Is it time to revisit more radical concepts of mutual deterrence such as that which the U.S. partook in during the early years of the Berlin Wall, in the 1960s, with the Soviet Union? We had a unique arrangement, the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, that carried over from post-World War II. The U.S. and USSR each allowed a team of 14 men to patrol the other’s side of the wall dividing East and West Germany. The U.S. had a military liaison mission in the Soviet Zone of Berlin, while the Soviets had a similar mission on the other side of the wall in Frankfurt. (The British and French had counterpart missions with the Soviets as well). The theory was that mutual observation would prevent possible hostilities — “tinderbox points — from erupting into more serious circumstances that might start World War III.

Says U.S. Army Col. (ret.) Paul Skowronek (USMA 1941) of that time, “Nowhere else in the world did the Russians permit such an arrangement, where tensions and dangerous misconceptions could be reduced by allowing their military establishment to be observed, if only enough to prove that they were not preparing to attack the West.” Col. Skowronek headed the U.S. Military Liaison Mission from 1963 to 1967.

Skowronek noted that reciprocal benefits provided practical experience in international arms inspection, albeit in a limited region, which could influence attitudes toward verification systems for arms control or for preventing a surprise attack. The arrangement also proved valuable in providing consistent communication between enemies. The Russians, as a secondary reward for their willingness to accept American observation teams, were able to maintain surveillance over U.S. military commitments to NATO in critical areas of West Germany.

Granted, this was all a “strange military accommodation,” as Col. Skowronek called it, but if there were a wall right now in eastern Ukraine or other hotspots we share with Russia, would such an arrangement ease ongoing tensions? (Following the success of the East/West Germany missions, in fact, there were proposals — endorsed by the Soviet Union — to include Poland and Czechoslovakia in a nuclear-free zone of Central Europe subject to international inspection[1]). Could the concept be applied to other areas of international tension?

Col. Skowronek pointed out to this author that prior military liaison missions helped to stabilize precarious standoffs along some of the most dangerous points of confrontation.

Of note, however, is point #2 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement that states, regarding the mission, “There will be no political representation.” This same premise is important for any future military liaison missions; they would best be served by top-notch, trained negotiators — not politicians with personal agendas. The liaison mission concept could be used in any number of precarious places in the world right now.

Author’s note: Col. Skowronek, now age 97, resides in San Antonio.

[1] Bender, East Europe in Search of Security, Chatto & Windus, 1972, p. 76