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Last Updated: Jul 14, 2008 - 9:43:30 AM |
There
are ten primary reasons for this:
1. President Bush is nearing the end of his term. Technically he is
entitled to make crucial decisions until the inauguration of the next
president. Nonetheless, a president at the end of his term in office is
considered a lame duck, and it is not appropriate for a president at
this juncture to make far reaching strategic decisions whose
consequences will unfold primarily after his tenure.
2. The meteoric rise of Democrat Barack Obama is a clear indicator that
American public opinion would like to see a change in the militant
policy pursued by President Bush. Military action against Iran at this
stage would constitute blatant disregard of public opinion. It is
doubtful whether any American president would be prepared to take such
a step.
3. In the American psyche, the word "Iran" is to a large extent
associated with failures and traumatic events, including the failed
attempt to rescue the American Embassy hostages in Tehran, the
Iran-Contra scandal, and others. These events have presumably left
psychological scars that would prompt various echelons of the
administration to shun a military option. It is doubtful that the
president would want to add to the list of Iran-related dramas,
particularly at the very end of his term.
4. The National Intelligence Assessment on Iran, which cast severe
doubts on the existing assessments of Iran's nuclear activity, and the
stark findings regarding the lack of nuclear activity in Iraq, create
significant obstacles to a military action against Iran. No president
can now rule out the possibility that assessments of Iran's nuclear
activities and the level of their threat were exaggerated.
5. The chances of success of such an action are highly in doubt. There
is no strategic surprise: action would take place with Iran well aware
of a threatened operation, and possibly able to demarcate probable
timeframes for its occurrence. It may be assumed that Iranian security
elements have taken preventive steps to foil massive damage of its
nuclear installations. They have likely spread the risk over greater
areas, i.e., place their nuclear installations in various locales, far
away from one another. Furthermore, it is almost certain that they
would improve means of fortification and camouflage. The bottom line is
that even under so called ideal circumstances it would be very
difficult to foresee the actual results of a military attack on Iran.
6. American action, whether carried out independently or with Israel,
would almost certainly lead to Iranian action against Israel. Should
the retaliation be severe and cause Israel many casualties, it might
force intense and long term American intervention in belligerent events
in the Middle East. It is highly doubtful that an American president in
Bush's position would make a critical decision that would bring about
another American embroilment in addition to its thorny involvement in
Iraq.
7. The United States must take into consideration the possibility that
military action on its part against Iran would begin a long blood feud
with the entire Islamic world. Even those in the Muslim world who do
not count themselves among Iran's admirers would almost certainly view
an act of aggression by a Western power against an Islamic state highly
critically. The United States must anticipate a massive increase in
terrorist attacks against American targets, including on American soil.
8. Action against Iran would lead to a steep increase in oil prices
around the world. Oil prices have already hit highs that are negatively
impacting on the world economy on a large scale. An escalation of this
trend might have very serious consequences for the global economic
crisis.
9. Although there is a broad consensus in the West that it is necessary
to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, many will nonetheless
view military action against Iran as the Bush administration's drive to
overshadow the political and strategic failures of his presidency. Even
today there is talk that the State and Defense Departments oppose
military action against Iran. The president could, of course, decide
differently. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the president would take
a dramatic and dangerous step of this sort when such senior members of
his administration and many on the outside do not share his views.
10. Finally, the UN decided on a series of economic sanctions against
Iran. Information funneled to the media suggests that these sanctions
are already having - or will have - consequences for Iran's economic
status and the stability of its regime. At the same time, there is also
talk of indirect communication between American and Iranian elements.
One may assume that the president would not make a decision on military
action before knowing definitively that all non-military options to
prevent Iran's nuclear activities have been tried and have failed. Such
a conclusion is highly unlikely by the end of the Bush presidency.
Should it become clear that the Bush administration is not leaning
towards military action against Iran, Israel will find itself facing
one of the most critical decisions in the history of the state: whether
or not to initiate aggressive independent action against Iran. A great
majority of the misgivings facing the American administration would
also confront the Israeli prime minister. Certainly this decision will
have far-reaching ramifications for Israel and for its relations with
the Arab and Muslim world and the international community, as well as
for its own economic situation.
It would seem that over the last few months there has been a change in
the attitude of senior Israeli officials to the "Iranian problem." In
previous years, Israel stressed that the problem was a global one, and
that it would tend to reject a unilateral strike against Iran. By
contrast, lately the impression seems to be that the Israeli
government's freedom of (in)action regarding Iran is narrowing.
Numerous declarations by very senior figures in Israel have placed
Israel in the position where it would seem committed to act against
Iran even unilaterally, i.e., without the cooperation of the United
States.
In the coming months these circumstances will confront Israel's
leadership with a difficult dilemma: assuming that the Bush
administration decides not to act militarily against Iran, Israel must
decide whether to act against Iran alone. Beyond the considerations
presented above, Israel also has to face the question of maintaining
credibility. Lack of actions is liable to harm Israel's credibility, to
present it as a paper tiger and as a result weaken its deterrence. As
it is, Israel's credibility index is not high given, for example, not
making good on threats to act decisively after the withdrawal from
Lebanon and after the disengagement from Gaza. If it turns out that
this time too Israel's threats against Iran have no backing, the
country's credibility will be damaged further. The Israeli leadership
is certainly aware of this dilemma, and will have to seek ways to
minimize the damages, regardless of whatever decision it ultimately
takes.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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