on GERD, irrespective of how the war in Ethiopia develops, says Soliman.

Bottom line

Among Ethiopia’s regional neighbours, Sudan stands to gain the least from the ongoing chaos next door. Nevertheless, while Addis Ababa has been busy with the fighting in the north, Khartoum has not remained completely idle.

What’s more, playing into the fear of a new refugee crisis on European territory is the very thing that has given Burhan a sense of legitimacy following his October coup. Allowing Hamdok to return to his role as prime minister could very well be another bargaining tool for Burhan to remain in power.