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Dysfunctions Last Updated: Jan 14, 2017 - 8:49:43 AM


Belmokhtar is certainly today the most influential Al-Qaeda of the Sahel
By Célian Macé, Liberation, January 6, 2017
Jan 14, 2017 - 8:48:27 AM

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For the first time, this Friday, a study is published entirely devoted to the jihadist group Al-Mourabitoune. The author, Marc Mémier, carried out this study for the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). It details the trajectory of this organization led by the Algerian national Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and in particular his attachment, after a separation of three years, to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). An alliance that "benefits both parties," says the researcher.

How is Al-Qaeda organized in the Islamic Maghreb today?

A distinction must be made between theory and practice. In theory, AQIM is run by the Algerian "emir" Abdelmalek Droukdel since 2007. It is surrounded by a shura ("council") composed of the main leaders of the organization. Aqmi defined two major regions of influence: "the emirate of the Maghreb", also called "central emirate", and "the emirate of the Sahara". The latter is directed since October 2012 by the Algerian Djamel Okacha, alias Yahia Abou el-Houmâm. Its zone is divided into four main katibas (or brigades), each counting a few dozen combatants, themselves divided into smaller sections of a few men. Al-Mourabitoune has been added as a new katiba of the group since the end of 2015.

But this well-established pyramidal hierarchical order is very formal. In practice, katibas are relatively autonomous and the umbilical cord with the central emirate has been largely cut. Droukdel, isolated and far from the front, struggles to collect and impose himself as an authority on the Sahelian troops. In reality, AQIM operates as a fairly fragmented and decentralized organization, with multiple alliances, such as with Ansar ed-Dine (in Mali) or other groups operating in the region.

Why did Belmokhtar break with AQIM at the end of 2012?

AQMI documents found in the cities of northern Mali after the French military intervention of January 2013 [Operation Serval, which became Operation Barkhane in August 2014, ed] revealed the deep disagreements between Belmokhtar and Droukdel. These include hostage-taking, supply of weapons, security of communications or, more importantly, structuring of the organization. Belmokhtar denies the legitimacy of the decision-making power of the commanders in Kabylie over the Sahara area, where it has been established for years. Taking as an example the success of the Yemeni model (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), he called for the creation of an independent Sahelian branch of AQIM, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Sahel, directly attached to Al- Qaeda and its leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. In other words, he refutes the authority of Droukdel.

The latter will remove him from the command of his brigade in October 2012. The split becomes inevitable. A few weeks later, Belmokhtar announced in a famous video his break with AQIM and the creation of a new elite unit, the Signatories by blood [which will become a component of Al-Mourabitoune]. In the following months, Belmokhtar, which established its base in Gao, Mali, will show its power by carrying out large-scale operations on the traditional lands of AQIM, such as the hostage-taking of In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013.

How do you explain his return to the fold of AQMI in December 2015?

Firstly, it should be pointed out that there was never a complete break between Belmokhtar and Droukdel. Exchanges have been maintained. Weakened since the French intervention, AQMI needs new forces to continue to exist and remain visible. Hundreds of jihadists were killed in the fighting. Belmokhtar has always considered it a mistake to confront the French forces directly. In 2013, while AQIM is under French fire, Belmokhtar is conducting spectacular and very murderous attacks in In Amenas (Algeria), but also in Agadez and Arlit (Niger) against the French company AREVA and the Nigerian army.

He will also take advantage of his exile in Libya, or it probably happens in January 2014, to extend his influence in North Africa. It is the only one to have this ability to strike all over the Sahel. It is estimated that Al-Mourabitoune has about 200 to 250 men, including some fifty active combatants, spread over several small cells in the Sahelian countries and probably also in the coastal countries of West Africa. Weakened, AQMI needed new forces to continue to exist and remain visible. By its operational capabilities, its strength, the historical legitimacy of Belmokhtar and the extent of its networks, Al-Mourabitoune was an essential asset for AQIM. Droukdel then wrote to Belmokhtar calling him to join the ranks of AQIM.

What was Belmokhtar's interest in this rapprochement?

From Belgrade, Belmokhtar has been at the forefront of the rise of the Islamic state (ISIS) and the loss of fighters to join the cause of the Al-Baghdadi caliphate. He went in turn to approach Droukdel and proposed to "unite the moudjahidin", in order to counter the influence of the EI and retain the fighters within Al-Qaeda. But if AQMI needs Belmokhtar, the opposite is also valid, to a lesser extent. The chief of Al-Mourabitoune, too, is weakened. In 2014, his next lieutenants were killed one after the other. In May 2015, one of the executives of the movement, Adnane Abu Walid Al-Sahraoui, joined the EI with some of the Al-Mourabitoune men. Belmokhtar was also targeted by the intelligence services and sentenced to death by the Libyan branch of the Islamic State, which published a pursue warrant in August 2015 calling for his elimination/killing.

By reconnecting with AQMI, Belmokhtar can benefit from the "label" Al-Qaeda, its symbolic and media power. But this choice could also be dictated by more personal considerations. Belmokhtar has still not got what he wants for years: the creation of a Sahelian branch directly attached to Al-Qaeda Central. It is possible, but this is only a hypothesis, that by reintegrating the hierarchy of AQIM, Belmokhtar will continue this project, this time by positioning itself internally. It is now in a position of strength, as shown by its new place granted by Droukdel within the "council of chiefs" of AQIM.

In your report, you point to unprecedented funding sources for Al-Mourabitoune ...

What probably constituted the main source of funding for the Sahelian katibas between 2008 and 2012, would be the ransoms payments resulting from the taking of hostages, and which has virtually disappeared since the beginning of the French intervention in 2013. As for the connection with drug trafficking, which has been much advanced, it does not really exist in reality, at least not on a large scale. Al-Mourabitoune can indirectly benefit from these trafficking as a smuggler, but the smuggling of various necessities (food, medicine, fuel, etc.), of which there is less talk, is a better source of income.

According to the statements of several fighters of Al-Mourabitoune interviewed in Sahelian prisons, the financing would come today largely from private donations originating in the Middle East. These funds would flow through humanitarian organizations, religious foundations, mosques or, more informally, via a chain of Sahelian traders. In both cases, the mechanisms are private, indirect, and involve many intermediaries. They are particularly difficult to trace. Finally, part of the financing of Al-Mourabitoune comes from actions to protect and secure infrastructure, especially oil, in Libya.

The French forces appear to have led an air raid in Libya on the night of 14-15 November 2016, which targeted Belmokhtar. Is his elimination a priority of the French anti-terrorist endeavour?

No public confirmation has so far been put forward on the claim of this air raid. It is therefore advisable to remain cautious. But if it did, with all the political and diplomatic risks that such an operation entails (especially after the popular demonstrations this summer against the French presence in Libya), this would show the importance of this target. And that makes perfect sense. Belmokhtar is the jihadist who has carried out the most actions in the region over the last twenty years. He is the historical leader and certainly today the most influential Al-Qaeda cadre in the Sahelian strip. The rhetoric of Al-Mourabitoune is particularly anti-French, and the forces of Barkhane are in the sights of the group. Above all, most of the leaders of Al-Mourabitoune having been eliminated, killing Belmokhtar would probably mean the end or the break-up of his group, structured around his person and his long experience of jihad.


Source:Ocnus.net 2017

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