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Last Updated: Jun 26, 2009 - 11:05:56 AM |
The assassinations of the chief of defence staff, General Batista Tagme
Na Wai, on 1 March 2009 and President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira early
the next day have plunged Guinea-Bissau into deep uncertainty. National
Assembly Speaker Raimundo Pereira was quickly sworn in as interim
president pending the election the constitution requires. That the
killings occurred only months after the acclaimed November
parliamentary elections, however, indicates that, in current
circumstances, the democratic process cannot cope with the rule of the
gun, as well as the extent to which the military’s use of force has
overwhelmed state institutions. Without outside help to end military
involvement in politics and impunity, it may be impossible to halt a
slide into further violence. Elites need to stand up to the military,
but they require support. The international community should work for
an international or hybrid commission of inquiry into the killings.
Security system reform needs to be improved by better international
coordination and creation of a national commission with enhanced
autonomy.
The situation further deteriorated when, in the early hours of 5 June,
a presidential candidate and former minister was shot dead in his home,
and a few hours later another former minister was also shot dead, along
with a bodyguard and driver, while motoring into Bissau. The
authorities claimed that they were resisting arrest for their part in a
coup plot, for which former Prime Minister Faustino Imbali was taken
into custody.
The precise motives remain unknown, but both the March and June
killings have credibly been linked to deep mistrust among the
political-military elites. The commission of inquiry established to
investigate the March killings is likely to be fatally weakened by lack
of political will to uncover the truth and widespread fear of
intimidation and retaliation. Without international involvement, it is
highly unlikely that the true culprits will be identified. This
reflects the inability of the justice system to counter impunity and
deal with the widespread criminality linked to drug trafficking that
has engulfed the country.
Since the return to multi-party rule in 1994, no president has
successfully completed the constitutionally-mandated five-year term.
General Tagme is the third chief of defence staff to be assassinated in
nine years. Although the violence pre-dates the surge of organised drug
trafficking in the region, the possibility of huge illicit riches has
increased the stakes in the power struggle, leading to a vicious cycle
of criminality and political instability, the beginnings of which are
visible not only in Guinea-Bissau but also in neighbouring Guinea.
Recent events point to increasing factionalism in the military, which
could pose a serious challenge to current efforts to reform the army.
Reactions to the March killings, domestic and international, have been
mixed. Some Bissau-Guineans regard them as presenting a welcome
opportunity for a new beginning, given the destabilising nature of the
personality conflict and rivalry that existed between President Vieira
and both General Tagme and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. But
most, especially in private conversations, view it as confirmation that
the military holds the state to ransom and is likely to continue to do
so in the absence of an international force to protect state
institutions. The international community, while condemning the
assassinations, has endorsed the interim government and the planned
election without sending a strong signal regarding the continued use of
force and widespread abuses committed by the military.
Prior to the 5 June killings, preparations for the presidential
election on 28 June 2009 were well advanced, and there is every chance
they will take place as scheduled, in view of the support and
endorsement the process has received from the international community
and the political parties represented in the National Assembly. The
campaign has been peaceful, with three favourites emerging, Malam Bacai
Sanha, Kumba Yala and Henrique Pereira Rosa – all former heads of
state. The election has the potential to help move the country beyond
the present impasse, but it could also provoke further instability. In
any case, an election alone is not enough to halt the continued
militarisation of politics.
To begin to build political stability through the de-militarisation of
political power, the following measures should be pursued by political
and military elites in the country and supported by the international
community, particularly the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (Comunidade
dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa, CPLP) and the UN:
*
Guinea-Bissau’s political elites, in particular the new
president, should fully and decisively implement reform of the armed
forces, prioritising the planned reduction from 4,458 to 3,500 troops.
They must stop looking to the military to settle or adjudicate
political disputes and desist from creating client groups in the army.
*
The military itself must realise that its continued involvement
in politics and related violence has seriously eroded its once proud
legacy. If it is to regain public trust, it must turn away from this
and embrace professional reform. Senior officers should consider early
retirement and postings to regional and wider international
peacekeeping operations as honourable options for ending their careers.
*
The international community must send a strong signal that the
continued use of force and human rights abuses are unacceptable and
will entail consequences. The international force to protect state
institutions and civilian politicians that some former senior
Bissau-Guinean officials have proposed should be established. Likewise,
an international or hybrid commission of enquiry into the
assassinations backed by a UN Security Council mandate should be
negotiated with the new president, as several Bissau-Guinean
politicians have urged, and pushed hard if, under pressure from the
armed forces, he proves reluctant.
*
Security system reform (SSR) needs to be much better coordinated
between the UN and the European Union (EU); a lead country should be
identified for implementation, possibly Portugal, the former colonial
power; and a trust fund created and the number of direct donors
reduced. Domestic ownership of the process should eventually be
enhanced through establishment of a national commission, with greater
autonomy than the current steering committee.
Source:Ocnus.net 2009
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