Ocnus.Net
French Soldiers Unprepared for Taliban Ambush
By GRAEME SMITH, Globe and Mail 20/9/08
Sep 21, 2008 - 7:32:24 AM
It was mid-afternoon when a tribal elder invited a U.S. military
commander for a quiet chat in a garden. His village was surrounded by
foreign troops, hunting around the mountain valley in search of
infiltrators from Pakistan rumoured to be lurking in the barren hills.
Thirty soldiers from a French airborne platoon wandered farthest from
the village, exploring a steep slope covered with rocks and scrubby
vegetation under a high ridge.
That hill would soon become a killing ground, scene of the deadliest
ambush against international forces since 2001, and the latest
troubling sign that the insurgents are mastering the art of guerrilla
war.
A NATO report on the incident obtained by The Globe and Mail provides
the most in-depth account so far of an attack on Aug. 18 that shook the
countries involved in the increasingly bloody campaign. The NATO
report, marked “secret,” reveals woefully unprepared French troops
surprised by well-armed insurgents in a valley east of Kabul. Ten
soldiers were killed, the report concludes, but the other soldiers were
lucky to escape without more deaths.
A Taliban fighter this month displays gear stripped from French
soldiers slain in an Aug. 18 ambush. Taliban attacks are growing more
sophisticated and their marksmanship is improving.
A Taliban fighter this month displays gear stripped from French
soldiers slain in an Aug. 18 ambush. Taliban attacks are growing more
sophisticated and their marksmanship is improving. (Veronique de
Viguerie/WPN)
The French did not have enough bullets, radios and other equipment, the
report said. The troops were forced to abandon a counterattack when the
weapons on their vehicles ran out of ammunition only 90 minutes into a
battle that stretched over two days. One French platoon had only a
single radio and it was quickly disabled, leaving them unable to call
for help. Chillingly, in an indication that the French troopers may
have been at the mercy of their attackers, the dead soldiers from that
platoon “showed signs of being killed at close range,” the report said.
By contrast, the insurgents were dangerously well prepared. The
investigation found evidence of well-trained snipers among the
guerrillas – highly unusual, because the Taliban are frequently mocked
for their poor marksmanship – and indications they were supplied with
incendiary bullets designed to punch holes in armour.
Insurgents have spread rumours in recent weeks that they captured
French soldiers during the ambush, perhaps even videotaping their
executions. “Maybe I will make her my wife,” said Mullah Rahmatullah, a
local commander, describing a captive female soldier in a boastful
conversation with a researcher for The Globe and Mail. Other rumours
described French soldiers dying of stab wounds.
But senior Western officials say this was a disinformation campaign by
the Taliban, who notoriously exaggerate their victories. The classified
military review concludes that all French dead were killed by insurgent
fire, except one soldier who died in a vehicle accident.
The French military declined to comment for this article, but French
officers have previously spoken about the ambush in fatalistic tones,
as if the insurgents inevitably score an occasional success.
“Our comrades fell during an ambush. They couldn't have done anything.
It's a tactic as old as Herod,” a French officer told Le Figaro, a
daily newspaper in Paris.
But only a swift rescue mission by other international forces prevented
more serious losses, the report said, also crediting a heroic
performance by a French intelligence officer who was wounded in the leg
but did not stop leading his troops.
“This contact could have been much worse,” the report said.
Military forces routinely conduct so-called “after-action” reviews in
the wake of major incidents; in keeping with the usual practice, the
report on the French ambush examines only the battle itself, on Aug. 18
and 19, in the Uzbin valley about 40 kilometres east of Kabul.
But other analysts have looked at the incident in a broader context,
speculating that trends in the Uzbin valley, and beyond, may have
contributed to the deadly incident. Some observers connect the French
ambush with attacks that killed nine American soldiers in July and
another that killed three Canadians earlier this month, all of them
examples of bold strikes against international forces by insurgents who
seem increasingly skilled at guerrilla warfare.Unlike the crude tactics
witnessed by Canadian troops in 2006, when the insurgents dug trenches
and bunkers, camping out in groups of several hundred and making
themselves easy targets for aerial bombing, insurgents in the recent
high-profile attacks have gathered ad-hoc units by pulling together
many small bands of fighters for specific missions.
A similar, temporary grouping of fighters assembled before the French
ambush, two Western security officials said, adding that the attackers
cannot be described as purely Taliban; they likely included fighters
from the Taliban movement, but also from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hizb-i-Islami network, and perhaps from other groups.
Senior officials said they suspect the involvement of Hazrat Noor, an
extremist leader from South Waziristan, in the lawless tribal areas of
Pakistan. A report in the French magazine Paris Match suggested a local
commander named Farouki may be responsible. Yet another insurgent
leader, Mullah Rahmatullah, has also taken credit for the ambush.
Originally a commander for Hizb-i-Islami in the Uzbin valley, Mr.
Rahmatullah now reputedly gets funding for his activities from both the
Taliban and Mr. Hekmatyar. All reports may be correct, observers say,
assuming that many groups co-operated on the attack.
The appearance of well-trained marksmen among the insurgents may point
toward the involvement of extremists trained in Pakistani territory,
said Brigadier-General Richard Blanchette, a Canadian who serves as
chief spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force.
“We do have hints that al-Qaeda provides training to some insurgents on
the other side of the border,” Brig.-Gen. Blanchette said. “Because
it's close, it would be very reasonable to believe that this could have
been an influence of outside training.” He added: “The fact that they
have more sophisticated arms is perhaps also a sign there's a
connection to outsiders.”
By one account, the insurgents were preparing for a strike against the
government headquarters in Surobi town, but found a ready target when a
column of military vehicles snaked up the narrow road among the steeps
hills of the valley. They were driving toward a small collection of mud
houses known as Spur Kunday, in the valley east of Kabul, investigating
reports of 40 Pakistanis sheltering in the village.
“This attack was most likely the result of two things,” the NATO report
said. “Either, A) the ISAF forces picked a village that had a great
deal of insurgents. The insurgents moved to defensive positions upon
the ISAF approach and executed a rehearsed plan.
The report continued: “Or, B) the insurgents had intelligence
indicating the route and destination.”
The village initially seemed quiet. A U.S. Special Forces commander and
interpreter talked with locals, and got the usual answers supplied by
ordinary Afghans when they find themselves surrounded by foreign
troops. “All villagers said that they supported the government, there
was no trouble here,” the report said.
A tribal elder asked to speak with the U.S. officer alone, and they
arranged for a private meeting in a garden, but the elder broke off the
conversation when he noticed a local police officer eavesdropping on
the exchange. The elder was escorting the soldier back to his vehicle
when shooting erupted from a ridge overlooking the village to the east.
In that direction, a French platoon was doing reconnaissance by
climbing a hill that sloped upward several hundred metres. Many
soldiers were holding positions in the valley, providing security for
the meetings at the village, but the platoon of 30 French airborne
troops had left their vehicles and hiked more than a kilometre away
from the main group, spreading themselves out in an area roughly 300
metres by 300 metres. They were in a vulnerable position, looking up at
rocky ridges to the north, south, and east, and that's where the
insurgents struck most fiercely.
Soldiers' accounts in the French media say the fighting started at 3
p.m. and they endured four hours without reinforcements. The NATO
report gives no timeline, but details a bloody struggle for survival as
the foreign troops were incapable of retreating.
The stranded French platoon soon lost communication with the rest of
the soldiers, making it impossible for them to call for air support.
“This was probably due to the fact that the French platoon had only one
radio,” the report said.
>From high positions overlooking the foreign troops, the insurgents
rained down devastatingly effective fire. All three U.S. Humvee jeeps
had their windows struck with well-aimed bullets. Large sparks trailed
out from the bullet impact sites, suggesting the insurgents were using
incendiary rounds.
“The enemy's accuracy was very good,” the document said.
While praising the performance of U.S. and French troops under the
onslaught, the report singled out the Afghan soldiers for criticism.
Fifteen troops from the Afghan National Army had accompanied the patrol
in three Ford Ranger pickup trucks, but two of the vehicles were
disabled under what the report described as “withering machinegun
fire.” Four Afghan soldiers were wounded. Eventually the ANA troops
decided to run away on foot.
“The ANA performed very poorly,” the report said. “The ANA force spent
much of the time lounging on the battlefield. When they finally
dispersed, most left their military equipment [including] weapons ID
cards, and other items for the enemy.”
Reinforcements from nearby military bases eventually forced the
insurgents to retreat, but some fighting continued through the night
and into the next morning. The final tally was 10 French killed and 18
French wounded, with estimates of 15 insurgents killed and 18 wounded.
The French dead were not recovered from the battlefield until midday on
Aug. 19, the report said. Some had been stripped of their equipment by
the ambushers.
The final sentence of the NATO report suggests the military forces
should return to the valley, prepared for another fight.
“Further presence in this denied area is crucial to disrupt the
insurgent freedom of movement in what is a long-held and uninterrupted
safe haven.”
Source: Ocnus.net 2008