Putin has sent in his air force and ‘trainers’ into Syria. In recent weeks Russia expanded its airbase in Latakia Province, bringing in thirty-four jet fighters (mainly Su-30s and Su-24s) about two dozen attack and transport helicopters, a strategic airlifter, and drones and two airborne electronic monitoring planes (IL-20 ‘Coot’). Russia’s ships brought in advanced battlefield armoured vehicles and weapons. U.S. military officials say Moscow has established sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry in the country. These include four BM-30 Smerch multiple-rocket-launching systems. Several hundred additional troops were deployed as “advisers” to Assad’s militia, not only in Latakia and Tartous provinces on the Mediterranean, but also near the front-lines in Hama and Homs provinces.

This array of military might has been directed at fighters which are not part of ISIL but are affiliated or associated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) The FSA has been armed and trained by U.S. Special Forces, many of whom remain in advisory positions on the ground in Syria. Putin’s objective is to support the aims of the faltering Assad regime.

The success of the Russian strikes has been achieved by the dropping of ‘dumb’ bombs (those without a guidance system) and a series of ZAB 2.5M sub munitions of RBK-500 “cluster bombs’ banned by international convention. So far their air assault task has been easy as they have faced no opposition in the air and the FSA ground to air missiles are currently too primitive to effectively counter the air strikes. However, this is how their adventure in Afghanistan began.

In defence of a government which the Soviets had installed in Kabul, the Soviets sent its troops across the Afghan border on Christmas day 1979. They rapidly occupied the area around the capital but their opposition, the mujahidin scattered to the rural areas. Initially the Soviets had overwhelming firepower and air supremacy. However, with the introduction of “Red-eye” and “Stinger” missiles and modern equipment the mujahidin were able to shoot down Soviet helicopters and to destroy Soviet tanks. These were largely supplied by the U.S. in Operation Cyclone (“Charlie Wilson’s War”). The mujahidin began a war of attrition with the occupying Soviet troops. This was very expensive in men, material and propaganda. It was bleeding the Soviet military dry and winning no friends around the world. Equally as important it distressed the parents and families of these soldiers who were suffering and dying in Afghanistan, creating a major gulf between them and the Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev Governments.

There are many recent developments in Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) including a range of laser-guided missiles capable of bringing down most of the Russian rotary wing and some fixed wing aircraft using relatively unsophisticated delivery systems. These are now being supplied to some groups of FSA insurgents. Saudi Arabia has also stepped up its supply of these to its allies in Syria.

Importantly, the Russian air strikes have served as a catalyst to unite, however temporarily, the disparate anti-Assad forces in pursuit of their common enemies - Assad’s forces and ISIL. A group of 41 rebel brigades, including Islamist battalions and many of those who have received U.S. backing, issued an appeal for help Monday from their Arab allies to counter the Russian intervention, which they called “a clear invasion of the country.” The signatories included the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham rebel group as well as more moderate units that have received help in the form of weapons and training provided by the United States and its allies, such as Suqour al-Jabal and Tajamu al-Izza, which are among the groups targeted by the Russian airstrikes. The al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra was not among them, though the group also has a strong presence in the areas under Russian attack and is supported by Turkey.[i]

This co-operation among the groups will allow the stationing in Syria of the most devastating response to Russian aircraft -  the delivery of two or three Patriot missile systems to the FSA fighters. These have already been used by Israel on September 23, 2014 to shot down a Syrian SU-24 aircraft which strayed into Israeli air space. The MIM-1-4 Patriot is a surface to air missile (SAM) which has been in use since the mid-1980s. It has been sold to many of Syria’s neighbours (Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE). In December 2012 NATO installed Patriot batteries in Turkey to protect its border with Syria. These could have a devastating effect on the Syrian aircraft as well as the Russian; a reprise of the Afghan disaster where the Russians lost their air dominance of the theatre.

On October 4, 2015 there was a new development in the reaction to the Russian airstrikes. Turkey made a very strong protect to Russia over the incursion into Turkish air apace of a SU-30 SM aircraft. According to NATO, the violations occurred “on 3 October and 4 October by Russian Air Force SU-30 and SU-24 aircraft in the Hatay region. The aircraft in question entered Turkish airspace despite Turkish authorities’ clear, timely and repeated warnings. In accordance with NATO practice, Turkish fighter aircraft responded to these incursions by closing to identify the intruder, after which the Russian planes departed Turkish airspace.”

Aviation experts say that the plane was a Russian Su-30SM which maintained a radar lock on one or both the Turkish F-16s for a full 5 minutes and 40 seconds. According the Russians, the violation was due to a “navigation error”. That is bizarre as the type of navigation systems carried by the Su-30 SM  (a 4++ generation fighter) is very sophisticated. It also doesn’t explain why the Russian plane locked on to the Turkish F-16s for such a long time: instead of turning back. If it had locked on to the F16 the Sukhoi was ready to fire (or to respond to fire).

This action by the Russian pilots was a very serious error. Turkey is part of NATO and for a Russian aircraft to lock into a position of attack on a Turkish jet inside Turkish airspace in a serious violation of the NATO rules of engagement. In 2014, a Syrian Mi-17 was shot down by a TuAF F-16, while in 2013 it was the turn of a Syrian Mig-23. Turkey immediately took up the matter of the armed Russian invasion of its airspace. On October 5,2015. NATO held an emergency meeting in Brussels of ambassadors from its 28 member states to respond to what Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called "unacceptable violations of Turkish airspace" after a Russian jet crossed its frontier with Syria on Saturday (3 October). Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, whose country is one of Assad's fiercest foes in the region, said Russia's defence of the Syrian leader was a "grave mistake". "Assad has committed state terrorism, and unfortunately you find Russia and Iran defending (him)," Erdoğan was quoted by Hurriyet as saying.[ii] Turkey has now stated that it has the right to shoot down any Russian planes in its airspace.

While it is of no small interest that Turkey has asserted its right to shoot down Russian planes invading its airspace and has emphasised that an invasion of NATO airspace by Russian fighters will engage all of NATO in Turkey’s defence, a far more devastating response by Turkey is available. Without Turkey’s consent Russians will have no warm-water port and the Black Sea fleet in the Crimea will be useless.

The control of the access to the Black Sea depends on Turkey and the Turkish Navy at the pinch points of the Bosporus and the Straits of the Dardanelles, both parts of Turkey...

The question of the free access to the Black Sea was settled at the Montreux Convention Regarding the Control of the Straits when it was signed on 29 July 1936. It is a recognised international agreement; registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on 11 December 1936. It regulates the transit of naval warships.  The Convention gives Turkey full control over the Straits and guarantees the free passage of civilian vessels in peacetime. However, it also restricts the passage of naval ships not belonging to Black Sea states. The terms of the convention have been the source of controversy over the years, especially over the efforts of the Soviet Navy trying to get access to the Mediterranean through the Straits.

Without the permission of Turkey Russian warships are not allowed to pass freely through the Straits. The Convention provided that Turkey was authorised to close the Straits to all foreign warships in wartime or when it was threatened by aggression; additionally, it was authorised to refuse transit from merchant ships belonging to countries at war with Turkey. Non-Black Sea state warships in the Straits must be less than 15,000 tons. No more than nine non-Black Sea state warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of no more than 30,000 tons, may pass at any one time, and they are permitted to stay in the Black Sea for no longer than twenty-one days.

When the Soviet Union made its pact with Hitler in 1939 it tried to use this agreement to force Turkey to abandon its control of the Straits. The Turks refused. In 1946 the Soviet Union demanded that the Turks relinquish sole authority over the Straits. This Turkish Straits crisis backfired on the Soviets when Turkey renounced its neutrality and accepted Truman’s offer of military aid. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952. The U.S. worked with the Turks to set up air bases and signals bases on the Soviet border. Turkish troops fought alongside other NATO members in the Korean War. The Soviets continued to object but made no progress. In the 1960s the U.S. naval vessels were given regular, unheeded, access to the Black Sea. In April 1982 the Convention was amended to allow the Turkish authorities to close the Straits at its discretion.

Despite efforts by the Soviet Union and its successor Russia to change the rules of access through the Straits and to apply the United Nations Convention of the Laws of the Sea of freedom of movement, Turkey has refused to ratify that treaty and the Montreux rules still apply. Turkey has the right to close off the Straits to foreign shipping whenever it so wishes, especially if there is a state of conflict between Russia and Turkey. If the straits are closed the Russians cannot supply shiploads of weapons or equipment to Tartous. It will have to use aircraft for all deliveries and will be denied permission to overfly NATO states in the region. The area around the Black Sea is full of U.S. Aegis missiles, capable of intercepting and destroying anything the Russians might attempt to use.

A report by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in September 2011 concluded that the Aegis missile system represents a grave threat to Russian nuclear strategy. “The focus is on what would be the main concern of cautious Russian military planners —the capability of the missile defines interceptors to simply reach, or “engage,” Russian strategic warheads—rather than whether any particular engagement results in an actual interception, or “kill.” Interceptors with a kinematic capability to reach Russian ICBM warheads would be sufficient to raise concerns in Russian national security circles – regardless of the possibility that Russian decoys and other countermeasures might defeat the system in actual engagements. In short, even a missile defence system that could be rendered ineffective could still elicit serious concern from cautious Russian planners.”

“Such large numbers of interceptors, which might in reality have little capability in combat, could be expected to create fears among Russian political and military leaders that the PAA [Phased Adaptive Approach] could cause some attrition of Russian warheads. According to the FAS report, shore-based radar units to support Aegis missile targeting by US warships are   already installed around the Black Sea shore in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia. Others are on U.S. naval vessels, like the USS Vella Gulf, currently in the Black Sea.[iii] Russian pilots are risking far more than their own personal safety by flying into Turkey.

There is another, non-lethal response to the Russian air campaign in Syria; one sponsored by Saudi Arabia. Saudi supports a range of Sunni fighters in Syria, some of whom have just been bombed an attacked by Russian planes. In addition to increasing the equipment being supplied to its allies inside Syria, the Saudis are preparing for a major blow against Russia.

Syrian rebels and their Saudi and Gulf Arab backers are dug in for the long haul and have the willingness and capacity to pay a much higher price for victory than Russia can at the end of a precarious supply chain. Riyadh has also positioned itself well to equip its Syrian proxies against Russian forces. In December 2013, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, approved a Saudi request to purchase nearly 14,000 TOW anti-tank missiles – ideal for Syrian rebels needing a cheap and effective counter to the Russian-backed Assad regime’s tanks. The missiles began arriving in 2015, with deliveries continuing for three years thereafter.

But Saudi Arabia has another, and perhaps more powerful weapon at its disposal: punishing Russia economically by keeping oil prices low. In 1985-1986, the Saudis massively expanded oil production to regain market share.  Riyadh’s action drove prices down by more than 60% and they did not recover until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait five years later. The prolonged period of low oil prices shattered the Soviet Union’s brittle, oil-dependent economy, hastening its collapse. In the current situation, oil prices have also fallen by roughly 60% and a recovery to the levels Russia needs to fund itself (more than $100/bbl) could take years.

Russia is highly vulnerable if the Saudis open the taps a bit more and further depress prices. Russian Deputy Energy Minister Alexei Teksler recently told journalists that if prices fall below $40/barrel, Russian oil production is likely to contract. Furthermore, the impact of low oil prices on Moscow’s coffers is not limited to crude oil: much of Gazprom’s gas exports to Europe are still priced on oil-linked formulas.

Moreover, the margins on Russian versus Saudi oil are very different. Despite a relative decline, Saudi Arabia is capable of producing additional supply with relatively little lead time. Saudi Arabia’s core fields produce oil for as little as US$ 4-5 per barrel. While the bulk of Russia’s Western Siberia fields, which account for the lion’s share of the country’s oil output, has production costs closer to $35/bbl even accounting for the rouble’s devaluation. Atop this, pipeline and maritime shipping likely adds another $10-15/barrel. In contrast to Russia, Saudi Arabia likely has the productive and national financial wherewithal to survive at least a year in a $30/barrel environment. In addition, the burgeoning U.S. production of shale oil will soon be opened for exports to the world as the Congress sheds the 1972 restrictions on the export of oil products. This will be a blow which will destroy the Russian economy without firing a shot.[iv]

So Russia is risking a great deal in its Syrian adventure and may soon face the consequences. There is no need to only expand a military response to its folly in Syria, however tempting. There are other tools like losing the Dardanelles and driving down the price of oil which will have more devastating and long-lasting results.

[iv] Gabriel Collins, “Russian Intervention In Syria Could Drive Crude Prices Deep Into The $30s”, Oil Pro 6/10/15