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Last Updated: Oct 8, 2008 - 12:46:41 PM |
On October 1 an article appeared in the
Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets, which appeared to delineate a
controversy within Russia’s General Staff about forthcoming cuts
planned to reduce its overall size. Yet, for those with an
understanding of the huge importance of the General Staff within Soviet
and Russian military traditions, there are far greater implications
than simply the numerical controversy. Behind the number crunching is
the recognition that the General Staff in effect represents the “brain”
of the Russian army. The most serious objections to these proposed cuts
suggest that the General Staff was caught unawares by the outbreak of
the conflict in Georgia in August, which undermines the Western
analysis to date of the origin and ignition of that critical conflict.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has started a massive reorganization
of the General Staff, scheduled for completion by March 1, 2009. At the
direction of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, the General Staff's
main directorates and services will be cut in order to optimize them,
and the total number of reductions is likely to be around 40 percent.
This will be carried out throughout the main directorates, including
such important ones as the Main Directorate for Operations (GOU), the
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the Main Organization and
Mobilization Directorate (GOMU).
Deputy Chief of General Staff and Chief of the GOMU Colonel-General
Vasiliy Smirnov called these rumors about the reduction of the General
Staff “foolishness.” But other Generals are resigned to variable cuts
that may constitute the reported figure of 40 percent across the
General Staff. Those voicing opposition to such reforms argue against
the inflated nature of the structure and dismiss the assertion that it
currently duplicates the functions of the main commands of the branches
of the armed forces and the directorates of their commanders.
Similarly, there is widespread disagreement over exactly how these
reductions should be implemented.
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the president of the Academy of
Geopolitical Problems, believes that the plan approved by President
Dmitry Medvedev on July 21 could potentially destroy the army,
eliminating up to 200,000 officers. In particular, Ivashov challenged
the idea that the optimization of the General Staff would improve the
combat capabilities of the Russian Army. “Take August 8, for example,
when the Georgian Army attacked our peacekeeping battalion in South
Ossetia. For two to three days command and control on the part of the
General Staff was essentially absent. Why? First, the chief of General
Staff was new, and his right hand, the chief of GOU of the General
Staff, had been dismissed and no replacement had been found. On August
8 the General Staff was in the process of moving to a new location. The
officers and generals were loading their property, maps, and documents
onto KamAZ trucks and essentially did not control the situation,”
Ivashov claimed (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, October 1).
On the other hand, Colonel Vitaliy Shlykov, chairman of the Commission
for Security Policy and Analysis of Military Legislation of the Public
Council under the Defense Ministry, is of the opposite opinion. He
describes the benefits of moving responsibilities and tasks performed
by the General Staff to the MoD, including subordinating the GRU to the
MoD instead of the General Staff, thereby improving the effectiveness
of the General Staff. Shlykov argued:
It should be an analytical-planning body and not be involved in purely
organizational work. In addition, the observation of secrecy is not a
General Staff matter. Everything that distracts it from planning,
analysis, and brain work should be taken from it. In no case, of
course, should it be eliminated, however, since these are all useful
functions. Historically, they have simply been in the wrong place in
light of the fact that for a long time, starting back in Soviet times,
the General Staff was “our all” (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, October 1).
Shlykov and Ivashov may have their differing views on these matters,
but they are in complete agreement that the General Staff is the body
that does and should focus on “planning, analysis, and brain work.”
Shlykov does not dispute Ivashov’s assertion that the General Staff was
caught off guard by the start of the conflict in Georgia: what is
shocking is that for Russia to have come anywhere near a premeditated
war of aggression against its southern neighbor, the “brain” would have
been tasked with the planning and execution of the operation, not
caught by surprise by the initial events over the first two to three
days.
As the Russian armed forces adjust to the implications of the conflict
in August, there are early signs of its impact on the priorities for
upgrading and procuring military equipment. Colonel-General Vladimir
Popovkin, chief of armaments and deputy minister of defense, suggested
that those events have forced a rethinking about how the Russian armed
forces will develop in the future. “Naturally the state defense order
is being adjusted, and for two reasons. On the one hand, in light of
the experience of the operation to compel Georgia to make peace. On the
other, in light of the results [of the modernization and procurement
from the state budget program] achieved last year,” Popovkin observed
(Krasnaya Zvezda, October 2).
The main challenge relates to modernizing existing equipment, while
also introducing new equipment; and here Moscow is keen to take
advantage of the experience of other armies that have tackled similar
issues. “As for studying other countries’ experience of modernizing
Soviet and Russian equipment, from trophies captured from the Georgian
army we have familiarized ourselves closely with what has been done in
Ukraine and the Czech Republic. What we have seen there is of no
interest to us,” Popovkin said. So, in Moscow’s view, simply adding
Western equipment to the force inventory, as in Georgia, does not
equate with successfully improving combat capabilities (Krasnaya
Zvezda, October 2).
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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