The incident led to an expected spat between the two outfits. While ULFA asked for the release of its captured cadres, the NSCN-IM claimed that they had been handed over to the Police. The NSCN-IM, further, warned the ULFA to desist from trespassing into Nagaland without its permission, rebutting the latter’s claim that the route used by its cadres falls within a ‘disputed’ territory.

Occurring at a time when the group is already facing critical challenges to its survival, the incident could not have come at a worse time, from the ULFA’s perspective. Since the collapse of the temporary truce between the Union Government and ULFA in September 2006, a total of 655 ULFA militants have surrendered (till October 31, 2007) across the State. During the same period, in three Districts of Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Sibasagar alone, Army personnel have killed 51 militants from the outfit and arrested 95 others. Separately, the police and the central paramilitary forces have also neutralized a number of ULFA militants in independent operations. The pressures of attrition have pushed the group into crisis that threatens its very existence.

The November 11 incident is the first of its kind involving armed violence between the two ULFA and the NSCN-IM, who had parted ways in 2001, after nearly a decade-and-a-half-long courtship. In the late 1980s, the NSCN-IM had provided arms training to ULFA cadres and introduced the group to the Southeast Asian arms bazaars, thus assisting its transformation from ragtag group of troublemakers to an outfit that could rival the firepower of the Security Forces (SFs). Subsequent years had seen a cementing of ties between the two groups, and these withstood several conflicting developments, including the ULFA’s formation of an umbrella group of insurgent organisations in the Northeast, the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF), along with NSCN-IM’s bete noire, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) in May 1990.

The immediate reason for the estrangement between the groups was the June 13, 2001, Union Government decision to extend the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM ‘without territorial limits’. The NSCN-IM interpreted this as recognition of its avowed objective of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland). Since this grandiose vision includes significant portions of the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills Districts of Assam, it was unacceptable to the ULFA, which claims to fight for a ‘sovereign Assam’. In its mouthpiece, Freedom, dated July 17, 2001 ULFA ridiculed the idea of Nagalim and opined that ‘history should not be distorted only to satisfy the chauvinistic ego.’ It further asked the NSCN-IM leaders to "review their stand concerning their most-talked Nagalim over others territories ( sic)". Even though the Union Government was to annul its decision subsequently, relations between both groups never improved after this point.

The split with the NSCN-IM in 2001 pushed the ULFA further into the lap of the NSCN-K. ULFA’s cadres started using NSCN-K camps in the Sagaing division of Myanmar, just across the international border along Nagaland. Such camradarie further deepened after the December 2003 military blitzkrieg in Bhutan, in which ULFA lost all its bases in that country. Since then, ULFA’s ‘28^th battalion’, which operates out of the Myanmar camps, has been solely responsible for the outfit’s concentrated activities in the State’s eastern-most Districts of Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Sibasagar. To execute these attacks, ULFA cadres have periodically travelled between Myanmar and Assam, principally using two routes: one through the Tirap and Changlang Districts of Arunachal Pradesh and another through the Mon District of Nagaland.

The NSCN-IM’s ambush of ULFA cadres is largely the fallout of ULFA’s ties with the NSCN-K and needs to be assessed within the context of the continuing fratricidal warfare between both the NSCN factions. Since their split in 1988, both the factions have engaged in bitter clashes across the entire territory of Nagaland and adjoining areas in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Area domination being the key objective, both factions have won and lost control over various Districts from time to time.

Interestingly, the November 11 ambush occurred at the Tizit sub-divisional town (under Mon District), where the NSCN-K has a designated camp, set up under its 2001 ceasefire agreement with the Government of India. Mon is the northern-most District of Nagaland and is strategically positioned at the tri-junction between Myanmar, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. Control over the District has thus become vital for any outfit that does business in any of these three regions. If recent incidents are an indication, the NSCN-IM is beginning to secure an upper hand over the NSCN-K in Mon. Several NSCN-K cadres have deserted the outfit to join the rival faction, thus, weakening the traditional support base of the Khaplang group among the Konyak tribals who dominate the District. On at least on two occasions in 2007 (June 24 and July 4), both factions have clashed at Tizit, 44 kilometres away from Mon’s District headquarters. Earlier, in March 2005, the NSCN-IM carried out an attack on NSCN-K’s Mon-based Ceasefire Supervisory Board office. The fact that the NSCN-K is gradually loosing its grip over Mon is further evident in their October 2007 request to New Delhi to shift the Ceasefire Supervisory Board office to the District of Zunheboto, which is the group’s stronghold.

For the ULFA’s ‘28^th battalion’, on the other hand, the Mon District has served as the shortest and safest transit route between Assam and Myanmar. Adjoining the Sibasagar District in Assam, Mon provides passages through the Patkai Hills range on the eastern side of the District to the NSCN-K camps at Lunglung in Myanmar. Another route starts from Sonari in Sibasagar District via Nyasa in Mon District and passes through Hoyet in Myanmar, to reach the camps located at Kachintala. However, the consolidation of NSCN-IM control over Mon and the November 11 ambush, makes both the routes highly unsafe and hence, unusable for Khaplang cadres. Dodging Mon and trekking through the adjoining Tuensang District to reach Assam is also not a workable option for the ULFA, as that considerably increases the length of the route, passing mostly through areas that are, again, dominated by the NSCN-IM.

This compels the ULFA’s ‘28^th battalion’ to fall back on the routes through the Tirap and Changlang Districts of Arunachal Pradesh. These routes have traditionally been less preferred by the militants as they involve treks though extended road lengths, compared to the informal routes through Nagaland. Moreover, these two Districts have also witnessed extended NSCN-IM activity since 2000. On November 12, 2007, five civilians were injured as IM and K factions exchanged fire in the Lazu village of Tirap District. In addition, in recent times, SFs’ presence has increased in these Districts. A sweep operation by the SFs was conducted in Tirap on October 26, 2007, two days after an NSCN-IM ambush killed five persons, including three personnel of the para-military Assam Rifles. Using Arunachal Pradesh territory as a route is, consequently, no less risk-prone for the beleaguered ULFA.

These developments will certainly impact on the operational capacities and effectiveness of ULFA’s ‘28^th battalion’. That being the only potent armed division of the outfit at present, the overall activity of ULFA in Assam is likely to be affected, with the State’s eastern-most Districts benefiting the most from the difficulties the rebel group is currently experiencing. It will be interesting to watch whether ULFA attempts to tide over the crisis by entering into an understanding with the NSCN-IM, though this cannot be an option as long its ties with NSCN-K remain intact.