
|
 |
|
Last Updated: Sep 8, 2008 - 8:58:07 AM |
As neo-fundamentalism makes further inroads into every aspect of Iran's
political and cultural life, Mahmood Ahmadinejad stands out as
practically the only viable candidate for next year's pivotal
presidential election.
On 24 August, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made a startling
comment about Ahmadinejad's government that shocked many observers. In
a private audience given to the president and members of his cabinet,
Ayatollah Khamenei told them he supported their work: "In this final
year, work with ?the energy of the first year. Do not think that this
year is the administration's final year; no. ?Work like a person who is
planning to work for another five years […]."
The comment was extraordinary because not only did it reveal the
Supreme Leader's true feelings on the matter, but also because it
showed a partisan engagement in Iran's factional politics, which
Ayatollah Khamenei so far has tried to avoid.
Aware of the questionable nature of the comment, Ayatollah Khamenei's
office issued a doctored version of the speech to the media the
following day, editing out the controversial section mentioned above,
with the media dutifully following orders.
"Ayatollah Khamenei has every reason to be pleased with this
administration," an Iranian journalist told ISN Security Watch on
condition of anonymity. "He has reversed many of the political and
cultural changes made under [former President Mohammad] Khatami;
re-introduced militancy in Iranian politics; stifled internal dissent;
and has, perhaps unwittingly, made substantial gains in Iran's foreign
policy sphere," he said. "Certainly, these should suffice for Mr
Khamenei to overlook his [Ahmadinejad's] personal flaws." The rival
candidates
Aside from Ahmadinejad, there are three other potential conservative
contenders who could make a bid for the presidency in 2009. These are
former parliamentary speaker Gholamreza Hadad-Adel present
Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher
Ghaliba. (There would surely be others, but only these candidates could
present any serious challenge to Ahmadinejad.)
Of these, Hadad-Adel was forced out of the position of parliamentary
speaker in a rather humiliating manner several months ago. During his
tenure, he proved to be an exceedingly ineffectual speaker, and his
claim to political fame is largely due to the fact that his daughter is
married to one of Khamenei's sons - not a very convincing vote winner.
The second, Larijani, has a much better chance. As Iran's former top
official on the nuclear case, he proved an adept diplomat and
negotiator, scoring major points in his dealings with European
diplomats last year. He also has familial and political ties with
Iran's influential clerics.
But it would be highly irregular for the head of one branch of the
government (i.e. the legislature) to resign from his job to take charge
of another branch. It is also believed that the support Larijani
received from the Ahmadinejad faction for his speakership in February
was made with the tacit understanding that he would not make a bid for
the presidency. In 2005, Larijani garnered only 2 million votes as
opposed to Ahmadinejad's whopping 17 millions.
The last serious contender, Ghalibaf, is presently the most serious
threat to Ahmadinejad. As mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf has done a
relatively decent job in the areas of municipal governing and law and
order, and according to a City Council consultant who spoke to ISN
Security Watch on condition on anonymity, he has earmarked large sums
of money for completing several municipal mega-projects in the next few
months. (This is no doubt with an eye to the election.) He also has
solid conservative credentials as a top former Revolutionary Guards
commander, which can only help in his electoral bid.
On the negative side, Ghalibaf has some major shortcomings as far as
conservative voters are concerned. First, he is "too modern" - meaning
that both in his demeanor and his policies, he is not sufficiently
fundamentalist. For instance, he regularly meets with reformist
politicians and has taken a number of liberal (in the Iranian context)
positions on some social issues.
To his detriment, he is also known mostly in Tehran. In the provinces
and smaller cities, which account for over half of the votes, people
know very little about him. Finally, he cannot galvanize the militants
and young Basij Militia members the way Ahmadinejad can - a serious
liability. Bumpy road ahead
None of these necessarily mean that the next few months will be smooth
sailing for Ahmadinejad. There are still a few factors that could wreck
his plans for a re-election, though few observers expect him to lose.
The first factor is Khatami. The former reformist president has been
urged by some of his supporters to make another run for presidency.
Though, as of now, he is understandably very reluctant to do so, that
could easily change. But the fact is that even if he does decide to
run, there is simply no guarantee that the "silent majority" would vote
for him again. In the last few years, most of Khatami's supporters seem
to have concluded that holding office in Iran does not provide one with
enough power to change the system in any measurable way.
In the last parliamentary election, Tehran voters, easily the most
liberal in the country, for the most part boycotted the poll. The
result was that conservative candidates won with the backing of a mere
13 percent of the electorate.
"If Khatami runs and most voters boycott the vote again, that would
finish him as a major political figure in Iran," said the journalist.
Perhaps for that reason Khatami may decide not to run. "However, in the
last 30 years, Iranians […] have proved to be quite unpredictable in
their political behavior. They may still surprise the conservatives,"
he said.
Ten years ago, an unexpected landslide vote for Khatami completely
changed the political landscape and nearly cost the conservatives their
power. For that reason, there has been a concerted campaign in recent
weeks to dissuade Khatami from running. Scores of hard-line MPs have
petitioned the Judiciary to prosecute the former president for an
interview he gave in which he had sharply questioned certain aspects of
Iran's foreign policy. Other groups are urging the Guardian Council to
disqualify him from the race.
The economy is another parameter that could undo Ahmadinejad.
Since he took office, inflation has officially gone up to more than 29
percent. The actual figure is probably much higher. This was a direct
result of massive politically motivated government spending - thanks to
the huge oil income windfall - and low interest rates. These policies -
such as interest-free loans to newlyweds or cheap credit to small
enterprises - which were directed at solving unemployment woes and
securing the lower class support, have had mixed results.
While lacking any discernible re-distributive effects, they have
convinced some voters of the government's sincerity. However, that has
been offset partly by the rampant inflation; as such, it remains
unclear how many of the 10 million social-justice-minded people who
voted for Ahmadinejad in 2005 may do so again.
To minimize risk, according to the well-connected Alefnews website, the
government plans to expend large sums of money in the coming few months
in Keynesian-type projects in the provinces where most of its support
is located.
The government's mismanagement of the economy is also legendary. Two
years ago, Ahmadinejad disbanded the 60-year-old National Management
and Planning Agency and handed over its functions to the governorates.
His economic policy is ad hoc and mostly predicated on immediate
results with no regard to the long-term planning.
This has given an opening to Ahmadinejad's old nemesis, former
president Aliakbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose position in the hierarchy
has been considerably bolstered since his election to the chairmanship
of the powerful Assembly of Experts last year.
Right before the Supreme Leader made his ringing endorsement of the
government last month, Rafsanjani had stated that the time for
attacking the government's economic policy had arrived. The Expediency
Council, which Rafsanjani also chairs and is currently filled with
anti-Ahmadinejad personalities, declared recently that it planned to
use its oversight over strategic economic policymaking to take the
government policy to task if and when it strayed from prescribed
policy. A number of task forces were set up to look into the matter
with one proposing a "National Development Fund" to replace the
Currency Reserve Funds, which is where much of the oil income is
deposited and which has been the government's veritable piggy bank.
For now, the institutional opposition has been subdued. The day after
the Supreme Leader's speech, Rafsanjani was forced to say that "we
should all support this government." But this is temporary. The
international factor
Theoretically, a worsening international situation could potentially
destroy the chances of an Ahmadinejad victory. But that's a rather
unlikely scenario at present. If anything, regional and international
developments could be considered as propitious for the Iranian
president.
To Iranian voters, The US' inability to match threats by deeds and the
West's general inability to punish Iran for pursuing its nuclear
program must seem a vindication of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric concerning
the hollowness of threats against Iran.
The recent war in the Caucasus seems to have also expanded Iran's room
for maneuver, which in the next few months may also be used as
political dividends by Ahmadinejad. (See Kamal Nazer Yasin, US, Russia:
Tension opens new options for Iran, EurasiaNet).
While at this moment Ahmadinejad is without any serious rivals in sight
and Ayatollah Khamenei appears to be satisfied with the general state
of affairs, one can not entirely discount the possibility that the
radical president may cause some domestic or even international
problems for the Supreme Leader, as he has done repeatedly in the past.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
Top of Page
|
|
 |

|