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Last Updated: Jul 5, 2009 - 8:16:11 AM |
THE last time Barack Obama was in Russia, he and Senator Dick Lugar
were detained by border guards for several hours at an airport in the
Urals, where they were looking at how American funds were helping to
get rid of stocks of dangerous Soviet-era weapons. America’s president
has every reason to hope things will go better this time, but that is
not setting a very high hurdle for success. Of all the great power
relationships Mr Obama inherited from George Bush, Russia is the most
awkward—awkward not only because it has been getting ever harder to
deal with but also because it cannot be ignored.
Over the past ten years, under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia has
become more nationalistic, corrupt and corporatist. Its economy,
although much bigger than a decade ago, is even more dependent on oil
and gas, an industry now controlled by a small group of kleptocratic
courtiers and former spies. The decision by Ikea, a well-known Swedish
furniture supplier once bullish about Russia, to suspend investment
because of graft is an indictment of the dire commercial climate Its
non-energy exports are smaller than Sweden’s.
Russia’s population is shrinking alarmingly, its death rate double that
in most developed countries. Conflicts in its north Caucasus republics
have flared again. Its armed forces are woefully ill-equipped and
poorly trained. Mr Putin has kept control by unleashing a virulent
brand of anti-Western “patriotism”—the latest textbooks are as tough on
America as they are soft on Stalin—and thuggishly silencing the
opposition. Last year in a pretence of democracy Mr Putin installed
Dmitry Medvedev (Mr Obama’s supposed host) as president while he
himself became prime minister.
In the long term Mr Putin’s refusal to modernise his country will
weaken Russia. Yet the place Mr Obama has to deal with now is still a
potent force. The largest country on earth, Russia stretches from
Europe to China. It is the world’s biggest producer of oil and gas. It
has a seat on the UN Security Council and of course that nuclear
arsenal. Above all it has the capacity to do both great harm and some
good.
Vlad the invader
Recently, the harm has been more noticeable. Last year’s invasion of
Georgia, followed by Russia’s decision to recognise South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, was the clearest sign that Mr Putin has given up any hope of
joining the West. Since then he has slammed the door on the World Trade
Organisation, opting instead for a no-doubt-mighty customs union with
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia has long criticised the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe for daring to highlight election
malpractice. Now Mr Medvedev is promoting a European security structure
that would in effect give Russia a veto over any expansion of NATO.
Countries such as Ukraine, in what Russia regards as its sphere of
influence, are nervous. At the UN Russia has dragged its feet on
sanctions against Iran and autocrats pretty much everywhere.
And yet Iran is also one of many examples of how Russian and American
interests should coincide. Neither Mr Obama nor Mr Putin wants to see
Iran emerge as a nuclear power, setting off a destabilising arms race
in the Middle East. Both also want a stable Afghanistan, with al-Qaeda
pushed out of sanctuaries there and in Pakistan: Russia has been a
useful conduit for Western supplies and troops. Both have worked to
safeguard nuclear and other weapons materials in the old Soviet Union
and are co-operating usefully in other countries.
On not being a pushover
Mr Bush’s policy towards Russia was both confused and confusing. One
moment he was looking into Mr Putin’s eyes and finding a man he could
trust; the next he was preaching democracy while failing to lift
cold-war economic restrictions. Mostly, though, he was not very
interested in Russia—and it showed. Russia, self-esteem wounded,
claimed that America was promoting democracy to further its
geopolitical interests.
Mr Obama’s combination of calmness and humility could well help America
deal with a country whose national pride is dangerously spiked with a
sense of inferiority. But there are plenty of pitfalls ahead.
America’s president needs to resist the temptation to play on supposed
differences between Mr Putin and the more “liberal” Mr Medvedev. These
are more notional than real, as the farcical second show trial of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former oil boss and a Putin rival, which is
taking place on Mr Medvedev’s watch, demonstrates.
Meanwhile, humility about some of America’s past mistakes should not
leave Russia’s leaders with the impression that Mr Obama will be a
pushover. Robustness is necessary because of the widening gap between
the interests of the Russian people and those of its ruling elite (the
people who stoke anti-Americanism even as they send their offspring to
Western universities and buy up holiday homes in France). With the
economy declining and social discontent rising, a stand-off with the
West might be tempting for Mr Putin’s cabal—but ruinous for most
Russians. It was not America’s fault that Russia failed to develop an
independent judiciary, opting for corruption as the organising
principle of its political system. Nor is it America’s fault that
Russia wasted the years of high oil prices.
Most of all, Mr Obama needs to be firm over Russia’s ambitions to
dominate the countries along its western and southern borders. Mr
Bush’s attempt to hurry Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, ready or not
(they weren’t, and won’t be for a long time) was a mistake. But both
countries, like all others in Europe, have the right to choose their
own friends. Mr Obama must make clear that he will not cut them adrift
and will not tolerate attempts to destabilise their governments.
Europeans could help too by diversifying their oil and gas supplies so
that Russia is not tempted to turn off their taps either (see article).
Ironically, given Mr Obama’s difficulties in the Urals, the easiest
place to start may be arms control. There is room to reduce further
both sides’ warheads; it is also a subject that flatters Russia. But
this is going to be an awkward relationship, one where the West’s
expectations of success should be low.
Source:Ocnus.net 2009
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