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Analyses Last Updated: Dec 3, 2016 - 9:26:11 AM


Sechins Acceleration
By Vladimir Pastukhov, , IMR 3/12/16
Dec 3, 2016 - 9:24:49 AM

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  • The fight for control of Bashneft and the battle between rival clans of siloviki is the prevailing explanation for the recent arrest of Aleksey Ulyukaev, but the author suggests a much deeper political motivation.
  • Pastukhov explains that there are essentially two common answers to the question, “What is going on?”: “stealing” and “fighting.” Both in a sense are correct, yet insufficient.
  • Pastukhov argues that this struggle is political: it is not so much for the redistribution of resources as it is an early sign of the reconfiguration of the system. And it seems that Rosneft’s CEO Igor Sechin is beginning to form his own election campaign. However, Sechin may not have yet realized all the risks: his brawl with the Kremlin clans could easily turn into a hollow victory.
  • Sechin effectively opened up a new era in the relationship between government and the press when he successfully unleashed a wave of attacks and lawsuits against Vedomosti and Novaya Gazeta, subsequently forcing the papers to retract articles on elements of Sechin’s concealed wealth.
  • Sechin has in this sense gone further than Putin in actively censoring the Russian press. Paradoxically, notes Pastukhov, you can now write more freely about Putin than you can about Sechin.
  • On the other side of the conflict stands Dmitri Medvedev. Having minimal influence on the security services and by extension on current politics, he occupies the more favorable position, thus becoming Sechin’s antipode and number one opponent.
  • Although the prevailing impression is that Putin stands behind the arrest of Ulyukaev, Kremlin officials understand that it is Sechin’s game and that he is able to influence the president’s opinion, edging over all other aspects of the presidential administration.
  • Pastukhov observes that Sechin instills in others more fear than Putin, and fear is the most effective resource in Russian politics, ultimately exercised by only one person.
  • Sechin can break the conventions and smash the rules of Putin’s “political etiquette,” nudging the president toward decisions he is not ready to make.
  • Putin is currently playing a complex game, and an important condition for success in this game is maintaining political balance. Excited by his early success, Sechin risks provoking a reaction from Putin or many of his own opponents.
  • Pastukhov concludes that Sechin’s acceleration could turn out to be a false start. Ulyukaev is not the only high-ranking Russian official to be the target of surveillance, and the FSB has many other subdivisions that are not influenced by Sechin.

Ускорение Сечина. Возглавил ли он пелотон или бежит впереди паровоза? Владимир Пастухов, 24 ноября 2016 г.


Source:Ocnus.net 2016

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