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Last Updated: Jan 13, 2009 - 11:29:27 AM |
Since this New Year's drama has been going on since 2006, it is no
surprise that the Kremlin has learned a thing or two about how to
handle the PR effort to sell the Russian story to the international
audience.
During the gas crisis of 2006, Moscow moved very slowly to provide
information and its own interpretation of events, as Ukraine started to
siphon off European gas after failing to agree to a new gas delivery
contract. It took days and even weeks to get Moscow's story out that
putting an end to unjustified energy subsidies to Ukraine was the right
thing to do as a matter of international trade. It was even a Russian
commitment to the European Union as part of the WTO membership
negotiations. It also sent a clear signal that Moscow was treating Kiev
as a truly sovereign and independent nation.
In 2006, Russia failed to warn Europe properly of the looming clash
with Ukraine over gas prices, so it came as a shock to the unsuspecting
Europeans when the spigot was turned off. As a result, the Kremlin was
instantly accused of "using the energy weapon." Information about the
Russian position subsequently emerged in bits and pieces, message
coordination was poor, initiative was lost and media outreach was
dismal, with the highest Russian representative being Gazprom CEO
Alexei Miller (not a very effective public communicator) because the
government was largely on vacation. In short, Moscow looked confused,
defensive, inconsistent and inept.
No longer. The Kremlin and Gazprom have learned the importance and
tricks of savvy PR. The difference with 2006 could not be starker. This
time around, Moscow began the information offensive well in advance,
way before it became clear that it was again on a collision course with
Kiev over gas prices.
In November, Moscow launched a well-orchestrated campaign to inform
Europe about a possible collapse of gas talks with Ukraine. Gazprom and
the Russian government provided daily updates of information on the
status of talks over debt repayment, making it clear how this might
affect the future of gas deliveries to and through Ukraine.
By December, when it became clear that Ukraine was likely to provoke a
crisis by disrupting supplies to Europe, top Gazprom officials,
including Miller, went on an offensive in Western media. Gazprom deputy
head Alexander Medvedev, one of the country's best communicators, was
dispatched to tour European capitals to deliver Gazprom and the
Kremlin's side of the story.
Gazprom acted preemptively by inviting Britain-based SGS, a leading
energy auditing company, to its gas pumping installations at the points
of entry and exit from Ukraine, providing early documented proof of
Ukraine's wrongdoing. Gazprom also wasted no time in filing a legal
complaint with the Stockholm Arbitration Court against Ukraine's
Naftogaz for breach of the gas transit contract.
During this year's crisis, message coordination was good. It was clear
that all Russian spokespeople on the issue were reading from the same
script. Emphasis on the commercial nature of the dispute was timely
shifted to Ukraine's breach of contractual obligations as a transit
country, including under the Protocol of the European Energy Charter to
ensure uninterrupted Russian gas deliveries to Europe under any
circumstances. Discussion of the need for alternative energy routes
bypassing Ukraine, like the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, has
been reinvigorated as more prominent European politicians endorsed the
proposals.
It was also a big diplomatic coup for Russia to drag the EU into direct
mediation and monitoring of Ukraine's fulfillment of its transit
obligations. This immediately made Ukraine look like the chief culprit
and forced Kiev to come up with bizarre explanations that only
reinforced the sense of Ukraine's culpability.
Media outreach efforts by Gazprom and the Russian government were
preemptive and proactive. Information was provided in a continuous
stream with copies of crucial documents -- like the gas transit
contract or abstracts from Gazprom's official correspondence with
Naftogaz -- readily available to Western media. Media venues with key
Gazprom and Russian government officials were arranged quickly,
culminating in a fantastic performance delivered by Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin at his meeting with European reporters late last week.
Indeed, this time around, Putin himself became the principal spokesman
for the crisis. This had the immediate effect of drawing media
attention to Russia's side of the story. There are few politicians in
the world who could rival Putin for the command of the detail and the
ability to put complex issues in the plain language of sound bites.
President Dmitry Medvedev played the appropriate backstage role of
someone who ultimately looks after the country's vital interests while
delegating authority for hands-on crisis management.
The investment in sophisticated PR capabilities paid off. During
"Ukrainian Gas Crisis -- 2009," few Western newspapers and television
programs described Russia as a bully wielding its "energy weapon" and
trying to bring down a burgeoning Ukrainian democracy. There are,
however, many more stories decrying Ukrainian chutzpah and accusing
Ukrainian leaders of exploiting European energy vulnerabilities for
settling their own political scores.
It looks like Russia won this one for sure.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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