“The Peace Corps Is a Potent Diplomatic Weapon”
No.
With diplomats stuck inside barricaded compounds or loath to venture from
expatriate residential ghettos, a Peace Corps volunteer is likely to be the
only representative of the U.S. government that poor, rural populations ever
see. As the State Department cuts back on its public diplomacy and cultural
exchange programs, the Peace Corps’ predominantly young volunteers wind up
carrying more and more of the responsibility for demonstrating that the
United States still has good intentions abroad.
That puts the Peace Corps and its volunteers in
an awkward position. The Peace Corps was created as a separate, independent
agency so that it would not be subject to short-term foreign-policy
objectives. Volunteers aren’t trained or expected to represent the U.S.
government, its positions, or its interests. When the Peace Corps is
characterized as an effective diplomatic weapon, it is thanks to the goodwill
that volunteers generate toward the American people, not toward official U.S.
policy.
Unfortunately, of the tens of millions of
people with whom Peace Corps volunteers have interacted during the last 47
years, many have no idea what the Peace Corps is. Few have any idea that the
Peace Corps is a U.S. government agency funded 100 percent by American
taxpayers. On the plus side, over my five years as a country director in
Cameroon, hundreds of villagers and officials told me how happy they were
simply to have volunteers in their communities. Less encouraging is that just
as often, I was told how fondly they remembered the Peace Corps volunteer
from Rome, Paris, or Tokyo. It’s tough to be an effective diplomatic weapon
and build goodwill among nations if people don’t understand what nation you
came from in the first place.
“The Peace Corps Recruits Only the Best and the Brightest”
Best and brightest?
As long as applicants meet the minimum
standards and are healthy and persistent, the Peace Corps rarely rejects them
outright.
False.
The Peace Corps learned how to recruit by emulating traditional fishermen in
developing countries—toss a large net and hope for the best. For decades,
this system has been notoriously ineffective, sending Spanish speakers to
Arabic-speaking North Africa and offering the rare, farm-raised,
French-speaking applicant a job teaching English in Mongolia.
The Peace Corps claims that about 1 in 3
applicants eventually becomes a volunteer, implying that the agency is about
as selective as many “elite” schools in the United States. Not long ago, the
figure commonly cited was 1 in 7. Either way, the truth is that so long as
applicants meet the minimum standards and are healthy and persistent, the
Peace Corps rarely rejects them outright. Each group sent overseas includes a
few highly motivated and capable individuals—and then there are the vast
majority who before joining the Peace Corps weren’t sure what to do with
their lives, were fresh out of school and seeking a government-subsidized
travel experience or something to bolster their résumé, or for whom the Peace
Corps represented a chance to escape a humdrum life or recent divorce.
Once overseas, the chances of being kicked out
are slim. I queried my fellow country directors in Africa to find out how
many trainees they had sent packing due to unacceptable performance. The
figure was less than 2 percent a year, meaning that once accepted, an
individual—qualified or not, motivated or not—is pretty much assured of
sticking around.
Unfortunately, the Peace Corps’ failure to
recruit the best isn’t limited to volunteers. Few agencies rival the Peace
Corps for the percentage of political appointees filling mission-critical
positions. Hardly the sexiest of sinecures, the Peace Corps’ 29 political
appointments tend to be lower-level politicians, third-tier party loyalists,
the relatives of elected officials, or minor political underlings who get
“parked” at the Peace Corps.
“The Peace Corps Sends Volunteers Where They Are Needed Most”
Rarely.
Like many bureaucracies, the Peace Corps operates predominantly on inertia.
The agency sends most volunteers to the same places where volunteers have
been sent before, often to do the same thing volunteers were doing 20 and 30
years ago—regardless of whether their mission still makes sense.
Reviewing the most recent U.N. Human
Development Report shows that the Peace Corps is active in 10 countries with
“high human development,” 49 with “medium human development,” and 11 with
“low human development.” With so few resources to achieve its goals, one
wonders why the Peace Corps hasn’t concentrated what little it has on the
world’s poorest countries, where the need is likely greatest. Granted, half a
dozen of those places are either so unstable or dangerous that there’s little
hope of achieving much. But even if the Peace Corps didn’t concentrate only
on the poorest of the poor, one has to question what it is still doing in
Romania and Bulgaria, two countries that have already become members of the
European Union.
One might also
ask why there is approximately one volunteer sent to Tonga for every 3,800
Tongans but only one sent to Tanzania for every 245,000 Tanzanians. Or what the
logic is of having one volunteer for every 2.5 million Mexicans when tens of
thousands of Americans live in Mexico, millions of Mexicans live in the United
States, and the two countries are among each others’ largest trading partners.
The reason, in many cases, is that someone simply decided on a number and no
one asked if it made much sense. Of course, closing a program in one country
and transferring its resources to another requires explanation and large
expenses, and is often resisted by the State Department and by zealous, vocal
former volunteers who hate to see programs in their countries shut down.
Some will argue
that wherever there are poor people the Peace Corps has a role. But with the
Peace Corps’ 8,000 volunteers spread out across more than 70 countries, giving
each one such a small presence guarantees that no one can say with any
authority if the agency is making a difference or not.
“The Peace Corps Is a Development Organization”
Says who?
Since its founding in 1961, the Peace
Corps has probably sent more development workers overseas, now upward of
190,000, than any other organization. But if the Peace Corps is a development
organization, then it’s a bit like the late, bug-eyed comedian Rodney
Dangerfield who, no matter what happened, claimed, “I don’t get no respect.”
Indeed, if the
Peace Corps were as successful at development as its literature and many
volunteers and staff members attest, one would expect other organizations and
scholars to cite it as a model. Yet pick up any of the recently popular books
on development by Paul Collier, William Easterly, or Jeffrey Sachs, and you
won’t find a single reference to the Peace Corps. Tony Blair’s 464-page
Commission for Africa report? Not a word. “Beyond Assistance,” the 215-page
report of the HELP Commission on foreign-assistance reform? Just three passing
mentions.
The reason the
Peace Corps is overlooked as a development organization has a lot to do with
the youth and inexperience of the majority of its volunteers. Equally important
is its unwillingness to decide if it is a development organization or an
organization with a mission “to promote world peace and friendship,” as
stipulated by Congress in the Peace Corps Act. It would like to be both, but
finds itself falling short on both objectives because it cannot decide which is
the more important.
Many Peace Corps
staff and volunteers see development work as a burdensome obligation undertaken
only to legitimize the cultural exchange aspects of the agency. But without a
focus on economic development and an improvement in standards of living, the
Peace Corps is really little more than an extended, government-sponsored
semester-abroad program. For applicants, the Peace Corps emphasizes the
personal experience, not the volunteer’s development impact. That, of course,
is not how the Peace Corps pitches itself to foreign governments, to whom it
promises significant technical development assistance—only to provide
predominantly recent college graduates who may or may not have any useful
skills to offer.
The real problem
is that the Peace Corps has never done a serious job of evaluating its impact.
If it is a world peace and friendship organization designed to “help promote a
better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served,” then, as
a start, it ought to ask the peoples served if they even know which country
Peace Corps volunteers come from. If it’s a development agency, then it needs
to undertake rigorous measures to assess its impact. Currently, it does neither
but rather relies on biannual surveys in which volunteers comment on whether
they think they are making a difference. It’s a bit like asking a bunch of
doctors how they think they are doing without ever talking to the patients—or
even checking to see if they are still alive.
“Locals Love Peace Corps Volunteers”
Not always.
People everywhere almost always get a kick
out of hearing a foreigner speaking—or trying to speak—their language. In small
villages around the world, a foreigner who can use local parables correctly or
dance the sacred traditional dance, or who appears content to sit around the
village circle for hours on end, is a curiosity, an amusement. Lifelong
attachments can and do grow. In Cameroon, dozens, if not hundreds of times, I
was asked what had become of so and so, a volunteer who had served 30 or even
40 years earlier. I loved that many people had such fond memories of volunteers.
For better or worse, people often loved “their” volunteers as much for the
volunteer’s willingness to buy rounds of drinks as for any concrete thing he or
she might have achieved.
But just as
often, people were disturbed by volunteers who had set terrible examples by
abusing drugs or alcohol or violating cultural sensitivities and professional
norms. The Peace Corps strives to represent the diversity of the American
population, but in casting its net wide, it scoops up many who represent less than
the best American traditions of dedication, persistence, creativity, optimism,
and honesty. Like any large organization, the Peace Corps has its share of
deadbeats, philanderers, parasites, gamblers, and alcoholics. The problem is
that the agency sends these people tens of thousands of miles from home and
expects them to work responsibly with minimal supervision. Disasters logically
result.
The Peace Corps
is remarkably effective at cleaning up the messes those volunteers make and
getting them back to the United States before local authorities step in. What’s
less clear is the Peace Corps’ overall impact on people’s impressions and
understandings of the United States. Does the goodwill generated by the small
minority of great volunteers outweigh the indifference or outright hostility
caused by the mediocre or truly sinister ones? The agency doesn’t know, because
it doesn’t ask.
“The Peace Corps Has a Strategy”
Nope.
The Peace Corps has plans, not a strategy.
A strategy implies a conclusion, a final goal. The Peace Corps has none. In
Washington, plans are already underway to celebrate the agency’s 50th
anniversary in 2011. Celebrating half a century of existence ought to be a
dubious benchmark for any development organization, particularly one that
actively encourages its volunteers to “work themselves out of a job,” yet has
no plans for doing so itself in any of the more than 70 countries where it is
currently active.
The Peace Corps
is unable to do this because it never has had any benchmarks to signal when the
mission has been accomplished. In Cameroon, volunteers are still teaching math
and science, the job they originally came to do in 1962. This was a situation I
tried but failed to change because the placing of volunteers in the field was
more important to the Peace Corps than questioning whether the Cameroonian
government had failed to do its job by not training and hiring adequate numbers
of local teachers over a period of more than four decades. In any case, doing
the same thing for 46 years ought to indicate that something is broken,
something the Peace Corps is unlikely to fix. A serious development
organization would either not allow such a situation to persist or would refuse
to abet it.
“The Peace Corps Is One of the Greatest Things America Has Ever
Done”
Dream on.
Today, the Peace Corps remains a Peter Pan
organization, afraid to grow up, yet also afraid to question the thinking of
its founding fathers. The rush to fulfill John F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign
pledge was such that the Peace Corps never learned to crawl, let alone walk,
before it set off at a sprinter’s pace. The result is a schizophrenic entity,
unsure if it is a development organization, a cheerleader for international
goodwill, or a government-sponsored cross-cultural exchange program. In any
case, the Peace Corps tries to do too many things in too many places with too
few people to really get much of anything done at all.
Despite these
inherent faults, the Peace Corps is probably one of the least-expensive development
agencies ever created. Supporting a volunteer in the field costs just $41,000 a
year, including overhead. That’s about $12,000 less than a year’s worth of
tuition, room, and board at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service
and a small fraction of the cost of supporting a single American diplomat or
USAID worker in a developing country. The agency has long prided itself on
doing more with a dollar than most other development outfits. Peace Corps Press
Director Amanda Beck estimates that the agency’s direct expenditures per
volunteer are actually only $3,000 a year. But if that is the case, one then
has to wonder what the Peace Corps is doing with the other $38,000 it spends
per year for each volunteer. However you count it, the agency’s relative
leanness says more about the lack of significant results in the development
business than it does about the Peace Corps’ cost effectiveness.
Based
predominantly on the life-changing experiences volunteers had while serving,
the Peace Corps continues to generate strong support from the American people.
But for the agency to approach its potential, deep, substantive changes must be
made.
Sargent Shriver,
the agency’s first director, recognized that a “Peace Corps, small and
symbolic, might be good public relations, but a Peace Corps that was large and
had a major impact on problems in other countries could transform the economic
development of the world,” according to former Pennsylvania Sen. Harris
Wofford. Because the Peace Corps has tried to be all things to all comers, that
grand vision has never been realized or even approached. To become effective
and relevant, the Peace Corps must now give up on the myth that its creation
was the result of an immaculate conception that can never be questioned or
altered. It must go out and recruit the best of the best. It must avoid
goodwill-generating window dressing and concentrate its resources in a limited
number of countries that are truly interested in the development of their
people. And it must give up on the risible excuse that in the absence of
quantifiable results, good intentions are enough. Only then will it be able to
achieve its original objective of significantly altering the lives of millions
for the better.