On July 28, Russian state television presented Vladimir Antyufeyev as “acting chairman of the council of ministers of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DPR prime minister],” and featured an interview with Antyufeyev from Donetsk (Rossiya 1 TV, July 28).
Earlier on that day, Antyufeyev himself told local media that he was moving up from his “deputy prime minister’s” post to that of “first deputy prime minister” and “acting prime minister,” as well as “acting commander-in-chief” of DPR’s forces (novorossia.su.ru, July 28; OstroV [Donetsk], July 28).
The known incumbents of those posts have been Aleksandr Boroday and Igor Girkin/Strelkov, respectively. Antyufeyev did not clarify which higher authorities had appointed him as their temporary replacement, and how long he would hold the two posts in his hands.
The “prime minister,” Boroday, left Donetsk for Russia, apparently on July 27. Two days earlier Boroday had conveyed a deeply pessimistic assessment of the “DPR’s” situation to a Kremlin handler by telephone. Ukrainian intelligence intercepted that conversation (sbu.gov.ua, July 28; Interfax-Ukraine, July 29).
For his part, Girkin/Strelkov briefed local media on the military situation on July 28 as commander-in-chief. A video-recording of that briefing, aired by the Moscow-based internet TV channel Life News (with which Boroday is closely linked), shows Girkin/Strelkov claiming that his forces killed “four mercenaries of the Negroid race” that day. He implies that these were part of a larger number of “American mercenaries” on the ground (Life News, July 28, dnr.today, Russkaya Vesna, July 28).
While Girkin/Strelkov’s briefing attempted to project confidence, Antyufeyev did acknowledge that Ukrainian government forces were retaking towns and advancing on the city of Donetsk. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission’s deputy chief, Swiss diplomat Alexander Hug, visited the newly empowered Antyufeyev in Donetsk. The Special Mission seeks help for international inspectors to access the crash site of the Boeing 777 airliner. “DPR” forces or their mentors from Russia shot it down on July 17, killing all 298 aboard (see EDM, July 18, 21, 23, 24, 25). Antyufeyev responded evasively to the OSCE’s request (Interfax, July 28). The OSCE and Antyufeyev have been acquainted with each other for 20 years in Moldova (see below).
Antyufeyev’s Russian TV interview topped the prime-time newscast (Rossiya 1 TV, July 28). Antyufeyev told Russia’s public that “Ukraine’s national fascists have organized a military invasion of the DPR, under the leadership of Kyiv’s rulers and the patronage of Western countries, primarily the USA. They aim to seize this territory, destroy its industry, and use [this] bridgehead for schemes that, in their opinion, would have a destructive effect on the Russian Federation’s statehood.”
That argument raises the stakes substantially in Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is no longer a matter of gathering more “Russian lands,” but rather of defending Russia’s existing territory and statehood itself. Implicitly this builds the case for Russia’s heavier, bolder involvement in support of the embattled Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”
Lieutenant-General Antyufeyev, the long-serving “state security minister” of Transnistria, became “deputy prime minister for security matters [silovyie voprosy]” in Donetsk on July 10, on arrival from Moscow. He was appointed to supervise the “DPR’s” “state” security agency, internal affairs “ministry,” and courts of justice (see EDM, July 21). The title of “acting defense minister,” first listed on July 28, expands Antyufeyev’s portfolio. This may be viewed as an attempt to encroach on Girkin/Strelkov’s authority, possibly laying the ground for a subsequent challenge to him. The Kremlin seems uncomfortable with Girkin/Strelkov’s hero status in Russia’s nationalist circles.
Girkin/Strelkov had taken over Sloviansk in mid-April, appointed himself commander-in-chief on May 12, and was confirmed as “defense minister” on May 16, pursuant to the “DPR’s” May 11 “referendum” (Novosti Donbassa, May 12, 16). His real command authority remained confined to the Sloviansk stronghold, but he acquired almost mythical authority in Russia’s ultranationalist camp.
On the ground in Ukraine’s east, the most significant Russia-backed separatist field commanders continue operating autonomously from Igor Girkin/Strelkov—the self-proclaimed military leader of the pro-Russia rebel forces and “defense minister” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic [“DPR”].” They basically “coordinate,” taking orders from him conditionally on a case-by-case basis, and conducting joint operations ad hoc. Following his withdrawal from Sloviansk to the city of Donetsk on July 5, Girkin/Strelkov announced his intention to establish a unified command under his own authority as “minister,” commander-in-chief, head of a “national security council,” city commandant of Donetsk, and even as chief of a “single military command of Novorossiya,” which would bring the Donetsk and “Luhansk People’s Republic’s” forces under his overall command (see EDM, July 14).
Those intentions remain unfulfilled to date. Meanwhile, Vladimir Antyufeyev—who on July 28 declared himself “acting prime minister” of the “DPR” as well as “acting commander-in-chief” of “DPR’s” forces (see Part One)—came in with supervisory powers over “state security” and “internal affairs” troops, and now with an acting defense minister’s title, or perhaps mere claim. As a Lieutenant-General, ranking far above Lieutenant-Colonel Girkin/Strelkov and the other commanders, Antyufeyev would be well placed to arbitrate among them. Apart from Girkin/Strelkov, the “DPR’s” most significant commanders are Aleksandr Khodakovsky and Igor Bezler.
Bezler, formerly a Lieutenant-Colonel in Russia’s special forces (akin to Girkin/Strelkov), took over the city of Horlivka in mid-April, operated for the most part separately from either the Slovyansk or the Donetsk commands, and ultimately left the city with some of his troops on or about July 26, as Ukrainian forces closed in. Bezler is said to be in Moscow at present. Remaining “DPR” fighters in Horlivka dangerously mined the Stirol chemical plant, owned by Dmytro Firtash, in that city. Bezler had made a specialty of collecting hostages for trade-offs. Following his departure, all remaining seventeen hostages were freed in return for the release of one Russian militant (Ukraiynska Pravda, July 28).
Khodakovsky, formerly a top officer of Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) in the Donetsk province, switched sides after the fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency and Russia’s paramilitary intervention. Khodakovsky became “DPR state security minister” and concurrently the commander of the “Vostok” battalion, the strongest force in the city of Donetsk until the arrival of Girkin/Strelkov’s force from Slovyansk. Their relations became so uneasy that Khodakovsky relocated to Makiyvka with a part of his force. Following the shooting down of the Boeing 777 on July 17, Khodakovsky told Reuters that he had heard from fellow officers about Russian BUK anti-aircraft missile systems delivered to “DPR” forces (Russkaya Vesna, July 10; RIA Novosti, July 28, 30).
Aleksandr Boroday (former “prime minister of DPR”), Girkin/Strelkov, and Antyufeyev are all carpet-baggers sent in from Russia (the first two of them argue that this is normal, as the Donbas and indeed Ukraine should rightfully belong to Russia). Symbolically, the local founding father of the “DPR,” Denis Pushilin, became chairman of its “parliament” in May. Having previously worked as a local agent for the MMM financial pyramid scheme, Pushilin was twice targeted (by shooting and a car bomb) in Donetsk in May and June, moved to Moscow by mid-June and sent a letter of resignation on July 18. The “parliament” has now elected an obscure veteran communist, Boris Litvinov, as chairman (RIA Novosti, dnr.today.news, July 29).
Russia wants such “representatives of the eastern regions” to participate in negotiations on settling the “crisis in Ukraine” and designing a “federal” constitution, on the back of Russia’s proxy forces. Moscow has already put Boroday forward for that political role, accepted by Berlin and the OSCE with alacrity. In fact, Russia has completely failed to assemble a political team that could represent this part of Ukraine in any negotiations.
President Petro Poroshenko’s peace plan envisages the disarmament (preferably voluntary) of pro-Russia forces in Ukraine’s east, political discussions with representatives of local society and interests, free elections to local government bodies, and parliamentary elections to be held here as part of Ukraine-wide elections. Hence the vital need to complete the anti-terror operation successfully by early autumn.
