On the 29th of June Putin’s Ministry of Defence suddenly announced it was firing 50 naval officers, including Vice Admiral Viktor Kravchuk and chief of staff Rear Admiral Sergei Popov. They were both fired for cause, as were several other unnamed senior officials from their posts in the Baltic Fleet. This came as a great shock to the country as such a purge of serving top commanders had not been seen since the days of Stalin, during the Yezhovshchina of 1936-38. Earlier, Admiral Viktor Chirkov had been removed in November 2015 officially because of ‘health concerns’. Chirkov, who had been Kravchuk’s patron in the navy for many years, was rumoured to have also been removed due to complaints about inadequate readiness in some units.[i] This may well have been true but others in the Navy have reported that the unwillingness of the admirals of the already-reduced Baltic Fleet to provide vessels and support to the Russian naval presence in Syria was a more immediate cause of the rift.

In addition to a lacklustre performance in a recent exercise by the two Baltic Fleet minesweepers during exercises that took place in August 2015 and the constant complaint that the Baltic Fleet had been left with only two ageing submarines, the fleet was slow in making available its newer vessels for the Syrian operations. The fleet’s four Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes have not deployed to the Mediterranean Sea or Indian Ocean a single time in the nine years since the first of the ships was commissioned into the fleet.[ii]

In late 2014 there had been a smaller purge of the Russian military when Putin dismissed twenty generals from their posts. In February 2014 Putin had dismissed six other generals. These generals were dismissed by a presidential decree announced through the Gazette and without fanfare. The officers dismissed included the lieutenant general of police, Sergey Lavrov, as well as the head of media relations in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Andrei Pilipchuk. Another was the first deputy commander of the central regional military command, Vladimir Padalko. Some other lower-rank officers were dismissed as well at the time.

The Russian Military Has Been Underfunded

Part of the reason for this purge of Russia’s military derives from the recurrent problem of funding. For years after the end of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact forces the Russian Government failed to provide adequately for the returning soldiers. When the Wall collapsed The third largest army in the world, the East German, was out of business. Massive quantities of East German (e.g. ex-Russian) military supplies were being offered at cut prices to the world as the re-unifying German state moved to change over to NATO equipment. One of the Soviet Union’s major industries, the arms industry, had the bottom fall out of its market. This was coupled with the enforced withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in bases across Eastern and Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact disappeared; the COMECON disappeared and there was not enough money in the reserves to keep paying, unilaterally, the costs of keeping Russian troops outside of Russia.

The soldiers were never paid much to begin with but the fall of the Soviet Union meant that they had very little indeed. These soldiers sold, with the connivance of their commanding officers, anything that wasn’t nailed down. They sold it for food and they sold it for trophies that they would carry home as they were demobilised. Most importantly there was no place in the physical Russian military establishment where these troops could be stationed. There were not enough bases inside Russia where the returning troops could be housed. There were no jobs for thousands of trained officers and NCOs.  The offset costs for the Soviet Occupation paid by their former ‘satellites’ were no longer forthcoming. There were too many mouths to feed and too few bases in which they could be sheltered. No one was sure what to do but everyone recognised the danger of a disgruntled army full of people with grievances and with nothing to do. The answer was to keep the numbers down and to keep them poor, weak and demotivated.

There was no money or market for new planes and ships. (I travelled to Novolipetsk in 1994 to the major military airport there. There was a giant field full of new MIG29s which had no home. They were produced but there was place to use them and no fuel to fly them. Pilots were flying less than an hour and a half each week because there was no fuel. I went to many airbases in Siberia and the Arctic and saw the unspeakable conditions in which the soldiers were living. It was no different went I went to the Northern Fleet offices in the Arctic and saw the awful conditions under which the navy was operating.) The military demanded money from the government to buy food and shelter. It wasn’t only asking for new weapon systems.

The government was willing to keep the military on a short leash and bereft of adequate supplies. It only turned to the military with offers of funds when the Chechen War began in 1993. However, the Russian military was largely opposed to the war in Chechnya and resisted the Yeltsin government’s demands. The military wanted no part of any war against the Chechens. As General Eduard Vorobyov stated as he handed in his resignation it was "a crime" to "send the army against its own people." [iii] Although the actual full-scale war against the Chechens didn’t start in earnest until 11 December 1994 there were numerous skirmishes and actions which ramped up the situation. This preparation for a war in Chechnya did not have the support of the Russian military. Yeltsin's adviser on nationality affairs, Emil Pain, and Russia's Deputy Minister of Defence Gen. Borisov also resigned in protest of the invasion, as did Gen. Boris Poliakov. More than 800 professional soldiers and officers refused to take part in the operation; of these, 83 were convicted by military courts and the rest were discharged. Later Gen. Lev Rokhlin also refused to be decorated as a Hero of Russia for his part in the war. This is why the war in Chechnya was fought almost entirely by the military forces of the MVD, not the Army. The border guards (formerly within the KGB) had been moved into the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD).  The MVD also controls the internal troops, the GAI (the traffic police) and has a section which deals with economic crimes. Most importantly it controls the special security police (OSNAZ, OMON, SOBR/OMSN). These MVD forces are now the ones Putin has chosen to be his “Presidential Guard”; the new Russian Praetorians.

The Challenge of the Ukraine

As a result, the policy of keeping the military poor and underfunded continued. This was theoretically changed when Putin led the invasion of the Ukraine and the seizure of the Crimea. Putin’s new military posture announced in December 2014 was a rapid injection of cash and resources designed to build up the Russian forces which had largely been ignored and isolated for over twenty years. Billions of roubles were allocated for new tanks, aircraft, naval vessels and nuclear forces. However, with the imposition of sanctions by the West these funds had to be rationed and the investment in technology diminished or deferred. The promised funds were not available.

Equally as important, the staggering cost of Russia’s ‘secret war’ in the Ukraine and the administrative burden of providing social services, pensions, water and electricity to the Donbas and Crimea ate away the army’s budget. Technological change was delayed; production targets were extended into the future and most equipment upgrading services were curtailed. In fact, a large part of the Russian war machine (planes, missiles, helicopters, etc.) was designed and built in the Ukraine; particularly in the Donbas. A great deal of the money which has been made available to the military equipment manufacturers has been to transfer the productive capacity of the Ukrainian arms industry back inside Russia.

Russia is extremely dependent on Ukrainian supplies, which accounted for 87 per cent of its military imports, according to the Stockholm International Research Institute.

The military-industrial complex of Ukraine is the most advanced and developed branch of the state's sector of economy. It includes about 85 scientific organizations which are specialized in the development of armaments and military equipment for different usage. The air and space complex consists of 18 design bureaus and 64 enterprises. In order to design and build ships and armaments for the Ukrainian Navy, 15 research and development institutes, 40 design bureaus and 67 plants have been brought together. This complex is tasked to design heavy cruisers, build missile cruisers and big antisubmarine warfare (ASW) cruisers, and develop small ASW ships. Rocketry and missilery equipment, rockets, missiles, projectiles, and other munitions are designed and made at 6 design bureaus and 28 plants.

Ukraine has certain scientific, technical and industrial basis for the indigenous research, development and production of small arms. A number of scientific-industrial corporations have started R&D and production of small arms. The armour equipment is designed and manufactured at 3 design bureaus and 27 plants. The scientific and industrial potential of Ukraine makes it possible to create and produce modern technical means of military communications and automated control systems at 2 scientific-research institutes and 13 plants. A total of 2 scientific-research institutes and 53 plants produce power supply batteries; 3 scientific-research institutes and 6 plants manufacture intelligence and radio-electronic warfare equipment; 4 design bureaus and 27 plants make engineer equipment and materiel.

Perhaps the best example is the company Motor Stich. It is the sole producer of engines for the MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters. It produces these engines for the Russian helicopter industry and a wide range of other military components. The air firm, Antonov, is based in the Ukraine and is one of the major suppliers of aircraft for the Russian Air Force and for Russian arms exports. Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport sold $13.2 billion in weapons and military equipment to foreign buyers in 2013. These arms deliveries in 2012-2013 included 13 An-140 and one An-148 transport aircraft.

The ability of the Russian industry to fill its own needs is compounded by the fact that it needs Ukrainian parts and subassemblies for its exports. It also supplies the engines for the jointly-produced AN-148 planes Other exporters to Russia include Mykolayiv-based Zorya-Mashproekt, which sells several types of turbines to Russia, including those installed on military ships. Another is Kharkiv-based Hartron, which supplies the control systems for Russian missiles. The volume of Russian imports of major conventional weapons in 2009-2013 was 176 percent higher than for the previous five-year period of 2004-2008 The Yuzhmash plant in Dnipropetrovsk is the only service provider for Satan missiles that Russia uses. The Ukrainians were also the main supplier of spare parts which its armed forces desperately need. So when the Russians spend their billions on defence a good portion of the expenditure is wasted on duplicating what they already had in the Ukraine.

Putin And The Military

Putin has always had a difficult relationship with the military. Putin’s career was nurtured in the KGB. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was briefly in counter-intelligence (Second Department) before moving on to the Fifth Directorate where he monitored Soviet dissent. He transferred to the First Department when he was offered a post in East Germany where he spent five years essentially looking into the opinions and actions of fellow Soviet officers and officials. He monitored the loyalties and actions of Soviet military and diplomatic officers. He ran numerous “stukachi” (informants) throughout the embassies and military garrisons and dealt with the offending officers accordingly. He was as well-loved by the military as the members of the police love their internal affairs departments. When the Soviet Union collapsed Putin was transferred to Leningrad where he spied on student movements and dissidents and the local garrisons of the military.

On 25 July 1998 Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin head of the FSB, the successor agency to the KGB and, in August 1999 he was named a Deputy Vice President of Russia. Later that same month he was elected Prime Minister of Russia. On New Year’s Eve 1999, Yeltsin resigned his post as President which left Putin as Acting President. Putin’s first decree as Acting President was to issue a “Get Out of Jail Free” card to the Yeltsin ‘Family’. This decree said that corruption charges against the outgoing President and his relatives would not be pursued. Like Gerry Ford in the U.S. taking over after agreeing a pardon for Nixon, Putin took over Russia after promising a pardon for Yeltsin.

When he took power, Putin brought in his allies, the ‘siloviki’ (the powerful ones) from the group of ‘Chekists’.  A ‘Chekist’ is a general, if pejorative, term for those who are or once were employed in the security operations of the Soviet state- KGB, GRU, MVD, FSB etc. (the ‘Organs’) Dzerzhinsky’s original agency was the Cheka. Under Putin, these new ‘siloviki’ have been firmly installed in the corridors of power. These Chekist siloviki, primarily the St. Petersburg flavour of Chekist, openly took power as ministers, government advisors, governors, bankers and politicians. There were more than six thousand of these Chekists in powerful positions in the Russian state after Putin took power. They are still there supporting Putin.

The siloviki have had little time for the military. Under the Soviet system there were three sources of power: the Party; the KGB; and the military, especially the GRU (military intelligence). Along with a supine civil administration they ruled the USSR. After the chaos of 1990 the KGB was best prepared to take over the reins of government. Their abortive coup against Yeltsin left the KGB in disgrace, the Party banned, and the military in a much stronger position.

When, on 20 August 1991, the KGB plotters attempted their coup against Gorbachev Yeltsin moved to protect the White House (the national assembly). The KGB in Moscow called for troops to attack the White House and to arrest Yeltsin using KGB troops (the Dzerzinksky Division), MVD troops, along with Alexander Lebed’s Airborne troops. The Minister of Defence ordered General Valentin Varennikov to order the attack. Varennikov passed on the order to General Grachev who refused to obey the order to attack. General Lebed removed the Airborne troops from the area of the White House and General Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov ordered his men to take up positions around the White House to protect Yeltsin and to shoot down any helicopters flying near the White House and to destroy any tank attacking it. The army was the saviours of democracy in the Battle of the White House and Pavel Grachev, Boris Gromov, Alexandr Lebed and Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov the heroes. The KGB was disbanded (later to re-emerge as the FSB), but the leaders of the KGB never forgot that it was the Army which saved democracy for Russia. When they returned to power as the siloviki under Putin they remained determined to starve the Army of weapons, power and resources. It was no accident that Putin intervenes in military leadership conflicts. It is habit.

Special Problems In The Baltic Fleet

So, in addition to the dissatisfaction of the Russian military with its political masters there are also some historical problems which beset the Baltic Fleet in particular. With the collapse of the USSR many Russian ports and export channels were lost. The dismemberment of the former USSR into its several constituent parts left the warm-water ports of the Baltic largely in the hands of the newly independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Black Sea ports were largely incorporated into the new Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The capacity of the remaining Russian ports after the breakup of the Soviet Union was about 187 million tons per year or a reduction of about 58% of the USSR's former capacity. This reduction in its port facilities meant that, even at current volumes of trade, Russian ports could handle only 54% of this trade. The balance of Russian trade (46%) had to travel to and through other countries. These shipments via foreign ports cost Russia dearly as this trade took place in hard currency; at 1992 rates these transfer payments amounted to about $2.3 billion per year and, in terms of a rapidly declining rouble, made up a geometrically-escalating cost for Russian commerce.

The loss of access to Russia of its former ports was qualitative as well as quantitative. The loss of the Baltic ports meant that Russia lost modern transhipment complexes it had built for potassium salt (8.8 million tons per year); petroleum products (39 million tons per year); chemical wet cargoes and compressed gas (1.3 million tons per year); grains and pulses (5 million tons per year); perishable goods (0.5 million tons per year); as well as a key train ferry reloading facility for Germany (5.3 million tons per year). The main grain port and grain silo area in Novo Tallinn, only operational in 1986, with over 370,000-ton grain storage space was lost.  The major Soviet oil export terminal at Ventspils was lost as was the modern container port at Riga. In the south, Russia lost port facilities for handling black oil and light petroleum products (1.7 million tons per year); chemical wet cargoes and condensed gas (3.6 million tons per year); urea (1.5 million tons per year; grains (9 million tons per year) as well as six major grain elevators in the port, especially at Odessa, the major grain port. Special port handling complexes for ore and coal reloading were lost (10 million tons per year) and a train ferry for handling cargo to Bulgaria (4.8 million tons per year). The last loss was compounded by the fact that its loss denied Russia direct access to the newly-opened international trade channel of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal.

Western Russia has only shallow depth, highly congested ports with little capital infrastructure to handle the bulk of its trade. Russia now had only one port grain elevator and one import complex for raw sugar; at Novorossisk. The sugar facility had a capacity of 0.8 million tons a year although Russia urgently required an import of sugar of about 4 million tons a year at current levels of consumption. On the Azov Sea there is only the shallow water port of Taganrog; and on the Caspian Sea only Makhachkala with a maximum of 7.0 million tons per year capacity. Over 60% of Russian ports are shallow depth ports incapable of handling modern vessels. Northern ports are frozen for large periods of the year and are kept open only by expensive nuclear-powered ice-breakers. Western insurance companies didn’t approve regular trade to these ports like Archangelsk or Murmansk. Also, in many ports like Makhachkala, Poti, Baku and others, there were civil wars and ethnic strife where rail lines had to pass through such troublesome areas as Chechnya, 'Free Georgia', etc.  where the security of goods in transit could not be guaranteed.

The Baltic Fleet has its headquarters in Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg), where it is defended by a naval infantry brigade. Kaliningrad fleet headquarters controls naval bases at Kronstadt and Baltiysk. The breakup of the Soviet Union deprived the Baltic Fleet of key bases in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, leaving Kaliningrad Oblast as the Fleet's only ice-free naval outlet to the Baltic

Unfortunately for the navy, Kaliningrad is separated from Russia by the nations of the 'Pribaltika' (Baltic States) A number of other ports along the Baltic coast were lost to Russia when the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania withdrew from the USSR. These include Tallinn, Riga, and Liepaja, which reduced Russia to only two locations for construction, repair and operational capabilities, namely St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. Much of the Northern Baltic Sea, including the Gulf of Finland, Gulf of Riga, and Gulf of Bothnia, is frozen over during the winter months. In addition, operations in this region are also limited during the autumn months due to low clouds and dense fog.

Access to the Baltic is severely restricted at the western margin by the intrusion of the Danish peninsula and a series of narrow straits, which themselves are interrupted by several islands. Strategically, this region is of prime concern to Russian military planners. From east to west and from south to north several significant areas deserve mention. First, the island of Bornholm represents a major control point to the Danish straits system, Denmark proper, and as a defensive position at the "mouth" of the Baltic. Second, is the Kiel Canal which traverses the northern German province of Schleswig-Holstein from the city of Kiel on the Baltic westward to the mouth of the Elbe River on the North Sea, just northwest of Hamburg. While small, the canal is capable of handling warships up to Krivak class size.

Between the offshore islands lies a series of small straits, only one of which is passable by deep draft vessels. This is known as the Great Belt (Store Baelt) lying between Fyn and Sjaelland islands. Finally, to the north lies the bulk of the Danish peninsula, whose tip is called The Skaw, and which controls access to the entire region via the Kattegat and Skagerrak (straits), which are some 20 and 60 nautical miles wide, respectively.[iv] So, to a large extent, the Baltic Fleet is, or can be, bottled up by NATO warships. This has tended to make the Baltic Fleet less confrontational than the Northern or Pacific Fleets.

Between the offshore islands lies a series of small straits, only one of which is passable by deep draft vessels. This is known as the Great Belt (Store Baelt) lying between Fyn and Sjaelland islands. Finally, to the north lies the bulk of the Danish peninsula, whose tip is called The Skaw, and which controls access to the entire region via the Kattegat and Skagerrak (straits), which are some 20 and 60 nautical miles wide, respectively.[iv] So, to a large extent, the Baltic Fleet is, or can be, bottled up by NATO warships. This has tended to make the Baltic Fleet less confrontational than the Northern or Pacific Fleets.

The Use of The Russian Military As A Political Lever

Despite the poor and rundown state of the Russian military the government decided to use its strength in pursuit of its political ambitions. In August 2008 the Russians sent in its army into Georgia where it met stiff resistance and served to boost the fortunes of the U.S. neocons associated with Dick Cheney. The will was there but the equipment sent to Georgia was in a poor state of repair and mechanical and logistical failures were the rule. The Russians succeeded in splitting off parts of Georgia but failed to cow the Georgians. The army was too feeble to make a lasting impact on the Georgians. It was clear that the army needed upgrading but the reforms suggested by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov were ineffective and badly implemented. “Reconfiguring the basic structure of the Ground Forces (from the battalion-regiment-division to the battalion-brigade order), then deemed a remarkable success, was achieved in parallel with the disbandment of hundreds of quarter- and half-strength units that were the heritage of the Soviet “mass army” construct. The price for this success was the forced retirement of thousands of officers, which bitterly alienated the officer corps.”[v]

With the onset of hostilities of the Russians in the Ukraine Putin announced massive sums for the modernisation of the Russian military by 2020.Unfortunately this was hampered by the dramatic collapse of the price of petroleum in the world market and the loss of the military facilities in Eastern Ukraine. While some progress has been made in upgrading the Russian military a great deal of the funds is no longer easily available from the budget and some items required for modernisation have been banned under the sanctions program. The Russian military soon recognised that they had been sold a kukla (in Russian slang kukla is a wad of paper with large denomination bills on the outside to suggest a wad of real money. Inside this roll of bills is only scrap paper).

This didn’t impede Putin’s use of the military to provoke a response from NATO. Like the Wizard of Oz, he shook the curtain to look as if he were a powerful force. However, for the most part, this was an exercise in building Potemkin villages of military might to frighten the natives. Most of the success of these enterprises (“little green men”, barrel rolls over U.S. ships like the Donald Cook, and buzzing US fighter planes) were achieved by the supine nature of the Western response to these provocations and the lack of a common will by the NATO states in confronting the Russians. This only encouraged Putin and led to the expansion of the Russian presence in Syria.

The reality of the comparison between NATO and the Russian military shows the disparity in size. In 2015, NATO spent around US $861 billion on its arms build-up - just about thirteen times Russia's military budget (US $66 billion). NATO nations - without the USA - are spending nearly the same amount per capita on their armed forces (US $440) vs. Russia's US $470, while the USA, alone, spends US $1,870 per capita on its military. 800,000 Russian soldiers are up against 3.41 Million NATO soldiers, 750 Russian fighter jets and 1,400 ground combat aircraft are up against NATO's 4,000 fighter jets and 4,600 ground combat aircraft. In a warfare situation, a single Russian aircraft carrier would have to take on 27 NATO aircraft carrier, 100 Russian frigates, destroyers or corvettes would confront 260 of the corresponding NATO warships, 60 Russian submarines would be confronting 154 NATO subs. Only in the domain of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and self-propelled guns (SPGs) would Russia hold a slight advantage over the western alliance. However, in modern warfare, the military advantage these weapons represent can be regarded as of subordinate significance.[vi]

The firing of the Baltic Sea admirals derives from a number of precipitating events. On the one hand there has been documented evidence of corruption at the highest level in the region where housing facilities and food supplies for the crew have been diverted. The local pakan (“Boss”) Viktor Bogdan, the king of the amber trade had a long-established relationship with Admiral Kravchuk and was marketing some of the diesel fuel assigned to the Fleet. There were stories about a collision between a Russian sub and a Polish spy boat near Kaliningrad. However, the main reason was that the Baltic Fleet resisted the demands of Putin to take an active role in following NATO vessels in the Baltic and interfering with the ongoing NATO naval exercises in the region. This interfered with Putin’ “projection of power” in the region.

What is most interesting is the information provided by the St. Petersburg news journal “Fotanka” that these admirals who were summarily fired have been replaced by group of naval officers from the Crimea. [vii] When the Ukraine split from Russia there were several efforts to divide the military forces, especially the Black Sea Fleet. After several false starts on 28 May 1997 Moscow and Kiev finally settled their dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, when Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Lazarenko signed three intergovernmental agreements. The two sides agreed to divide the fleet's assets and to lease port facilities in Sevastopol to the Russian Navy. Under the agreement the two nations split the fleet's ships evenly, though Russia agreed to buy back some of the more modern ships with cash. This went relatively smoothly and both nations based their Black Sea fleets in the Crimea.

However, when the Russians invaded and occupied Crimea in the Spring of 2014, the Ukrainian Navy did very little to impede the invasion. Several high-ranking officers of the Ukrainian Nany defected to Russia along with their ships. The Ukrainian authorities charged them with desertion, high treason, terrorism, the conversion of state property and violating their oaths of office. The Russians took them in and pronounced them to be Russians (holding their ranks). One of their ranks, Sergey Yelisey became the deputy of the commander of the Baltic fleet in July 2014. He was the only Baltic admiral who was not sacked by Putin. Former  Ukrainian Vice-Admiral Vice Admiral Alexander Nosatov has now joined him. They may soon be joined by another Ukrainian now serving in the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Vladimir Kasatonova. Putin and the Navy know that this new staffing of the Baltic Fleet will be obedient. They have no place else to go.

One positive result of all this turmoil is that the Russian military are recovering their confidence and sense of mission in their military adventures in Syria. For decades the Russian military had no real experience in fighting against a real enemy. It made do with shooting its own people in Chechnya and the Caucasus but had little chance to test its equipment and command structure in the heat of battle. Perhaps this gain in their self-confidence will allow them to drop their need for provocation and testing of the Western reaction and lead them to a less conflicted international situation.