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Last Updated: Jul 14, 2008 - 9:52:36 AM |
The books On Military Campaigns and The Science of Military Strategy
include it as the first of 10 principles of war [2]. Moreover, Military
Strategy reverses the sequence and puts "knowing ourselves" first [3].
Many articles from the official Chinese press illustrate the fact that
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has an active program of
self-evaluation and is well aware of its strengths and weaknesses,
especially in relation to the armed forces of the United States.
Despite 2,500 years of tradition in "knowing yourself", every year
since 2005 the US Defense Department has warned, "China's leaders may
overestimate the proficiency of their forces by assuming that new
systems are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately supplied
and maintained, and well integrated with existing or other new
capabilities" [4]. This assertion is listed among "misperceptions
[that] could lead to miscalculation or crisis".
While acknowledging today's PLA is vastly improved over its larger,
less-technologically-advanced self of a decade ago, some PLA officers
have expressed frustration over this conclusion (as well as others) in
the Pentagon reports [5]. Many foreign perceptions of the PLA do not
comport with officers' personal experience, what is written in official
Chinese sources, and what is taught in professional military schools.
Since 2006, the official Chinese media has published repeatedly a
general assessment of Chinese military capabilities - sometimes called
the "two incompatibles" or "two cannot suits" - that identifies
surprising limitations for the force.
Smaller and better, but still strapped for cash
Since 1997 the active-duty PLA has been reduced by 700,000 personnel to
about 2.3 million [6]. Unlike other militaries, PLA active-duty rosters
include an unknown number of uniformed civilians [7]. Comparable
American civilians working for the Pentagon would add over 650,000
personnel to the 1.36 million active US military personnel, making it
nearly the same size as the active PLA force [8]. But, as the PLA has
become smaller, it has developed greater capabilities which cost more
to sustain.
The announced Chinese defense budget has more than quadrupled since
1998 [9]. These increases have resulted in large pay and benefit
increases; new uniforms, better food and living quarters; an array of
new, mostly Chinese-made equipment, especially computers and
communications gear; and increased tempo and realism of training
exercises. Nonetheless, attracting and retaining qualified personnel is
a problem, new equipment expensive to purchase, operate, and maintain,
and China, too, faces increased prices for oil and other commodities.
As a result, the PLA sees itself with minimal financial resources and
consistently urges efficiency and thrift.
In 2006, the Army paper stated, "China is a large developing country.
Money is needed in many aspects. The contradiction between the needs of
military modernization construction and the short supply of funds will
exist for the long run." A year later, the director of the PLA's
Finance Department emphasized the requirement to use "limited financial
resources to ensure military modernization ... the armed forces must
find ways to improve their financial and economic management".
Missions and general assessment
The PLA has set the goal of "winning informationized wars by the
mid-21st century" with milestones at 2010 and 2020 [10]. The military
and security intelligentsia is now debating future requirements under
the rubric of the "historic missions for the new stage in the new
century". New missions will "gradually" extend the reach of the PLA and
emphasize "non-traditional security" operations such as anti-terrorism,
disaster relief, economic security, public health and information
security.
The PLA also has a multi-layered deterrence mission, which includes
China's nuclear posture as well as deterring attacks on the mainland
and preventing Taiwan from further movement toward independence. The
Chinese armed forces are obsessed with defending China from long-range
precision air strikes and repairing civilian infrastructure damaged
during such attacks. Concurrently, security forces are preparing for a
range of potential terrorist actions, including nuclear, chemical, and
biological attacks.
PLA doctrine shares the concept of "peace through strength" prevalent
in America during the Cold War. It understands that credible deterrence
requires a capable military and the willingness to use it. But,
according to The Science of Military Strategy, "Warfighting is
generally used only when deterrence fails and there is no alternative,"
and preferably, "strategic deterrence is also a means for attaining the
political objective" [11].
Since 2006 official Chinese publications have stated on more than 20
occasions, "The level of our modernization is incompatible with the
demands of winning a local war under informatization conditions and our
military capability is incompatible with the demands of carrying out
the army's historic missions" [12]. This general assessment has been
applied specifically to personnel development, training, logistics, and
technology levels. For example, the director of the General Logistics
Department wrote the PLA must address the issue of "an insufficient
logistics modernization level [to win] informatized local wars and
insufficient support capability for the requirement of fulfilling the
historical missions".
On June 19, 2008, the Liberation Army Daily reported: All participants
[at a Symposium on Military Management Innovation] held the view that
the combat effectiveness of the troops today is nagged by "two cannot
suits", ie, its modernization level cannot suit the demand of winning
the IT-based local wars, and its military capability cannot suit the
requirements for fulfilling its historical mission in the new century
and the new period.
The general assessment and PLA doctrine
These judgments, often called "contradictions", are attributed to Hu
Jintao and are clearly at odds with the Pentagon's warning. They are,
however, consistent with the long-term goal "winning informationized
wars by the mid-21st century". While most foreigners focus on new
equipment, PLA officers understand their doctrine requires the
integration of all forces, old and new, military and civilian, into
joint operations that incorporate firepower, mobility, information
operations, and special operations. In recent years, training for
"integrated joint operations" has increased, but this year PLA
headquarters placed primary emphasis on basic training, small unit
training, and command and staff training.
"Trump Card" weapons are one of many elements that must be integrated
into complex campaigns. PLA war planners operate under the assumption
that the PLA will be the weaker side in most scenarios so it will "use
inferior weapons to defeat a superior enemy". People's War, with its
emphasis on deception, use of stratagem, fighting the enemy close in,
political mobilization, and civilian support, is still "a fundamental
strategy" [13].
Sun Tzu also taught, "All warfare is based on deception" [14]. Could
these assessments be a strategic deception campaign? With the exception
of the English-language "two cannot suits" example, nearly all of the
roughly 20 references to this formula have appeared in Chinese [15].
Most are buried within longer articles that first praise the PLA for
progress made, but then follow with the bad news. The intent of the
message is to encourage the troops to greater action, "If we are
complacent with the status quo and ignore reform, the only consequence
that can come about as a result is that we will be left even further
behind with respect to the great worldwide trend of new military
changes by the strong militaries of the world."
Thus, while the use of this term is part of an internal propaganda
campaign, the vast majority of instances are not intended for foreign
consumption - though the Chinese could correctly assume that foreigners
do read their newspapers (many of which are available on the Internet).
If the Chinese intend to deceive the Pentagon with these words, the
Pentagon has not been swayed.
Specific evaluations
After all routine major training exercises, unit leaders assess
achievements and identify shortfalls. For example, commanders and staff
officers were recently described as falling "far short in meeting the
demands of joint operations", and a group army commander called for
steps "to resolve the problem of training lagging behind operational
requirements in practice ...".
The Sichuan earthquake relief operations have revealed much about PLA
joint operational capabilities. Though no weapons are involved, this
deployment is being conducted according to PLA joint operations
doctrine, providing a real-world test bed for the PLA. Within two weeks
of the disaster, some 133,000 active-duty PLA and People's Armed Police
personnel and 45,000 reservists and militia were deployed.
Most traveled by road or rail, but in the first days of the operation
the air force conducted what Xinhua called "its largest airlift yet" of
some 11,420 troops. About 100 military helicopters (nearly one quarter
of the Army Aviation inventory) were dispatched from all over the
country. Civilian assets augmented these fleets.
While a "heroic" effort, the Liberation Army Daily noted "the PLA's
long-distance rapid insertion capability [is] in a state of relative
weakness". People's Daily commented, "With this earthquake, we mustered
as many helicopters as possible, but overall they were still too few,
and their capabilities not yet improved". The PLA will gain important
experience from these efforts, but, just as important, the deployment
offers an opportunity to evaluate its performance.
The view of the PLA as stated publicly by the Pentagon is quite
different than the PLA's internal evaluations published in multiple
open sources. While the assessments described above should not result
in complacency by the United States and China's neighbors, the
professional PLA leadership probably knows itself much better than some
Americans think - just as Sun Tzu urged.
Notes
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p
84. Translated by Samuel B Griffith.
2. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds), On Military Campaigns, Beijing:
National Defense University Press, May 2000, p 86. Translated by
Language Doctors.
3. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds), The Science of Military
Strategy, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, p 230. This
text actually lists this statement among the 10 "strategic principles
for people's war".
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, The
Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005, p 26; Military
Power of the People's Republic of China 2006, p 25; Military Power of
the People's Republic of China 2007, p 15; Military Power of the
People's Republic of China 2008, p. 22
5. Based on author's conversations with PLA officers in June 2006,
November 2006, and April 2008.
6. Chapter IV, The People's Liberation Army, China's National Defense
in 2006. Every other year since 1998, China has issued a White Paper on
National Defense.
7. Chapter III, National Defense Construction, China's National
Defense, July 1998.
8. US personnel figures are available here. These numbers do not
include contractors.
9. The growth of China's announced defense budget can be traced in the
series of its White Papers. See also Table 4, in Dennis J Blasko, Chas
W Freeman, Jr, Stanley A Horowitz, Evan S Medeiros and James C
Mulvenon, "Defense-Related Spending in China: A Preliminary Analysis
and Comparison with American Equivalents", United States-China Policy
Foundation, May 2007, p 19. A key conclusion of that study is there is
not "enough information to make a reasonable estimate of the total
amount of Chinese "defense-related spending".
10. Chapter II, National Defense Policy, China's National Defense in
2006. Emphasis added by author.
11. The Science of Military Strategy, p 224. Achieving "the political
objective" through deterrence is consistent with Sun Tzu's teaching,
"To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." The Art of
War, p 77.
12. For a few examples, see Qiushi Article by General Political
Department on Scientific Development Concept CPP20060802710009 Beijing
Qiushi (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, August 1, 2006, No 15; JFJB
Commentator on Training National Defense Students CPP20071214710011
Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, December 14,
2007, p 1; and PRC Army Paper Calls for New Situation in National
Defense, Army Building CPP20080101701001 Beijing Jiefangjun Bao
(Internet Version-WWW) in Chinese January 1, 2008. All translated by
OSC. Emphasis added by author.
13. The Science of Military Strategy, p 117.
14. The Art of War, p 66.
15. The Chinese term, liangge buxiang shiying, has been translated in
many ways. In addition to the renderings stated above, the term has
also been translated as "two non-adaptations" or "two unsuitable
points". These variations in translations could cause confusion among
those who only read the English.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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