With just under 50 percent of votes counted on the party list system, People's Front of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the Bloc of President Petro Poroshenko, yes, are vying neck-and-neck still for first place, at around 21-22 percent of the vote. As of writing ,the People's Front was just ahead with 21.62 percent to Poroshenko's 21.45 percent.
As I wrote yesterday this is a disappointment for Poroshenko as his party had been polling well ahead of the other parties in opinion polls up until this week, in the 30 percent+ area with the Peoples' Front in single digits, and in third place. This vote will be a personal triumph for Yatsenyuk and likely will ensure his continued stay in office as prime minister as head of a coalition government of pro-European Union reform parties, including Poroshenko's.
Polling in third place is "Samopomich," the party of the popular mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovyi, with 11.11 percent. The party was not expected to do that well - perhaps not even crossing the 5 percent barrier required to get into parliament - so Sadovyi did not even place himself on the electoral list of his own party, as he preferred to remain as mayor of Lviv. However, the vote has propelled the party and Sadovyi into national politics. He is a liberal reformer, and his party contains many new fresh political faces, raised through the EuroMaidan protests. I expect Samopomich to be a central player in any pro-EU reform coalition, but with the party aiming to keep the next government true to the spirit of Maidan.
The Opposition Bloc party of former ruling Party of Regions politicians, including former minister of energy, Yuriy Boyko, and Serhiy Lyovochkin, former head of the presidential administration under ex-President Viktor Yanukovych, is polling fourth with 9.8 percent, slightly ahead of expectations. As its name implies the party is expected to become the main opposition party in parliament, and reflective more of the views of former regime supporters in South and East Ukraine. However, it just shows how much support in society for Regions-types has collapsed as the former Regions Party had a solid 35-40 percent poll base in the past two parliamentary elections.
Note also that the other party formed of former regions supporters, For a Strong Ukraine, led by former deputy prime minister Serhiy Tyhipko, seems to be coming nowhere, with 3.12 percent of votes as of writing. Tigipko ran in the 2010 presidential election as a pro-business modernizer, and came a surprising third place at the time, behind Yulia Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, before cutting a deal with Yanukovych, which many people saw as a sellout by some of his middle-class voters. This election probably marks the end of Tigipko as a political force.
Also performing surprising poorly is the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, with just 7.38 percent, i.e. around half his prior opinion poll ratings - voters appear to have seen through his populist, almost comical bravado in favor of more serious pro-EU politicians.
Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna Party is also polling poorly still with just 5.7 percent, just over the 5 percent threshold required to get into parliament, but well below the party's score in the 2010 parliamentary election. After Tymoshenko's poor showing also in presidential elections earlier this year, many will also see this as marking the final demise as Tymoshenko as a major political player in Ukraine. Tymoshenko has offered her support to a pro-EU ruling coalition but Poroshenko might still be nervous of drawing Tymoshenko into any ruling coalition block given his own somewhat tortuous relations with Tymoshenko from his time in the Yushchenko administration.
Interestingly, as of writing, the nationalist Svoboda Party was polling just below the 5 percent threshold required to get into parliament, at just 4.69 percent. Also note that the far right, Right Sector party is unlikely to get into parliament with a poll score thus far of just 1.87 percent. These elections thus further underscore the relatively weak polling base for more extreme nationalists in Ukraine - despite the fears expressed over such forces in Ukraine in Russia and various international media outlets.
Also notable, is the further demise of support for the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is polling at just 3.93%, and is unlikely to get into parliament - the first time the party has been not represented in the Rada since independence, and indeed before during Soviet times. The party seems now to be paying the price for its close association with Yanukovych, and support for Russia's cause in Ukraine.
Another "loser" in these elections was Anatoli Hrytsenko, the pro-EU/NATO former defense minister, whose Civil Position party is again polling below the 5 percent threshold at 3.19 percent.
Reviewing the above results, the elections were a victory for those supporting Ukraine's Westernising agenda, as just short of 80% of those voting backed parties in favour of the new EU orientation and away from Russia. Only 20% or so of voters backed the maintenance of a more neutral line, less antagonistic towards Russia - note that even the Opposition Party does not support separatism in Donbas, or the annexation of Crimea by Russia.
Admittedly, turnout in the parliamentary elections was relatively low, at just over 52 percent, down from just over 60 percent in the presidential elections in May. That said voting was obviously made difficult by the continued conflict in the Donbas, the annexation of Crimea, and the fact that as many as 800,000 people have been displaced either within Ukraine or across its borders - perhaps as many as 10 percent of the former electorate of Ukraine were simply unable to vote in these elections by the new administration in Crimea, the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.
Boyko from the Opposition Party has claimed that these elections were the dirtiest ever in Ukraine's post independence history - the OSCE will give its verdict therein later today. Some will argue also that the low turnout is a reflection of the disillusion with the government in Kyiv felt by many former Regions ' supporters, who simply failed to vote - albeit they did have a choice of party in both Boyko's Opposition Party and the party of Tigipko.
These elections show that from the party lists, close to 90% of seats will be allocated to pro-EU parties, so perhaps around 190 seats. In addition, Ukraine runs a constituency-based system which is more difficult to call.
Typically this system benefits business interests, closer to the former ruling Regions Party, but the party's results still suggest a strong showing by the main pro-EU reform parties, and likely sufficient for these parties to secure a two thirds constitutional majority in parliament, I.e. 300 seats.
This could be significant for pushing through key reform legislation, but also perhaps bills lifting Ukraine's non-aligned status and even in support of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine, and perhaps antagonistic towards Russia. This large constitutional majority hence could be very positive for the domestic reform agenda, but will need to be managed carefully by the president's party in parliament if it is not to prove confrontational towards Moscow.
These results are not particularly positive for Moscow, given the poor showing by parties representing the former Regions party, and also strong showing by the Popular Front and Samopomich, both less willing to compromise with Moscow - indeed perhaps a majority of deputies in the new Rada will be much less inclined to appease Moscow. Controlling this anti-Moscow vent in the new Rada could prove challenging, as noted above. Arguably, Moscow would have preferred a stronger showing by the party of Poroshenko, seeing this as enhancing the incumbent president's ability to offer concessions to Moscow.
In terms of technicalities, the Central Electoral Commission has indicated that the final election results will be posted on Nov 10, while members of the current ruling coalition have indicated that they aim to put together a new coalition agreement within 10 days. They have also suggested that they will try and make this as inclusive as possible in terms of pro-EU parties and aiming to secure a constitutional majority in parliament. The speed of formation of the new coalition government is important, as the first task for the new government will be completing the next reviews under the IMF SBA, and securing the release of the next two credit tranches before year end, and seen as critical to ensuring the continued stability of the UAH, the banking sector and the wider economy.
How will Russia react to all this? Moscow has been eerily quiet in reaction to these elections, noting only that election took place, and were not conducted in a very fair manner, but not really accepting yet of the results. Note that the Ukrainian military is reporting several troops killed in Donbas overnight, and yet another offensive by separatists to take control of Donetsk airport, which is hardly re-assuring.
Meanwhile, this week (Oct. 29), sees another attempt to broker an agreement over winter gas supplies for Ukraine, with Naftogas and Gazprom due to meet. Perhaps this will be a key test of the post-election state of relations between Russia and Ukraine. Public statements have been encouraging, but privately the tone is much less optimistic, with neither side seemingly that willing to cut a deal over gas, and significant hurdles still remaining.
