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Last Updated: Aug 27, 2008 - 11:27:47 AM |
Keeping an eye on geopolitical parity is one duty Moscow never shirks
nowadays. Of course, it could adopt a different pattern of behavior and
succumb to Washington's every demand the way Yugoslavia once did. What
this compliance cost Yugoslavia is common knowledge. First, all
republics were encouraged to cede and leave Serbia all alone. Second,
the West left Serbia without its own ancestral lands of Kosovo and
Metochia. Even that is not all, or so it seems.
With President Boris Tadic studiously looking the other way, all of
Serbia may be restricted to Belgrade city limits soon. The Serbian way
of non- resistance to the bullying West is not for Russia. It follows
that something has to be done. Response to appearance of the American
ABM defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland should take the
form of an increased military presence of Russia in Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and also in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and
Belarus. As well as in Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela. (With Belarus,
everything is clear since we will form a union with this country one
fine day.)
Military experts say that these measures will neutralize the American
ABM defense system in Poland whose efficiency is going to be marginal
in any event. This system kills one missile out of five on its lucky
day and never even sees guided missiles with nuclear warheads.
President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin was demanding Russian
peacekeepers' withdrawal from the Trans-Dniester region and their
replacement with an international contingent barely a year ago. It took
Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov a great deal of patience and persuasion to
convince Voronin to learn to live up with the idea that Russia would
retain its presence in the region as long as assets of the 14th Army
remained there. As a matter of fact, Russia was supposed to withdraw
all of that from the region seven years ago, in keeping with the
Istanbul Accords (1999).
On the other hand, withdrawal from the Trans-Dniester region would have
meant leaving the self-proclaimed republic on its own and depriving
itself of a chance to establish a military base there one fine day. Now
that Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko reached an agreement with his
Romanian counterpart Traian Basescu to settle the Trans-Dniester
conflict without Moldova, Voronin has a chance (and the time) to
authorize an increase of the numerical strength of the Russian
peacekeeping contingent in the region and permit establishment of
Russian military bases just about anywhere in Moldova. Russian
peacekeepers in the Trans-Dniester region number almost 1,000 men these
days (two motorized infantry battalions, battalion of guards,
helicopter unit, and several auxiliary companies).
The contingent is to be increased to brigade's size soon. Also
importantly, the reinforced contingent will help Moldova itself with
its national security. Restoration of Russia's military presence in
Central Asia began in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Return to
these post-Soviet republics was anything but easy and unproblematic,
thanks to NATO. Return to Uzbekistan was particularly difficult.
President Islam Karimov was one of the initiators of the anti- Russian
GUUAM (an alliance of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova). Moreover, one of the first US military bases in the
post-Soviet zone was established precisely in Uzbekistan (in Khanabad).
Karimov even did his best to keep the Russian military out of
Kyrgyzstan, so that a major conflict between Moscow and Tashkent was
barely averted in 2001. In any event, Karimov and Voronin reconsidered
their options. Islamic gunmen provoked several border incidents several
years ago. The Uzbeks turned to the United States for help but
Washington chose to remain deaf to all requests.
Uzbek secret services in the meanwhile came by the documents proving
that the gunmen had aimed to seize Samarkand and Bukhara and - which
was particularly piquant - that they had elicited promises of non-
involvement from the Americans. Karimov did not forgive the Americans.
He ousted them from Uzbekistan in 2005 and invited the Russians to the
former US AF base a year later. Official Tashkent severed ties with the
Americans and withdrew from GUUAM. More or less analogous metamorphoses
occurred in Kyrgyzstan too.
Reassuring Moscow of his goodwill and readiness to advance relations
with it, President Askar Akayev did what he could to prevent transfer
of the airfield in Kant to the Russians. At the same time, he did not
exactly object to the American expansion into Central Asia so that the
US AF established its airbase in Manas right near the capital city of
Bishkek in 2002. Once the AF base was established, Islamic fanatics
launched their attacks - just the way it had been in Uzbekistan nearby.
Moreover, Akayev was hard pressed by existence of unsolved territorial
disputes with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, ones he couldn't hope to
settle on his own. Claiming to want "parity" in the country, Akayev
authorized establishment of a Russian military base. It was established
in 2003 (Russia has SU-25 ground-strafers based there). As for Akayev,
he told the Americans to vacate the premises in spring 2005 - the way
Karimov had done before him. When Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected the
president of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian military solidified its positions
in this country. Russia has several other military objects in
Kyrgyzstan these days - torpedo testing center, long-range
communications center, and seismic station working for the Russian
Strategic Missile Forces. It is necessary to add that Russian military
presence meets long-term interests of Central Asian republics.
The Tajik Pamir are Kyrgyz-populated. Samarkand and Bukhara in the
southern part of Uzbekistan are Tajik-populated. There are four Uzbek
enclaves on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. State borders actually exist
on paper because Central Asian states cannot maintain their integrity.
Skirmishes between border guards are not exactly unheard-of (one
involving Uzbek and Tajik border guards was reported only recently).
There is Afghanistan nearby, a major pain in the neck. Islamic
fundamentalists cross the borders without hindrance, ferrying into
Central Asia weapons, drugs, and ideology. All hopes are pinned on the
Russian military, particularly in Tajikistan. President Emomali
Rakhmonov kept stalling for time in the matter of permitting a Russian
military base in Tajikistan when his country's national security was
maintained by Russian border guards' presence. All of that ended in
December 2004 when Russia withdrew its border guards and left
Tajikistan facing the task of securing its own borders. It did not take
official Dushanbe long to realize the scope of problems it was facing
with Russian border guards gone and nobody to turn to for assistance.
Russia ended up owner of the Nurek electronic center in less than a
month.
Its 201st Motorized Infantry Division posted in Tajikistan was
developed into a fully-fledged military base. These days, three Russian
regiments are quartered in Dushanbe, Kulyab, and Kurgan-Tyube. By way
of military presence in Tajikistan, Russia also has a battery of Grad
multiple rocket launchers, AF group (five SU-25s), helicopter wing,
antiaircraft missile regiment, regiment of self-propelled artillery
pieces, and a regiment of jammers. Nearly 8,000 men strong, the Russian
military contingent includes 100 tanks and 300 infantry fighting
vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Also importantly, Tajikistan
does not even demand a rent for the military base. Georgia's reckless
foray into South Ossetia offered Moscow additional opportunities even
in this region that seemed lost to its influence forever. President of
South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity has already authorized establishment of a
major military base, and his Abkhazian counterpart Sergei Bagapsh is
expected to follow suit in the immediate future.
Political situation being what it is, Russian military presence in the
region will ensure its security in the Caucasus and serve as a
counterweight to American presence. The situation in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in the meanwhile may repeat itself again in Azerbaijan.
President Ilham Aliyev will probably be re-elected but the Americans
seem to be backing the Azerbaijani opposition rather than their
protege. There are no guarantees at all that Aliyev will tolerate it.
In fact, he is likely to do what his Uzbek and Kyrgyz colleagues did.
In the meantime, there is an obstacle to the Russian-Azerbaijani
rapprochement, one by name of Yerevan. Two years ago, Azerbaijani
Defense Minister Safar Abiyev declared his country ready "to take every
conceivable measure to restore territorial integrity and control over
Nagorno-Karabakh", and relations between Moscow and Baku plummeted.
Russian then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov proclaimed Moscow ready to
dispatch its military to Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh).
In fact, Ivanov repeated the offer to Stepanakert a year later.
Official Baku was understandably upset then. It is probably different,
these days. Aliyev may put up with deployment of the Russian military
in Stepanakert and with other, even more resolute, steps now. In any
event, Russian military analysts anticipate establishment of a Russian
military base in Azerbaijan in a foreseeable future - on Aliyev's
request. In other words, the Russian military returned to the borders
of the erstwhile USSR and established a security belt along the Russian
perimeter. Leaders of Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria offer territories of
their countries for Russian military bases too. It is going to put
Russia in a position where it will be able to make a lot of problems
for the United States in the Middle East and Latin America. Sure, it is
not going to endear Russia to Europe or America, but it will allow for
at least a semblance of military parity. Also importantly, this
expansion promises Russia both foreign political dividends and purely
economic ones. Control is frequently more rewarding than actual
possession.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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