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Last Updated: Aug 27, 2008 - 11:31:48 AM |
On the eve of “recognition,” Russia prevented the OSCE from performing
its monitoring responsibility in South Ossetia, the springboard for
Russian troops into Georgia’s interior. Moscow has enjoyed a
cat-and-mouse game with the OSCE for a decade in South Ossetia, but its
latest move undercuts an agreement concluded as recently as August 19
with the OSCE’s incumbent Finnish Chairmanship.
The OSCE Mission to Georgia had fielded a grand total of nine, unarmed
military monitors (MMOs) in recent years to observe the implementation
of the ceasefire in South Ossetia and report on violations, which this
small and poorly equipped team often missed. The last three MMOs left
South Ossetia shortly after the August 7 outbreak of the Russia-Georgia
war. As Russian forces entered South Ossetia massively after that date,
and population displacements ensued, the OSCE’s Finnish Chairmanship
and Western member countries had a good case to make for augmenting the
OSCE’s monitoring presence in South Ossetia.
Moscow, however, seeks de facto international acceptance of its seizure
of Georgian territory adjacent to South Ossetia, in the so-called
buffer or “security zone,” which Russia claims to occupy under the
French-brokered armistice. Moscow tries to associate the OSCE with the
buffer zone scheme by having this international organization monitor
that zone, signifying de facto acceptance of that arrangement within
the Russian-drawn demarcation lines.
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced, “The Russian side
supports the deployment of a considerable number of additional OSCE
observers in the security zone” (Interfax, August 19). U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Daniel Fried retorted, “There is no [such thing as]
security zone” (Guardian, August 20).
Following intense negotiations between the OSCE’s Finnish chairmanship
and Russia, the organization’s Permanent Council authorized on August
19 an increase in the number of OSCE military monitors in Georgia. In
the consensus-bound Permanent Council, approval of a decision means
having Russia on board. Under the August 19 Decision, the expanded
monitoring’s goal is “full implementation of the six principles
included in the agreement proposed by the French and Russian
presidents.“
To that end, an additional 20 Military Monitoring Officers shall be
“deployed immediately, in areas adjacent to South Ossetia.” Up to 80
MMOs may be added in a follow-up stage, but that shall be subject to a
new decision by the Permanent Council regarding modalities of the MMOs,
to be proposed by the OSCE’s Chairmanship “without delay.” Those
modalities shall also apply retroactively to this batch of 20 MMOs
(Permanent Council Decision no. 861, August 19, 2008).
This means, first, that Russia has managed to avoid any serious
monitoring by the OSCE in South Ossetia, at a time of unprecedently
heavy Russian military presence there, and while material evidence of
mass ethnic cleansing of Georgians from South Ossetia can still be
recorded, before it is suppressed. Second, it means that Russia will
confine the OSCE’s MMOs to the buffer zone and seek OSCE compliance
with the Russian occupation’s rules and regulations there. Thirdly,
approval of another batch of “up to 80” MMOs is subject to Russia’s
veto power in the Permanent Council.
Procedurally, the added 20 MMOs would apparently operate without a
formal mandate, and certainly without approved modalities. This
situation increases Russian leverage over the group. Given the current
situation on the ground, however, the OSCE Chairmanship was almost
certainly justified in seeking to deploy these MMOs as fast as
possible, rather than negotiate at length with the Russians about
mandate and modalities for this first additional batch.
Sharing that sense of urgency, the United States and the European Union
approved the deployment despite its unsatisfactory terms while filing
major interpretative statements. On the EU’s behalf, the presiding
country France recorded the “wish of the EU” for these observers to be
deployed rapidly in South Ossetia within Georgia. The United States
“expects” the same, along with full access for MMOs to check the
withdrawal of military forces to their pre-August 7 positions -- i.e.,
their return to Russia.
Both the EU and the U.S. underscore in their interpretations that the
MMOs’ deployment shall not affect the terms of the “international
format” envisaged in point five of the armistice agreement; and that it
shall not preempt the establishment of further international
mechanisms. In other words, the monitoring mission is no substitute for
an international peacekeeping and negotiating format regarding the
South Ossetia conflict.
The OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alexander Stubbs, similarly “hopes” that the MMOs would “very soon” be
ensured safe and free movement “throughout Georgia” (i.e., into South
Ossetia) and humanitarian assistance corridors would equally soon open
(i.e., by Russian troops or in their wake) (OSCE Permanent Council
documents, Chairmanship Press Release, August 19). OSCE “hopes” for
Russian cooperation are chronically unrequited, however.
Meanwhile, the OSCE has the right to deploy again to South Ossetia the
eight remaining MMOs of the nine who were based there until early
August, under the old mandate. Keen to restore that presence, Stubb
indicated while visiting Georgia that Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sergei Lavrov has assured him that Russia would not impede the
MMOs’ reentry there (Civil Georgia, August 22). The OSCE Mission has a
field office in Tskhinvali and stationed up to five of its MMOs there,
prior to the August 7 outbreak of hostilities.
On August 25 the first batch of MMOs arrived in Tbilisi as scheduled,
en route to South Ossetia and the nearby Russian-occupied area of
Georgia. On the following day, however, the Russian military stopped
them near Gori and did not allow them to proceed any farther. This
group of MMOs left Georgia today, but the OSCE is determined to persist.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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