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Dysfunctions Last Updated: Oct 19, 2018 - 10:59:36 AM


Failed Space Launch Illuminates Russia’s Multiplying Misfortunes
By Eduard Abrahamyan, EDM 15/10/18
Oct 17, 2018 - 3:04:49 PM

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The booster malfunction in the third minute of the Soyuz MC-10 rocket launch last Thursday (October 11) avoided tragedy. Though they did not reach orbit, Cosmonaut Aleksei Ovchinin and astronaut Nick Hague landed safely on the ground (TASS, October 11). But it certainly represented another bad break for Russia’s space program. It also added to the chain of international and domestic setbacks Russia keeps generating for itself. Embarrassing blunders of military intelligence (GRU) operatives have exposed Russia to the pressure of new sanctions (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 7). Clumsy diplomatic posturing has raised the prospect of expulsion from the Council of Europe—or of Russia’s pre-emptive exit (Kommersant, October 12). The Constantinople Patriarchate has proceeded with granting independence to the Ukrainian Orthodox churches against fierce objections from the Russian patriarchate (Novaya Gazeta, October 11). And finally, the strategic deadlock in Russia’s Syrian intervention—aggravated by the quarrel with Israel triggered by the Syrian missile hit on a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance plane (see EDM, September 27, October 9)—has generated speculation about a new risky military adventure in war-torn Libya (RBC, October 9).

In this bleak context, the significance of the failed space launch illuminates the profound causes of each of these unrelated fiascoes. Indeed, the crisis in the Russian space industry goes deep and signifies the exhaustion of the old Soviet technological base and a lack of innovative designs (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11; see EDM, February 1, July 19). President Vladimir Putin has recently ordered the acceleration of work on the new heavy Angara-A5 rocket, but the main design bureau, Khrunichev Center, is suffering from a bad financial crisis and cannot rely on homemade substitutes for Western technologies (Bfm.ru, August 17). Russian engineers are trying to fix the technical defects after each failed launch; but the managers have no answer to the fast progress in the United States’ space programs, both public and commercial (RBC, October 11). For now and perhaps for the next couple of years, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is still interested in preserving cooperative ties with Roscosmos, but Moscow cannot count on retaining the competitive advantages it has enjoyed in the last couple of decades (Novaya Gazeta, October 11).

The structural crisis in the Russian space industry is aggravated by appallingly poor leadership, which is now entrusted to Dmitry Rogozin, known more for his bombastic statements than managerial skills (Lenta.ru, July 26). He supervised the construction of the new Vostochny cosmodrome in the Far East, which has become a symbol of runaway corruption (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 14). When a dangerous leak was discovered at the International Space Station last month, Rogozin was quick to blame US astronauts, hinting at sabotage (Kommersant, September 12). His assertions that Ovchinin and Hague can try again to reach orbit this spring is raising more concern than optimism (RIA Novosti, October 12).

Rogozin perfectly illustrates Putin’s problem of finding competent people for dealing with the accumulating problems. The president’s court is crowded with corrupt sycophants, among which he tries to identify loyalists who appear to lack significant ambition—but such individuals also tend to shirk responsibility. Presently, Putin is busy reshuffling the cohort of governors seeking to subdue discontent brewing in many regions, but it is futile to discern any logic in his appointments (Republic.ru, October 4). Notable among the discarded is Georgy Poltavchenko, who loyally served as the city governor of St. Petersburg for seven years and planned to continue (Carnegie.ru, October 5). He has been demoted, on October 3, to take charge of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) but is unlikely to perform any better than Rogozin does as the head of Roscosmos. The shipbuilding industry is indeed badly underperforming, not least due to Western sanctions. The Russian navy cannot stage enough parades and shows of flag to camouflage this crisis (Gazeta.ru, August 1).

All Russian state corporations, including the badly mismanaged Gazprom, excel at dressing up their demands for budget subsidies as “national security” matters. But Roscosmos has gone beyond that and turned into a virtual “black hole,” in which money disappears without any promise of returns. The hugely expensive construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome has brought no dynamism to the chronically depressed Far East (Forbes.ru, September 13). Nonetheless, the Khrunichev Center expects some $1.5 billion from the budget just to cover its debts, while every failed launch (four this year) adds to the list of undelivered commitments (RBC, September 28). Russian state budget expenditures, meanwhile, are being trimmed almost across the board, from military modernization to social benefits (Rosbalt, October 9).

Weak economic performance determines most of the particular setbacks and misfortunes, and scandalous corruption in the state corporations is one of the drivers for this trend (Navalny.com, October 11). This business “culture” compels even those foreign investors who know their way around the sanctions regime to reduce their Russian portfolios (RBC, October 12). The inescapable reality of falling incomes translates into broadening and deepening public disappointment in Putin’s “more of the same” course. And the propaganda campaign of blaming the hardships on Western hostility is no more convincing than Rogozin’s accusations of US astronauts drilling holes in the space station (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11). Irritation over shameless corruption and the urge for—rather than typical fear of—changes are not focused on the regional authorities but go all the way up (Snob.ru, October 9). Polls measuring public trust in Putin’s leadership have registered an unprecedented drop from 59 to 39 percent in less than a year (Levada.ru, October 8).

Little compelling evidence exists to suggest that the current sequence of setbacks for Russia is likely to reverse into a period of renewed good luck. The next launch of the legacy Soyuz rocket will hopefully be smooth; but even a successful liftoff will not cancel the organizational inefficiency and the technological backwardness of the Russian space industry. Putin needs to show resolute authority, but he cannot simply fire Rogozin. For one thing, this loud-mouth maverick makes for a poor scapegoat. But additionally, Putin fears elite intrigues and betrayals more than public discontent. The Kremlin has no way of knowing how much resilience there is in the seemingly rigid but severely corrupt system of power, but it cannot find a way to energize it in order to preempt the next disaster with a proactive move that would be a sure win. It appears, there is nearly no appetite for taking risks among the major stakeholders in the autumnal Putinist system.

--Pavel K. Baev


Pashinyan Formulates Armenia’s New Iran Strategy

Armenia’s interim Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held talks with Iranian President Dr. Hassan Rouhani, on September 26, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York (Premierminister.am, September 26). The meeting, initiated by the Iranian side, was immediately heralded as signifying a new era of amicable relations and strategic interaction (Panorama.am, September 27). Reportedly, the leaders touched upon a wide spectrum of issues, including trade and economy, transport logistics construction, as well as regional security challenges. President Rouhani noted that “the countries boast a high level of mutual trust” (Mehrnews.ir, September 26).

The perspective of dynamically developing ties with Iran fits into Pashinyan’s concept of forging long-term strategic relations with pro-Western democracy Georgia as well as theocratic authoritarian Islamist Iran (Hetq.am, June 5). Trapped in a conflict with arch-rival Azerbaijan and under an economic embargo by Turkey, landlocked Armenia considers positive diplomatic relations with its remaining neighbors, Georgia and Iran, to be of paramount importance. Moreover, the idea to pursue a qualitatively new paradigm of partnerships with Tbilisi and Tehran is plausibly driven by Pashinyan’s objective to build a foundation on which to balance Armenia’s profound dependence on Russia.

Earlier this year, in a phone conversation with Rouhani, the new Armenian prime minister reassured Iran’s president that Yerevan would continue to avoid any “anti-Iranian” international initiatives, which helped to dispel concerns in Tehran about the recent democratic revolution and resulting regime change in Armenia (Isna.ir, May 14). Soon thereafter, with bilateral trade turnover having grown to $264 million (Panorama.am, February 2), Pashinyan inaugurated the long-articulated Meghri trade zone in Armenia’s south, designed to boost economic/trade development with Iran as well as enable the establishment of new joint ventures. The Meghri trade zone is widely understood to be a key connection for Iran to be able to access the Russian-conceived Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which Armenia joined in 2015. Interestingly, however, the interim free trade accord reached between Iran and the EEU last May makes no mention of the Meghri site (Eurasiancommision.org, May 17).

In contemporary International Relations studies, the alignment between the market-leaning Christian democracy of Armenia and the Islamic theocracy-based authoritarian regime of Iran is often seen as a sporadic example of good neighborly relations between contrasting types of state systems (Edward Wastnidge, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami, 2016). This harmonious coexistence, however, is heavily based on historically shared interests and ethno-cultural similarities derived from civilizational closeness. Furthermore, it is underpinned by a mythologized ideational-political narrative in both societies about the competition between the “Turkic World” and “Pax-Iranica.” Nonetheless, Armenia and Iran have hitherto failed to reach an all-embracing strategic treaty, despite repeated attempts in past years.

The first visible efforts to develop an all-encompassing, institutionalized, long-term partnership were made under the presidencies of Mohammad Khatami and Robert Kocharyan, who assumed power in Iran (1997) and in Armenia (1998), respectively. The so-called Dialogue Amongst Civilizations concept, vigorously articulated by Khatami, become an operational framework for structurally renewing Iran’s foreign policy strategy, which hence reinvigorated Yerevan-Tehran ties. It suggested a milestone plan to reach a trilateral pact initially comprising Armenia and Iran as well as Greece. Based on this interplay, it was envisaged that Georgia, Syria, Cyprus and Bulgaria would also subsequently be drawn into this alliance. Outlining the negotiations held in Tehran in June 28, 1999, then–Greek defense minister Apostolos-Athanasios Tsokhatzopoulos announced that Greece, Iran and Armenia would soon allegedly sign a defense cooperation agreement to substantially reinforce the tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, adopted back in 1997. The statement ultimately sparked discontent in the United States and Russia, however. And the process of trilateral rapprochement was derailed, restraining Greece and Armenia from further steps, including the presumed exchange of military expertise and technologies.

As WikiLeaks revealed, the pressure tactics applied by some US officials but most aggressively by Russia resulted in revisions to the Armenia–Iran gas pipeline, which was then under construction. The initially agreed-upon pipeline diameter were severely downgraded, making it of little use even for Armenian domestic needs. And later, as a result of corrupt deals during 2013–2016, all of the Armenia–Iran pipeline infrastructure was taken over by Gazprom, sparking bewilderment in Iran (Lragir.am, August 3, 2016).

Under Serzh Sargsyan’s rule, Armenian relations with Iran drifted toward gradual stagnation stemming from his government’s chronic difficulties with formulating a strategic vision for his country. Moreover, Yerevan’s inertia was combined with Tehran’s reluctance to irritate Moscow by encroaching on what Russia considers its zone of privileged interests. With Armenia’s accession to the EEU at the expense of prospective relations with the European Union, Yerevan found itself significantly constrained in its ability to pursue a diversified foreign policy. On the other hand, the nuclear deal the international community soon reached with Iran yielded a relatively favorable environment for Armenia (see Commentaries, August 7, 2015). Sargsyan’s regime thus started championing Armenia as a bridge between the EEU and Iran. However, the Iranian side showed somewhat less enthusiasm, considering this initiative more of a Russian than an Armenian idea. Conversely, Armenia’s continued attempts at euro-integration (see EDM, December 4, 2017) were tolerated by Tehran as it considered Yerevan a convenient “channel” for dealing with the West.

In those intervening years, Serzh Sargsyan’s succeeding prime ministers Tigran Sargsyan and Karen Karapetyan failed to carry out a series of joint projects with Iran—namely, the Iran–Armenia North-South highway and railway (see EDM, June 24, 2015). Part of the problem was their limited room for collaborating with Tehran, primarily due to a need to consider Russian interests. This behavior obviously irked the Iranians, who opted to expand Iran’s cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan (see EDM, November 9, 2017), so as not to be trapped by Russia’s zero-sum playbook while dealing with Armenia.

In private meetings, some Iranian diplomats admit that the Armenian “Velvet Revolution” to a certain degree engendered hope in Tehran that the new leadership in Yerevan might prefer to rehabilitate the atmosphere of strategic alignment in an effort to diversify Armenia’s stagnating foreign and security policies. Yet, Moscow is certain to view any such steps taken by Yerevan as threat to its preponderance in Armenia and to challenge these moves. Above all, however, the main obstacle Armenia’s post-revolutionary government may need to overcome in seeking closer ties with Iran is the predictable anger from Washington. To alleviate the negative consequences, Yerevan may try to take a proactive approach by initiating a genuine and transparent dialogue with Washington about its intentions to mitigate Russia’s malign influence while additionally seeking to regionally balance the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance through a partial co-alignment with Iran.


Source:Ocnus.net 2018

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