The economic situation in France is grave. President Hollande has just replaced several of his key ministers over the issue of continued austerity in France. In a recent interview in Le Monde, Hollande admitted that that the austerity policies France he had been compelled to follow to meet the eurozone�s budget deficit target had made it quite impossible to achieve a recovery after six months of zero growth and more than a year of weak economic activity. Yet, when faced by a similar analysis by his Economy Minister, Arnaud Montebourg, Hollande disagreed and accepted the resignation of the minister. Now he is embarked on a further plan of austerity to fit inside the eurozone�s Procrustean bed; trying to achieve growth at a time of deeply inadequate demand.

One constraint on choosing where to reduce government spending in France results from the effects of the major reductions already made in the 2013 budget which removed billions of Euros from government departments. Among the hardest hit by these reductions has been the French military. It has been the role of the French military in military engagements all over the globe which has maintained French prestige and power in international councils. The French military posture and the French government�s willingness to employ this military power has maintained the image of France as a major player; particularly in Africa where its client states have provided France with a collegium of votes within the UN structures.

The 2013 defence budget sliced �720 million from equipment spending. The 2014 budget calls for an additional cut of �355 million (US $484 million). In May 2014 the heads of the various French forces threatened to resign over the issue of cuts. Le Drian, the Defence Minister, proposed raising money by selling the government�s shareholdings in defence companies (�500 million).

This will not solve many problems as France has already spent much of its 2014 military budget in operations around the globe. Le Drian wrote that �7 billion of equipment contracts planned for 2014 and 2015 would be delayed, which would have �disastrous industrial consequences.� Thousands of jobs will be lost at Nexter and Renault Trucks Defence in the land sector, at Concarneau, Cherbourg and Saint-Nazaire shipyards and especially in the aerospace industry. There are severe consequences, particularly for the nuclear deterrent, for a planned order of the Airbus A330 multirole tanker and transport plane and for the Army, which is woefully under-equipped. Intelligence-gathering kit, including a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV, Ceres spy satellite and light aircraft, would be delayed, he said. There are fears that defence will be slashed despite the 2014-19 multiyear budget law being adopted. The six-year plan sets a total spending of �190 billion, with an annual �31.4 billion budget. The French are dependent on the order from Russia for the three ships to keep the military financially afloat.

The problem for France is that it maintains wide engagement of its military in operations outside of metropolitan France. These are very expensive. There are currently 36,000 French troops deployed in foreign territories-such operations are known as "OPEX" for Op�rations Ext�rieures ("External Operations"). Among other countries, France provides troops for the United Nations force stationed in Haiti following the 2004 Haiti rebellion (the MINUSTAH). France has sent 235 troops, especially special forces, into Afghanistan to help the United States and NATO. In Op�ration Licorne a force of 435 French soldiers is still stationed in C�te d'Ivoire on a UN peacekeeping mission. The French Armed Forces have also played a leading role in other ongoing UN peacekeeping missions.� �France is participating in 8 of 16 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, with 952 total personnel (48 civilian police officers, 16 military observers and 888 troops) deployed under United Nations mandates.

The French Joint Force and Training Headquarters (L'Etat-Major Interarmees de Force et d'Entrainment) at Air Base 110 near Creil is the principal command and control centre for medium or large-scale international operations. They conducted the French side of the no-fly zone over northern Libya, during the Libyan Civil war. This operation was known as Op�ration Harmattan.

The French presence is particularly significant in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), with 859 military personnel. The remainder of French personnel have been mainly assigned as military observers and senior staff officers. In addition to this direct contribution to peacekeeping operations, France is also contributing about 6,600 troops to peacekeeping operations under UN mandate within the framework of the EU, NATO and in a national capacity, often in particularly dangerous areas.

On 10 November 2008, the EU Council adopted a joint action, Operation Atalanta, establishing a military operation providing for the deployment of a naval force off the coast of Somalia in support of UNSC resolutions pertaining to the fight against piracy in Somalia. France is taking part in Atalanta with a frigate permanently deployed throughout the entire duration of the operation and the temporary participation of a maritime patrol aircraft, ATL 2, based in Djibouti. �France plays an active role in the EULEX Kosovo �rule of law� mission, which replaced the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in December 2008 with. 192 troops deployed. France has a limited number of troops involved in several other operations, notably the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe�s mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (OSCEBIH).

Since colonial days France has stationed its troops across Africa in permanent bases. These participate in controlling the internal politics of the African nations of franćafrique.

These included:

1. C�te d�Ivoire, where the French troops in Operation Licorne and its helicopters recently overthrew the government of Gbagbo and supervised the killing of numerous Ivoirian citizens in collaboration with UN Peacekeepers.
2. b. Chad, with the Epervier mission. Established in 1986 to help re-establish peace and maintain Chad�s territorial integrity, and establish and protect the government of Deby
3. c. France is present in Mali since January 2013 in support of the Malian authorities in the fight against terrorist groups. 2,900 men were deployed with the Serval operation.
4. Since December 2013, France also operates in the Central African Republic in support of the MISCA, the African Union peacekeeping operation. 1,600 men are deployed with the Sangaris operation.
5. France also supports the participation of African soldiers in peacekeeping operations through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP) program

Recently the French have concentrated their troop deployments in West Africa to fight the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Around 3,000 soldiers will remain in the expansive Sahel area of Africa to check Islamist violence and arms trafficking, with no specified exit date. French forces will be organised around four base camps, each with its own focus, and with headquarters based in the Chadian capital of Ndjamena

This new operation is known as Operation Berkhane (the name refers to a sickle-shaped sand dune). It is an effort to streamline French military activity in the region and to retain the military power but reduce the costs of duplication of tasks. Following diplomatic agreements with Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (the �Sahel G-5�), over 3,000 French troops will be involved in securing the Sahel-Sahara region in cooperative operations involving G-5 troops. Other assets to be deployed in the operation include 20 helicopters, 200 armoured vehicles, 200 trucks, six fighter-jets, ten transport aircraft and three drones^[i]

The initiation of Operation Barkhane brings an end to four existing French operations in Africa; Licorne (C�te d�Ivoire, 2002-2014), �pervier (Chad, 1986-2014), Sabre (Burkina Faso, 2012-2014) and Serval (Mali, 2013-2014). Licorne is coming to an end (though 450 French troops will remain in Abidjan as part of a logistical base for French operations) while the other operations will be folded into Operation Barkhane. Operation Sangaris (Central African Republic, 2013-present) is classified as a humanitarian rather than counter-terrorism mission and the deployment of some 2,000 French troops will continue until the arrival of a UN force.. Some 1,200 French soldiers will remain in northern Mali. Existing French military deployments in Djibouti, Dakar (Senegal) and Libreville (Gabon) are expected to be scaled back significantly

The French Army, especially the Foreign Legion, has been very active in African political affairs, keeping in power France�s political friends among the African presidents and ousting others who were less appreciative of French post-colonial rule. These external obligations have proved to be a growing burden on the French budget without all of the traditional substantial returns to the French economy coming from the monopolistic presence of France in the economies of franćafrique. Globalisation has led these nations to turn to alternative markets for their products and they have been willing recipients of investments from countries outside of France � notably China. Despite the economic burden, France has chosen to maintain the post-colonial dominance of the political and military structures of its former colonies but is now suffering from the diminishing returns to the French economy of these expenditures. The normal French military presence in Africa costs �400�450 million a year. Government planning estimates put the cost of a long-term sustained operation in Mali at �300�400)[ii]. Although popular, the Mali operation is very expensive and its costs have been increased by operations in the Central African Republic.

An additional factor in the changing French relationship to Africa derives from the challenges to Hollande in taking over the burden of empire from Nicholas Sarkozy in May 2012. The campaign for the French Presidency was fought almost entirely on French domestic issues which, at that time, favoured the Socialists. France�s African policy was not a factor in the election.

This was because there has almost never been a parliamentary oversight of African policy in French politics. African policies have been direct responsibility of the French President and a small coterie of advisors. This tradition started under DeGaulle, reflecting the powerful lobbies of the French Masons in France�s colonial policies. Jacques Foccart, De Gaulle�s �eminence grise� was �Mr. Africa� and was in personal control of African policies � including coups, assassinations and ethnic cleansing.

The French Masons represent the elite of French business and politics, Most of them were educated together at the same two schools and most pursue a career in the administration of the French government or the administration of French business. The majority of this elite has been educated at the �cole nationale d'administration (ENA), founded by DeGaulle in 1945 or at the �cole Polytechnique.

Freemason lodges maintain a formidable, covert influence within the French judicial and police structures. All three Freemason lodges in France have gained reputations in recent years for being caught out peddling political influence and pursuing false invoicing on state contracts, particularly in companies controlled by the state. Freemasons in the judiciary hamper any investigations through bureaucratic measures designed to torpedo any serious attempt at reform. They have played a major role in French colonialism and France�s post-colonial dominance of its former colonies. One of the topmost grievances raised by the muzzled French press has been the Grande Lodge National Fran�aise�s (GLNF) open-armed embrace of brutal or corrupt African dictators who are Masons. The other two Grand Lodges are no different.

Just as in France, Freemasonry is ubiquitous at the very top of many African states. Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese president, is Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Congo � Brazzaville linked to the National Grand Lodge of France; President Mamadou Tanja of Niger; Chad�s Idriss Deby and Fran�ois Boziz� of the Central African Republic were among at least twelve African presidents linked to the Masons. In November 2009 Ali Bongo, the new Gabonese President was ordained as the grand master of the Grand Lodge of Gabon (GLB) and the Grand Equatorial Rite, the two predominant Freemason orders in Gabon. In Congo-Brazzaville, both the current president, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and the former president, Pascal Lissouba, are freemasons, although they belong to different chapters of the order. Mr Lissouba is an initiate of the Grand Orient of France while Mr Sassou Nguesso belongs to a Senegalese lodge affiliated to the French Grand National Lodge. Most of these African presidents, but not exclusively, are francophone: Paul Biya, president of Cameroon, Blaise Campaore, president of Burkina Faso; Robert Guei, former head of C�te d�Ivoire; John Kuffuor, former president of Ghana, to name but a few. There are scores more at Cabinet level. They maintain close links with their French colleagues. The custom is that the French Presidential cabal keeps the Africans in power using the French military; rich through the French companies; and, in turn, the Africans supply tens of millions of euros for the French electoral campaigns � all without public discussion or parliamentary involvement.

Under Chirac, African policy was run by the President himself. He worked with the �Cellule Africaine� composed of African Advisor Michel De Bonnecorse, Aliot-Marie (the Defence Minister) and DGSE chief Pierre Brochand. They were aided by a web of French agents assigned to work undercover in Africa, embedded in� �French companies like Bouygues, Delmas, Total, and other multinationals; pretending to be expatriate employees.

Under Sarkozy the �Cellule Africaine� was run by the President and included �Bruno Joubert and an informal adviser and Sarkozy envoy, Robert Bourgi. Claude Gu�ant, secretary general of the presidency and later interior minister, played an influential role.

This changed dramatically under Hollande. Hollande did not automatically inherit the background support of the French business community on taking office; especially the leaders of French Masonry despite being educated at ENA. Unlike the Socialist, Mitterand, who was a much more flexible ideologue capable of serving both Vichy as well as republican France in his career, Hollande won office through a domestic reaction against Big Business. Holland promised to impose a 75% levy on high-income earnings and to introduce a broad swathe of confiscatory taxes on business activities. This has been the bone of contention between him and business and is has not diminished in his current predicament.

Hollande�s �Cellule Africaine� is composed of his trusted friends: Jean-Yves Le Drian (Minister of Defence); the chief of his personal military staff, General Beno�t Puga; the African Advisor H�l�ne Le Gal, and a number of lower-level specialists from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury. There are few direct interactions with French Big Business who choose to deal directly with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, primarily through the �old Boy� network of �Enarchist� civil servants.

This would not matter much except for the fact that France has run out of money and is also running out of credit. This is a problem for France and the eurozone but also a very serious problem for Africa, especially French Africa which largely continues to operate under the terms of the post-colonial Colonial Pact

The problem is that francophone Africa is composed of several independent states dominated by the French under the terms of the Colonial Pact.

It was Foccart "the eminence grise" who negotiated the Pacte Coloniale with the evolving French West African states who achieved their "flag independence " in 1960. Not really having planned for it, in 1960 de Gaulle had to improvise structures for a collection of small newly independent states, each with a flag, an anthem, and a seat at the UN, but often with precious little else. It was here that Foccart came to play an essential role, that of architect of the series of Cooperation accords with each new state in the sectors of finance and economy, culture, education, and the military. There were initially eleven countries involved: Mauritania, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Madagascar. Togo and Cameroon, former UN Trust Territories, were also co-opted into the club. So, too, later on, were Mall and the former Belgian territories (Ruanda-Urundi, now Rwanda and Burundi, and Congo-Kinshasa), some of the ex-Portuguese territories, and Comoros and Djibouti, which had also been under French rule for many years but became independent in the 1970s. The whole ensemble was put under a new Ministry of Cooperation, created in 1961, separate from the Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories (known as the DOM-TOM) that had previously run them all.

The key to all this was the agreement signed between France and its newly-liberated African colonies which locked these colonies into the economic and military embrace of France. This Colonial Pact not only created the institution of the CFA franc, it created a legal mechanism under which France obtained a special place in the political and economic life of its former colonies.

The Pacte Coloniale Agreement enshrined a special preference for France in the political, commercial and defence processes in the African countries. On defence it agreed two types of continuing contact. The first was the open agreement on military co-operation or Technical Military Aid (AMT) agreements, which weren't legally binding, and could be suspended according to the circumstances. They covered education, training of servicemen and African security forces. The second type, secret and binding, were defence agreements supervised and implemented by the French Ministry of Defence, which served as a legal basis for French interventions. These agreements allowed France to have pre-deployed troops in Africa; in other words, French army units present permanently and by rotation in bases and military facilities in Africa; run entirely by the French (but paid for by the African hosts).

In summary, the colonial pact maintained the French control over the economies of the African states; it took possession of their foreign currency reserves; it controlled the strategic raw materials of the country; it stationed troops in the country with the right of free passage; it demanded that all military equipment be acquired from France; it took over the training of the police and army; it required that French businesses be allowed to maintain monopoly enterprises in key areas (water, electricity, ports, transport, energy, etc.).� France not only set limits on the imports of a range of items from outside the franc zone but also set minimum quantities of imports from France. These treaties are still in force and operational although somewhat more relaxed in their application.

One of the most potent measures of control of African economies has been the pooled currency, the Communuate Financiere de l'Afrique (CFA) franc. The WAEMU CFA franc is issued by the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) and the CEMAC CFA franc is issued by the BEAC (Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale). These currencies were originally both pegged at 100 CFA for each French franc but, after France joined the European Community's eurozone at a fixed rate of 6.65957 French francs to one Euro, the CFA rate to the Euro was fixed at CFA 665,957 to each Euro, maintaining the 100 to 1 ratio. It is important to note that it is the responsibility of the French Treasury to guarantee the convertibility of the CFA to the Euro.

The monetary policy governing such a diverse aggregation of countries is uncomplicated for African Central Banks because it is, in fact, operated by the French Treasury, without reference to the central fiscal authorities of any of the WAEMU or the CEMAC. Under the terms of the agreement which set up these banks and the CFA the Central Bank of each African country is obliged to keep at least 65% (now 50%) of its foreign exchange reserves in an "operations account" held at the French Treasury, as well as another 20% to cover financial liabilities.

In short, around 70% to 80& of the foreign reserves of these African countries are deposited in the "operations accounts" controlled by the French Treasury. The two CFA banks are African in name, but have no monetary policies of their own. The countries themselves do not know, nor are they told, how much of the pool of foreign reserves held by the French Treasury belongs to them as a group or individually. The earnings of the investment of these funds in the French Treasury pool are supposed to be added to the pool but no accounting has ever been given to either the banks or the countries of the details of any such changes. The limited group of high officials in� the French Treasury who have knowledge of the amounts in the "operations accounts", where these funds are invested; whether there is a profit on these investments; are prohibited from disclosing any of this information to the CFA banks or the central banks of the African states. According to the 2012 annual report of the Bank of France, the amount of African cash it safeguards is larger than the individual gross domestic products of all but two of the nations in the CFA region.

Mamadou Koulibaly, former finance minister and speaker of the Parliament of the Ivory Coast says the CFA franc�s peg to the euro discourages companies from investing. �The CFA franc does not favour exports and trade,� he says. �It does not favour industrialization. It keeps prices high. It does not make sense in a globalized world.� The return on the notional total of� US $20 billion also angers the ex-minister, who notes that the money would yield more under professional management. And, he says, the funds benefit France, which uses them to reduce its borrowing. (France, with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 90 percent, has pledged to slash its deficit and debt.) �The operating account was designed and formulated primarily to serve the interests of France. It is important for France and unnecessary for African countries,� says Babissakana, chairman and CEO of Prescriptor, a consulting firm based in Cameroon�s capital of Yaounde. To Babissakana, the tiny interest rate paid out is �a state financial crime strictly contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations.�[iii]

Koulibaly says the tie to the euro makes goods 20 percent to 30 percent more expensive in the CFA zone. This is a hardship for the 90 percent of people in the region who don�t have bank accounts and cannot easily convert their cash to euros. He wants an independent audit of the CFA franc and France to be investigated by the UN�s International Court of Justice.

The major problem with the CFA franc is that because of its pegging to a fixed rate to the Euro its value reflects the successes or failures of European monetary policies, not African realities. Now, in the wake of the global credit crunch there are more worrying changes. The principal worry is the state of the French economy and the pressures on the Euro to cope with the vast monetary and fiscal divergences among the 27 states and the impact of the sovereign debt crisis. The declining value of the African reserves, bound up in investments in a falling French stock market has diminished the ardour for French subsidies of development projects in such economic basket cases as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and others.

If the Euro fails, breaks apart into two zones, or disappears in a mountain of defaults what happens to the francophone African states? Their money is tied up in the French Bourse, almost completely out of their control. They have no idea of their positions and are not confident that a decaying France will be able to financially maintain a par CFA which will be credible or reflect the value of African exports; the very nature of the original bargain. There are many African economists who are convinced that the French Treasury has been using their reserves as collateral on French long-term debt and that the French have already hypothecated their reserves. If the Euro breaks up or declines dramatically, how will the Africans get their own money back?

So the current crisis in Paris is not just a fight over how much austerity the French economy can endure, nor how obedient the Eurozone has to be towards the German fiscal strictures. There are almost thirty African states who fates are directly involved as well. Unfortunately the Africans have no say in the matter. Their opinions are not sought nor are their warnings heeded. Not much has changed since the birth of independent African states in the 1960s. As they say in Ghana, �by the time the fool has learned the game, the players have dispersed.�