But so far, even where Sarkozy has successfully implemented his program, the results have been far less dramatic than expected.  His tax-break for workers who put in overtime, for instance, has had relatively minor impact on earnings, while adding yet more red tape for employers.  The final terms for rolling back retirement benefits for the so-called "special regimes" (heavy laborers who currently qualify for a full pension after fewer years of active contribution) have yet to be announced; but they are expected to result in largely symbolic cost reductions.

In fact, despite Sarkozy's energetic first year in office, very little seems to have actually changed for the average worker and consumer, other than the skyrocketing cost of gas and basic commodities.  While Sarkozy is not responsible for either, the resulting disappointment has proven politically costly, and has been exacerbated by the fact that, so far, some of the biggest ruptures delivered by President Sarkozy have been with the promises made by Candidate Sarkozy.  A promise to replace the country's numerous employment contracts with a simplified and unique one was abandoned.  Others, including a professional reinsertion stipend that would have ensured that salary for an unemployed worker returning to work would be higher than the unemployment benefits it replaced, have been delayed or watered down.

Sarkozy's memory has also proven to be selective when it comes to his foreign policy.  Vocally opposed throughout the campaign to Turkey's adhesion to the EU, his first European initiative upon taking office was to greenlight ongoing negotiations with Ankara in return for quick passage of his prized "EU mini-treaty," the yet-to-be-ratified Treaty of Lisbon.  Having promised to withdraw French forces from Afghanistan, Sarkozy instead agreed last month to deploy 700 additional troops, in the face of overwhelmingly opposed public opinion.  And while Candidate Sarkozy declared that the promotion of human rights would assume a central role in French foreign policy, that hasn't kept President Sarkozy from pursuing France's commercial and strategic interests with Libya, Russia, and China, to name just a few.

At times, too, the promises Sarkozy has kept have proven more damaging than the ones he has broken. His first legislative success was a tax reform bill that capped rates at 50 percent, raised the per person tax-deductible inheritance from €50,000 to €150,000, and allowed those subject to France's "wealth tax" to deduct up to €50,000 by investing in a small or medium-sized business.  The measures, while far from shocking to an American sensibility, were widely criticized in France as a post-election handout to Sarkozy's wealthy entourage.

Likewise his immigration policy, which at the time of the presidential campaign was largely seen as a ploy to woo the National Front electorate of far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen.  But Sarkozy has pursued it with determination, implementing a voluntary recourse to DNA testing for immigrants who claim family unification status, as well as a yearly quota for deporting illegal immigrants. The measures offended deep-seated sensitivities anchored in the historic legacy of WWII, sparking popular outrage and galvanizing flagging political opposition.

As much as the content of his legislative record, though, it is increasingly Sarkozy's style that has put him in the crosshairs of public opinion and the media.  Quickly dubbed the "hyper-president" by the French press, for the first 10 months of his term Sarkozy was rarely, if ever, out of the spotlight.  The "presidentialization" of the government was significant, since historically the French president has primarily functioned as a head of state, rather than a head of government.  Apart from foreign policy, which he has traditionally overseen very closely, the president has generally identified the broad lines of domestic policy and left it to his prime minister to implement them. 

The arrangement served to preserve the president's dignity from the political rough and tumble of governing, as well as to provide a convenient head to roll in the event of a setback.  By contrast, Sarkozy is known for being intimately involved in preparing legislation, at times bringing in the ministers concerned at a late stage of negotiations.

In addition to his governing style, Sarkozy's personal style has also caused him problems.  From the night of his election -- when he stopped on his way to deliver his victory speech to dine at a ritzy restaurant with a collection of bankers, industrial magnates and popular celebrities -- Sarkozy has worn the presidency as if it were a gaudy piece of jewellery to flaunt.  Indeed, his taste for Rolex watches and mirrored Rayban sunglasses recently won him the nickname of the "bling bling president."  His unpopular tax package was introduced in the aftermath of a widely criticized post-election vacation on the yacht of a wealthy tycoon friend.  His summer vacation in Maine was spent at the home of yet another.

Perhaps most unusual for France, though, where politicians' private lives were historically considered off-limits, Sarkozy's romantic life has been the subject of a media feeding frenzy, beginning on election day, when his then-wife, Cécilia, was notably absent when it came time to actually vote, and visibly pale and tense at his side when he greeted his followers later that night.  Their subsequent divorce, and Sarkozy's remarriage to ex-model Carla Bruni, has fuelled not only the gossip columns, but the mainstream political press for months.

Of course, there's no small amount of hypocrisy in the media subsequently taking him to task for his exhibitionism.  But under Sarkozy, the presidency has at times seemed more like a reality TV show -- unscripted, unrehearsed, and unedited -- than the incarnation of the French nation, as the oath of office puts it.  The result has been a bulimic backlash against what many have come to regard as too much presidential presence and not enough presidential stature.  From his agitated mannerisms, to his inelegant use of the French language, Sarkozy has been accused of vulgarizing the office of the president.

The charge, while not untrue, says as much about France as it does about Sarkozy.  "L'exception française" is an essential part of French cultural identity.  From its non-aligned posture within the Cold War alliance, to its rearguard resistance to globalization and market liberalization, France has consistently defined itself as apart of -- rather than a part of -- the West.  Sarkozy's program, from re-integrating into the NATO command structure to liberalizing the economy, represents the implicit suggestion that France become a country like the others.  And while Sarkozy might not incarnate the France of De Gaulle, Mitterand, or even Chirac, the argument can be made that he does reflect the France of Sarkozy, for which reality TV is no longer the cause for philosophical treatises but an accepted part of popular culture.  So the revulsion that he now provokes might very well be the shock of recognition.  Either way, the rupture that Candidate Sarkozy announced to such advantage has proven both more difficult and more costly to achieve in the hands of Sarkozy, President.