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Last Updated: Jun 28, 2009 - 7:53:46 AM |
In the past month, a quick succession of events has occurred that could
significantly change the U.S. relationship with countries in the Middle
East. Notable speeches by U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and important elections in Lebanon and Iran
all occurred within a span of weeks. To a certain extent, the timing is
coincidental, and the events largely unrelated. But they are connected,
and he connection could have meaningful long-term consequences in the
region.
During his election campaign, Barack Obama pledged to deliver a major
speech on U.S. relations with the Islamic world from the capital of a
Muslim country within the first 100 days of his administration.
Although Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo missed his 100-day target (his
April address to the Turkish parliament in Ankara apparently didn't
count), it did not underwhelm in scope or ambition. Seeking a “new
beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one
based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” Obama stressed points of
common interest between the United States and Islam. Although he
reiterated his intention to pursue “violent extremism” and his view
that the danger posed by al Qaeda is not an “opinion to be debated [but
a] fact to be dealt with,” Obama also emphasized that the United States
did not seek permanent military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. He
stressed the commonalty of themes such as democracy, women's rights,
and economic development, and he sprinkled his speech with references
to the Koran. The White House promoted the speech heavily and went to
great lengths to ensure its translation and dissemination in languages
and technologies widely used in the Muslim world. Reaction to Obama's
speech was generally positive, with the main caveat that his
conciliatory words needed to be translated into real action.
Just a few days after Obama's speech, on June 7, Lebanon held widely
anticipated parliamentary elections. Long seen as a comparatively
sophisticated and diverse corner of the Middle East, Lebanon has been
wracked intermittently by civil war and outside intervention since the
1980s. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005
led to a popular uprising that drove occupying Syrian forces from the
country. In 2006, Israel waged a war against Hezbollah, a militant and
political organization based in Lebanon that is popular among the
country's Shia population and that receives significant support from
Iran. Last year, a power-sharing crisis boiled over into open conflict
between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. The June 7 election was
seen not only as an important opportunity for the Lebanese to cast
their votes, but also as a proxy in a wider contest of popular opinion
between Iran (which supported Hezbollah) and the United States (which
preferred a coalition led by Rafik Hariri's son, Saad). Hariri's
coalition won more seats than the Hezbollah-led coalition, representing
at the very least a perceived setback for Iranian and Sryian influence
in Lebanese politics.
Among the closest observers of Obama's speech in Cairo was Israel.
Concern about the steadfastness of Obama's support for Israel predates
even his election, and many Israelis wondered if Obama would sacrifice
U.S. support for Israel in his address to the Muslim world. Obama made
no such sacrifice, and he reiterated the United States' strong and
“unbreakable” bond with Israel. He did, however, express his opposition
to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. On June 14, Israel's newly
elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered his own notable
speech, in which he endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state. This
was the first public endorsement of its kind for Netanyahu, who had
developed a hawkish reputation during his previous stint as prime
minister and in his recent election campaign. Netanyahu's endorsement
was far from complete, however. It was conditional on the
demilitarization of the new Palestinian state and on the recognition of
Israel as a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital. These
conditions likely will not form the basis of an ultimate settlement.
But the statement represented a notable shift in tone, if not
necessarily in substance.
Potentially the most significant event in recent weeks is still
ongoing. On June 12, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new
president. In many ways, Iran lies at the heart of the U.S.
relationship with the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program is of
constant concern to the United States and its allies, and President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has spoken openly of his desire to destroy Israel.
Iran supports militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and it
exerts influence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also possesses significant
quantities of oil, and it borders the strategic Straits of Hormuz. Most
importantly, Iran has a long history of resentment toward the United
States. The 1979 Islamic revolution was partly fueled by anger at the
United States' long support of the Shah, and the revolution has served
as inspiration for militant Islamic movements around the world. On June
12, Ahmadinejad faced off against an array of opponents, the most
significant being Mir Hossein Mousavi, a conservative former prime
minister who experienced a tremendous surge of support among
reform-minded Iranians. The official tabulation showed Ahmadinejad
winning with 63 percent of the vote—a far more lop-sided outcome than
had been expected, and one that seemed rigged by the authorities. Since
then, Iran has experienced its largest wave of protests since 1979.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, has been resolute in
resisting calls for a new election and in upholding Ahmadinejad's
declared victory. The outcome of the election and the protests remains
uncertain, but one thing is clear: this episode has unequivocally
changed the nature of Iranian politics.
Individually, each of these events would have been significant and
noteworthy. And to a certain degree, their clustering within a few
weeks was the result of chance—the elections in Lebanon and Iran, in
particular, were not scheduled to coincide with each other. But the
scheduling of speeches is much more flexible than the scheduling of
elections. Netanyahu, for example, likely scheduled his speech to
follow Obama's. The prime minister had already received pressure from
Obama on the question of settlements in the West Bank. It was important
for him to address this pressure, and politically, it was useful for
him to present a conciliatory front, if only as a negotiating tactic or
to throw his rivals off-balance. Before he could do so, however,
Netanyahu needed to see what Obama would say in his much-anticipated
Cairo speech.
Indeed, it was Obama's speech in Cairo—the first in this sequence of
events—that was most amenable to strategic timing. Obama seems
well-aware of the symbolic value of his own election, not only in the
United States but around the world. In part, this value is due simply
to the fact that he is not George W. Bush. But it is also due to his
unique background, and to the role that his background can play in
challenging negative misconceptions of the United States. Obama's
campaign pledge to give a major address in a Muslim capital recognized
this. Any U.S. president can address a Muslim audience. But only Obama
could do so as a president with an international background, a
childhood spent in a majority-Muslim country, and a middle name like
“Hussein.” Obama likely knew the impact his speech could have in the
Middle East, and he surely knew when Lebanon and Iran were holding
their elections. Although the administration denies it, the timing of
Obama's speech on the eve of these elections may have been very
deliberate.
This doesn't mean that Obama's speech in Cairo was responsible for the
victory of Hariri's coalition in Lebanon, or for the upheaval and
uncertainty following Iran's election. But even if it had no direct
effect, Obama's speech may have indirectly helped to preclude a more
negative outcome, from the U.S. perspective. The Bush administration
was very unpopular in the Middle East, and although Obama's election
was a hopeful sign, there was little concrete evidence that his
approach would be much different. His speech in Cairo reiterated to
voters throughout the Middle East that his administration would a much
more willing partner with receptive regimes. In other words, the
promises made by reform-minded candidates in Lebanon and Iran would be
much more realistic and achievable with President Obama in office.
Elections and speeches, however, are only the first steps toward
successful policies. Until the situation in Iran stabilizes, it is far
too soon to judge Obama's timing.
Source:Ocnus.net 2009
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