In the largest Russian military exercise since the height of the Cold War, Moscow this week is deploying 300,000 troops, 900 tanks and 1,000 aircraft in central and eastern Russia. The military demonstration, called “Vostok 2018,” or East Exercise 2018, is expected to last from Sept. 11 to 15. This year, for the first time ever, Chinese military forces will participate, sending 3,200 troops and 30 aircraft over the border into eastern Russia. Similar Cold War-era drills only included states that were part of the Soviet sphere.
The Vostok exercise highlights two important, seemingly contradictory things about the relationship between China and Russia. First, the appearance of military cooperation masks deep strategic distrust and suspicion below the surface. But second, despite these real limitations, strong incentives and a lack of alternatives provide a sturdy foundation for a continued strategic partnership going forward.
Vostok 2018 represents the latest in a series of combined Chinese-Russian military exercises stretching back more than a decade. Their militaries have been training together since 2005, and China and Russia have been holding joint naval exercises every year since 2012, including near each other’s respective hotspots. Last year, China sent three naval ships to its first jointly held exercise with Russian forces in the Baltic Sea. In 2016, the two navies carried out a joint exercise in the South China Sea, which many read as a response, in part, to a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejecting China’s territorial claims in the contested waterway.
Warm political statements by top Chinese and Russian leaders have complemented these military actions. In June, Chinese President Xi Jinping awarded China’s first “friendship medal” to Russian President Vladimir Putin, describing the Russian leader as “my best, most intimate friend.” During a visit to Moscow in April, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said he wanted to “let the Americans know about the close ties between the armed forces of China and Russia.” Alarmed by these developments, commentators have warned of the growing global alignment between authoritarian states in China and Russia against the liberal democracies of the West, which some have characterized as an “axis of autocracy.” Moscow and Beijing seem to be in the market for partners against the West. In June, they hosted Iran at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Central Asian regional security bloc led by Beijing and Moscow.
To be sure, the image of close strategic cooperation belies the reality of deepening Russian dependence on China. The loss of Western markets due to sanctions from the U.S. and Europe has contributed to a stagnating Russian economy that has not grown by any appreciable amount since 2008. According to the International Monetary Fund, Russia’s economy has now been surpassed in size by South Korea. Moscow has accordingly grown more dependent than ever on Chinese markets and technology.
Friendship between Xi and Putin may be sincere, but competition and distrust simmers beneath the surface.
Moreover, friendship between Xi and Putin may be sincere, but competition and distrust simmers beneath the surface. Russian resentment has grown over China’s expanding influence in Central Asia. Joint investment in Russia’s sparsely populated far east has provided needed resources, but it has also intensified Russian fears that Chinese migration will follow, leading to “China’s de facto territorial expansion.” Indeed, many Chinese still begrudge Russia’s control of territory, such as the port of Vladivostok, seized through unequal treaties in the 19th century. And it is worth recalling that while this year’s participation by Chinese forces is certainly unusual and noteworthy, the whole point of the decades-long Vostok series of exercises has been to prepare the Russian military to defend against potential Chinese incursions.
It is easy to overstate the impact of these limitations, however. Deepening tensions with the United States and Europe provide a powerful incentive for cooperation. In December 2017, the new U.S. National Security Strategy named Russia and China as “strategic competitors” that aim to “erode American security and prosperity.”
An escalating trade war under President Donald Trump has strained China-U.S. ties, while officials in Washington have stepped up criticism of Chinese influence operations and efforts to stifle political opponents of Beijing abroad. Symptomatic of the fraying U.S.-China relationship, the latest National Defense Authorization Act carried provisions prohibiting Chinese participation in key U.S.-led military exercises, tightening controls on technology and targeting Chinese political interference in other states. Similarly, tensions between Russia and the United States continue to rise, with Washington authorizing more sanctions in retaliation for Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and its ongoing actions in Syria and Ukraine. Russia’s relations with the European Union, already strained by Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, have plummeted further since March, when the EU and the U.S. expelled scores of Russian diplomats in response to the poisoning of a former Russian spy in southern England.
Both China and Russia also face a complex security environment, shaped by a mix of domestic unrest, slowing economic growth and transnational threats. Given that neither country has an alternative partner available with their power and reach, both will likely continue to view cooperation as imperative, whatever their differences.
In some ways, China and Russia’s ad hoc partnership presents a reverse image of America’s relationship with its European allies. Statements of official solidarity from Beijing and Moscow disguise deeply rooted diffidence and suspicion, while official statements of rancor between Trump and European leaders scarcely obscure a rich, deeply institutionalized, albeit fraying, trans-Atlantic relationship. In both cases, however, countries are seeking to expand the terms of cooperation with their erstwhile partners while managing structural differences and points of tension. The limitations of China-Russia ties should not therefore diminish their durability. As countries grapple with the effects of an increasingly uncertain and unstable international system, they are finding friends with limited benefits to be better than no friends at all
