One aspect of the effects of the global recession has been
the strong pressures impacting on the monetary arrangements of the
Economic
Community of West African States
(
ECOWAS
) or in French the
Communauté
économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'ouest (
CEDEAO
). This
regional grouping of fifteen African states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo) contain both Francophone, Anglophone
and one Lusophone states.. These nations joined together in the Treaty of Lagos
in 1975 in an effort to construct an economic and monetary union which would
promote growth, stability and the integration of the economic development in
the region. ECOWAS was also designed to become part of an even larger union,
the African Economic Community.
The core of the difficulties in maintaining and controlling
such a monetary union has been the complicated relationship within ECOWAS
between the formerly-French West African states who use the CFA franc (the
Financial Community of Africa -
Communauté
financière d'Afrique – CFA franc)
as their common currency and the non-francophone (except Guinea) states
in the region who do not use the CFA franc. These eight CFA states are members
of the customs and currency union, the
West
African Economic and Monetary Union (
Union
économique et monétaire ouest-africaine) WAEMU which co-exists within the
wider ECOWAS organisation.
WAEMU
represents seven francophone West African states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) plus the lusophone Guinea-Bissau.
This
WAEMU was established by the
Treaty of Dakar in 1994.
There are actually two separate
CFA francs in circulation. The first is that of the West African Economic and
Monetary Union
(WAEMU). The second
is that of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC) which comprises six Central
African countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon),
The other states within ECOWAS use
their own currencies but have pledged to introduce a common currency within
their own grouping, the West African Monetary Zone –
WAMZ, by the end of this yea,r 2009. These states (Ghana, Guinea,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and soon Liberia) hope to introduce a new
common currency, the
ECO, to rival
the CFA franc and, eventually to merge the ECO and the CFA franc into a single
monetary unit for the region. The pace of these developments is very slow.
One of the primary problems in
dealing with the CFA is that it is not within the purview or competence of
African officials to regulate the value or changes in the CFA franc. This was
the sole responsibility of the French Treasury officials, and now, the French
officials seconded to the European Central Bank (
ECB). This is a result of an incomplete decolonisation by France of
its former colonies in Africa.
[i]
The French Legacy:
The creation and maintenance of
the French domination of the francophone African economies is the product of a
long period of French colonialism and the learned dependence of the African
states. For most of francophone Africa there are only limited powers allocated to
their central banks. These are economies whose vulnerability to an increasingly
globalised economy expands daily. There can be no trade policy without
reference to currency; there can be no investment without reference to
reserves. The African politicians and parties elected to promote growth,
reform, changes in trade and fiscal policies are made irrelevant except with
the consent of the French Treasury which rations their funds. There are many
who object to the continuation of this system. President Abdoulaye Wade of
Senegal has stated this very clearly “The African people’s money stacked in
France must be returned to Africa in order to benefit the economies of the
BCEAO member states. One cannot have billions and billions placed on foreign stock
markets and at the same time say that one is poor, and then go beg for money....”
[ii]
This system of dependence is a
direct result of the colonial policies of the French Government. In the
immediate post-war period after the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement in
July 1944 the French economy urgently needed to recover from the several
disasters of the Second World War. To assist in this process it set up the
first CFA amongst its African colonies to guarantee a captive market for its
goods.
The principal decision which
resulted from the Bretton Woods Agreement was the abandonment of the Gold
Standard. In short, the new system gave a dominant place to the dollar. The
other currencies saw their exchange rate indexed to the dollar. The reserves of
the European central banks at that time consisted of currencies of dubious
post-war value and gold which had been de-pegged from the fluctuations of the
currency. For this reason France needed the currencies of its colonies to
support its competitiveness with its American and British competitors. De
Gaulle and his main economic advisor, Pierre Mendès France met with some
African leaders and developed a Colonial Pact which would enshrine this is in a
treaty (with both public and secret clauses).
“Following the devaluation of the
French Franc, it was naturally expected that the currency which was also
circulating in Francophone Africa would also be devalued. Instead, France
decided to create a new currency for its African colonies on 26 December 1945...
The newly created CFA was however not
devalued but overvalued. In deciding to overvalue the new currency, the CFA
zone economies were effectively excluded from the international market as their
products became too expensive on the competitive global market.
There remained only one market
for the CFA zone, and that was France their colonial master. This enabled
Metropolitan France to appropriate to itself the raw materials needed for its
post-War and young industries. The colonies were tied hand and foot to serve
Metropolitan France as other markets closed their doors to their expensive
products. Thus through the new CFA currency, France was able to economically
re-colonise its African colonies that had earlier been cut off from Paris as a
result of the War.”
[iii]
Decolonization south of the
Sahara did not happen as de Gaulle had intended. He had wanted to create a
Franco-African Community that stopped short of total independence. But, when
Sekou Toure's Guinea voted "no" in the 1958 referendum on that
Community, the idea was effectively dead. Guinea was severely punished because
of its decision and the French soon had to proceed towards allowing the
independence of its colonies but at the price of a strict continuing control
over their economies. They agreed at independence to be bound by the Pacte Colonial.
The key to all this was the
agreement signed between France and its newly-liberated African colonies which
locked these colonies into the economic and military embrace of France. This
Colonial Pact not only created the institution of the CFA franc, it created a
legal mechanism under which France obtained a special place in the political
and economic life of its colonies.
The
Pacte Colonial Agreement enshrined a special preference for France
in the political, commercial and defence processes in the African countries. On
defence it agreed two types of continuing contact. The first was the open
agreement on military co-operation or Technical Military Aid (AMT) agreements,
which weren’t legally binding, and could be suspended according to the
circumstances. They covered education, training of servicemen and African
security forces. The second type, secret and binding, were defence agreements
supervised and implemented by the French Ministry of Defence, which served as a
legal basis for French interventions. These agreements allowed France to have
predeployed troops in Africa; in other words, French army units present
permanently and by rotation in bases and military facilities in Africa; run
entirely by the French.
According to Annex II of the
Defence Agreement signed between the governments of the French Republic, the
Republic of Ivory Coast, the Republic of Dahomey and the Republic of Niger on
24 April 1961, France has priority in the acquisition of those "raw materials
classified as strategic.” In fact, according to article 2 of the agreement,
"the French Republic regularly informs the Republic of Ivory Coast (and
the other two) of the policy that it intends to follow concerning strategic raw
materials and products, taking into account the general needs of defence, the
evolution of resources and the situation of the world market.”
According to article 3, "the
Republic of Ivory Coast (and the other two) inform the French Republic of the
policy they intend to follow concerning strategic raw materials and products
and the measures that they propose to take to implement this policy.” And to
conclude, article 5: "Concerning these same products, the Republic of
Ivory Coast (and the two others) for defence needs, reserve them in priority
for sale to the French Republic, after having satisfied the needs of internal
consumption, and they will import what they need in priority from it.” The
reciprocity between the signatories was not a bargain between equals, but
reflected the actual dominance of the colonial power that had, in the case of
these countries, organised "independence" a few months previously (in
August 1960).
In summary, the colonial pact
maintained the French control over the economies of the African states; it took
possession of their foreign currency reserves; it controlled the strategic raw
materials of the country; it stationed troops in the country with the right of
free passage; it demanded that all military equipment be acquired from France;
it took over the training of the police and army; it required that French
businesses be allowed to maintain monopoly enterprises in key areas (water,
electricity, ports, transport, energy, etc.). France not only set limits
on the imports of a range of items from outside the franc zone but also set minimum
quantities of imports from France. These treaties are still in force and
operational.
[iv]
The WAEMU CFA franc is issued by
the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest). This currency
was originally pegged at 100 CFA for each French franc but, after France joined
the European Community’s Euro zone at a fixed rate of 6.65957 French francs to
one Euro, the CFA rate to the Euro was fixed at CFA 665,957 to each Euro,
maintaining the 100 to 1 ratio. It is important to note that it is the
responsibility of the French Treasury to guarantee the convertibility of the
CFA to the Euro.
The monetary policy governing
such a diverse aggregation of countries is uncomplicated because it is, in
fact, operated by the French Treasury, without reference to the central fiscal
authorities of any of the WAEMU states. Under the terms of the agreement which
set up these banks and the CFA the Central Bank of each African country is
obliged to keep at least 65% of its foreign exchange reserves in an “operations
account” held at the French Treasury, as well as another 20% to cover financial
liabilities.
The CFA central banks also impose
a cap on credit extended to each member country equivalent to 20% of that
country’s public revenue in the preceding year. Even though the BCEAO has an
overdraft facility with the French Treasury, the drawdowns on that overdraft
facility are subject to the consent of the French Treasury. The final say is
that of the French Treasury which has invested the foreign reserves of the
African countries in its own name on the Paris Bourse.
The central banks of these 2
zones – the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) for WAEMU and the Bank
of the Central African States (BEAC) for CEMAC – have supranational status. For
each zone, the reserves of member states are pooled; members have no
independent monetary policy and no possibility of undermining the central
bank’s independence or monetising public deficits.
This fixed exchange rate regime
draws its credibility from monetary agreements with France that, via the
Treasury, guarantee the convertibility of the CFA franc and provide the central
banks an overdraft facility (compte d’opération) to meet liquidity needs. As a
counterparty to this guarantee, 50% of their reserves must be placed within the
French Treasury in the compte d’opération. The reserves must amount at least to
20% of central bank short-term liabilities. If the reserves are below this
level (or if the compte d’opération is in debit) for more than one quarter, the
central banks must take corrective measures (interest rate increases, credit
rationing, and seizure of foreign exchange available in the zone).
[v]
In short, more than 80% of the
foreign reserves of these African countries are deposited in the “operations
accounts” controlled by the French Treasury. The two CFA banks are African in
name, but have no monetary policies of their own. The countries themselves do
not know, nor are they told, how much of the pool of foreign reserves held by
the French Treasury belongs to them as a group or individually. The earnings of
the investment of these funds in the French Treasury pool are supposed to be
added to the pool but no accounting is given to either the banks or the
countries of the details of any such changes. The limited group of high
officials in the French Treasury who have knowledge of the amounts in the
“operations accounts”, where these funds are invested; whether there is a
profit on these investments; are prohibited from disclosing any of this
information to the CFA banks or the central banks of the African states.
Prof Nicholas Agbohou, author of
Le Franc CFA et l'Euro Contre l'Afrique,
and an ardent critic of the CFA-French relationship stated the dilemma clearly
in a recent interview” The economy of any given country is managed by its
central bank or in the case of a regional community such as the Economic and
Monetary Union of West African Stares (UEMOA), their central hank, the BCEAO,
manages the economies of the member states. A central bank, in turn, is managed
by an administrative council that determines the running of the bank. A central
bank is therefore an important component of a country's economy as it is the
principal bank of any country. Commercial banks give credit to individuals or
institutions. The interest rate on credit is increased or lowered in conformity
with the socio-economic development objectives of the country. For instance, if
the central bank wishes to inject credit into the economy to favour the growth
of entrepreneurship, the interest rate is lowered.
The CFA zone central banks' administrative councils are composed of: 16
administrators, 2 of them French in the BCEAO; 13 administrators, 3 of them
French in the BEAC; and 8 administrators, 4 of them French in the BCC.
Questioner: But the French are in
a minority here?
Agbohou: Yes, but in reality the
paradox is that it is their reduced number that poses problems in as far as the
less visible the French in these administrative councils, the more they are
able to give the naive Africans the illusion that they (the Africans) are the
masters in control due to their numerical strength.
The sad truth is that this French
minority has "blocking powers", in other words the French enjoy veto
powers on any major decisions taken by the banks' administrative councils.
For a decision to be valid at the BEAC, it must be unanimously approved by all
the members of the administrative council. At the Comoros Central Bank or BCC,
at least five of the eight administrators must approve a decision. At all
times, no decision can be approved without the French. France is, therefore, in
a position to block any major decisions taken by these banks. So if a decision
favoured by the Comorian representatives at the BCC does not tally with French
interests, the French administrators have the power to block it.
The way these central banks function,
therefore, legalise and perpetuate the direct intervention of France in the
vertebral column of the CFA zone economies. Even to appoint the governor of the
BEAC for instance, the candidacy is proposed by Gabon, but it must be approved
by Paris which seeks to ensure that the governor is malleable and ready to
dance to French tunes to the detriment of African economic interests.”
[vi]
This makes it impossible for
African members to regulate their own monetary policies. The most inefficient
and wasteful countries are able to use the foreign reserves of the more prudent
countries without any meaningful intervention by the wealthier and more
successful countries.
Perhaps the best description of
these anomalies can be found in the writings of the Cameroonian economist Célestin
Monga”.
[vii]
The crux of the matter comes down to the plain, unvarnished truth that the much
praised advantages of the Franc zone primarily buttress a captive market tailor
made to suit certain French businessmen installed in Africa, which
concomitantly serves the transactions of corrupt African elites who regularly
journey to France to augment their personal deposits in Parisian banks. While
they are over here, why not offer themselves Pierre Cardin suits and shopping
sprees without worrying about exchange rates? As for some farsighted French or
African businessmen who would be interested in creating small businesses or
developing industries on a durable basis, they are more concerned by the
structural problem of mechanically, deteriorating profitability which persists
when the currency of a weak economy is tied to the fixed exchange rate of an
overly strong currency such as the euro.
What interests job creators
aren’t the modest inflation rate conjured up by the advocates of the Franc CFA
but the opportunities for commercialising their production. From this
standpoint, the monetary policies of black African countries adhering to the Franc
zone continue to suffer from a rash of self-inflicted masochism.”
[viii]
The Challenge of the CFA
The major problem with the CFA
franc is that because of its pegging to a fixed rate to the Euro its value
reflects the successes or failures of European monetary policies, not African
realities. For the last few years the rising value of the Euro relative to the
US dollar has made African primary products much less competitive than the
unfettered currency might have achieved. As Monga continues, “
At a time when the world’s economy is
slowing down, when the crisis of the international financial system and the
stock markets threaten developing countries with recession, it is hard to
understand why Francophone African countries, which rely almost exclusively on
exports for their development still accept monetary arrangements that leave
them no room for manoeuvre as far as external competition or internal economic
policy is concerned. To make matters worse, the imports of these countries are
usually billed in euros whereas exports are paid back in dollars. A strong euro
against a weak dollar not only overrates the franc CFA (making for a loss of
price competitiveness for export products on international markets), but also
means a loss of export volume and therefore tax revenues.”
[ix]
This is particularly true for the
range of African commodity prices. In the
Standard
and Chartered Bank Global Focus
[x]
this point was stated succinctly, “Commodities account for over 80% of the CFA
franc zone’s exports and, given their impact on the balance of payments, budgets,
and growth, have a strong influence on the policy stance toward the peg. In
1994, depressed commodity prices led to macroeconomic imbalances and
contributed to the devaluation. Commodity prices, particularly oil, were booming
for much of 2008, pushing up international reserves and leading to a rapid
improvement in the barometer. The picture differed between WAEMU and CEMAC,
however. Rising oil prices negatively impacted WAEMU countries (net oil importers)
but strongly benefited CEMAC countries (net oil exporters). Furthermore, oil
prices increased faster than prices of cocoa, gold, and cotton, which are key
WAEMU exports. The cotton sector is of high importance to some WAEMU countries
(Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali) in terms of export receipts and employment – it
is estimated that 15-20 million people in WAEMU depend on the sector for their
livelihoods. Cotton prices did not boom to the same extent as other commodity
prices, rising only modestly since 2006. (They are even more depressed in
local-currency terms.)
[xi]
The vulnerability of the WAEMU to
the pressures of the high Euro-dollar spread were not felt by the other African
states in ECOWAS, especially Nigeria. In Nigeria the windfall profits of $147 a
barrel oil greatly enhanced the economic health of the country and its
acquisition of substantial monetary reserves. As an important oil and gas
producing state its fortunes burgeoned. The high prices paid for cocoa produced
increasing income for Ghana and Guinea benefitted from the rising price of
bauxite. These commodities are principally traded in dollars. More importantly,
these two states were not bound by the restrictions of the Pacte Colonial and
could purchase their imports outside the European market (France) and thus had
a much lower vulnerability to a rising Euro.
Now, in the wake of the global
credit crunch there are more worrying changes. The principal worry is the state
of the French economy and the pressures on a Euro to cope with the vast
monetary and fiscal divergences among the 27 states. The ECB has lowered
interest rates but seems incapable of pursuing a monetary policy which will
resolve the differences among the several European states. The French
government has recently allocated 428 billion euros to stimulate growth in the
French economy, a large part of which will be directed at infrastructural
projects. This does not leave a lot of cash to assist its African dependencies.
The declining value of the African reserves, bound up in investments in a
falling French stock market has diminished the ardour for French subsidies of
development projects in such economic basket cases as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso
and others. France has shown itself unwilling to continue to finance the
stationing in Africa of so many troops, including those wearing the blue berets
of the United Nations.
Even for
those states which have discovered oil and gas reserves the falling price of
oil has threatened many budgetary plans.
In the Anglophone countries of
ECOWAS there is also a marked effect of the global crisis on the local
economies. In Nigeria, long the powerhouse of the West African economy there
has been a precipitous decline in the value of the Naira. The continuing crisis
in the Niger Delta and the threat of the restriction of oil output by the
rebels has increased the lack of confidence in the long-term stability of the
Nigerian economy. The Christmas coup in Guinea, and the subsequent suspension
of the country from ECOWAS, makes it much more problematic for a rapid
restoration of income to the country from the vast mineral wealth which had
been flowing to the recently deceased president’s coffers.
In short, there is little about the WAMZ
states that would lead investors to expect growth, stability or a common
economic policy. There appears to be little chance of an agreement on a common
currency by the end of 2009. Still less is there a chance of uniting the WAMZ
currencies with the CFA.
In a recent address, the Deputy
Governor of The Bank of Ghana, Mr Van Lare Doso, said that even if the ECO was
introduced it would take Ghana three years or more to make it legal tender.
[xii]
There is little expectation that
the current economic climate will bring windfall benefits to West Africa. The
fundamental reason for this is not the state of the world’s economy nor the
piratical domination of the CFA zone by the French; although they play a part.
The reason why common markets, customs unions or multinational groups survive
and thrive is because the constituent states trade with each other. The
reasoning behind the formation of the European Economic Community; the EFTA and
similar variants of these models is that the European states were trading
heavily with each other. The uneconomic interference of customs duties,
tariffs, currency restrictions, if scrapped, would be beneficial to all the
partners. Despite the parallel battle over Federalism within the EU it has been
clear that there have been positive and sustained gains for most parties from
the creation of the union. Indeed it has succeeded in attracting ever more
candidates to the union.
This is not true in Africa. There
is very little intra-African trade; indeed most of that is the result of
land-locked countries having to rely on neighbours for transit business. Intra-African
trade, even in foodstuffs, is a small (around 5%) of national trade for most
countries in ECOWAS. Some of this is due to producing raw materials which are
exported to countries which are equipped to process them; the lack of a large
and sophisticated domestic market for semi-finished goods which can be further
processed; the lack of efficient storage facilities and, most importantly, the
woeful lack of intra-African transport facilities.
Africa
is a vast continent of immense
resources but with very poorly developed transport integration with other
centres of commerce. This lack of integration with the rest of the trading
world is a heavy burden on African exporters and has led to a situation in
which an enormous percentage of the prices realised by African exports in the
world marketplace is paid for in transport costs. In the developed world these
transport and insurance costs make up about 5.5%-5.8% of the delivered price.
In some countries in
Africa the cost of
transport and insurance can make up to almost 80% of the cost of goods or
products delivered to the world markets. Moreover, absent a developed
intra-African air or sea service, this 80% of the market price for African
products is paid to foreign companies in the developed world; and paid in U.S.
dollars. This burden of external payments has a marked effect on currency price
pressures as well.
To illustrate this one can work backwards. If the
market price of a good is determined by the price at the destination than that
price is the CIF price. If the transport and insurance costs account for such a
high percentage of this price, it then follows that to be competitive; the
African exporter must reduce his FOB price to reflect this differential. For
example, if manganese ore sells at $250 per ton CIF Western Europe and
transport costs of this manganese amount to $60 per metric ton, then the
maximum FOB price of the manganese ore FOB
Africa
cannot be more than $190 per metric ton. The price of transport and, most
frequently insurance, is not controlled by the African exporter. He is at the
mercy of the shippers for whom transport rates are escalating.
Another important aspect of Africa’s dilemma is
that the transport patterns which have emerged as a result of the outsourcing
of international transport has been the continuation of links between African
countries and the traditional colonial markets; e.g. Anglophone Africa to Great
Britain; Francophone Africa to France; Lusophone Africa to Portugal, etc.
North-South traffic is the most frequent African transport route;
East-West Africa is almost unknown. Western Europe still
takes about 50% of
Africa’s exports. With the
growth of major petroleum and gas exports from Africa since 1992 this figure of
50% is, in itself, misleading as these high value exports mask a concomitant
decline in the value of African non-hydrocarbon exports. These trade patterns have
led to ludicrous anomalies. Fresh produce from Southern Africa is shipped to
Europe and then trans-shipped again to
West Africa.
Tobaccos often follow this routing. The hungry displaced civilians in Africa’s
regional wars in
Liberia,
Sierra Leone,
Angola
and the D.R. Congo were forced to import expensive food from Europe via the
World Food Program while African exporters of food had to send their products
to
Europe at low prices because of the
transport nexus.
The point is that monetary union must reflect a
pre-existing economic interdependence. Without that it is a futile exercise.
There is no advanced level of economic interdependence in West Africa, partly
due to the nature of African export markets and partly because of the
distortion in the ability of francophone countries to act in their own
interests because of the domination of France. Whatever the reason, there is
little convergence among the West African economies so there will likely be no
convergence in their monetary policies.
As a result it is unlikely that and ECO will be
circulating within the WAMZ in January 2010. However, there is every likelihood
that the CFA francs will continue their distortions of the African economies
and very little is likely to change for the better.
[i]
See “How France lives off Francophone Africa
via the CFA franc, Mamadou Koulibaly, “New African” 1/08
[ii]
“We Want Our Money”,
Ruth Tete, “New
African” 1/08
[iii]
“The
Euro is bad news for the CFA”, Ruth Nabakwe, “
New
African” 7/02
[iv]
See
“LES
SERVITUDES DU PACTE COLONIAL”, Mamadou Koulibaly, CEDA 4/05
[v]
“Standard and Chartered Global Focus” 15
January 2009
[vi]
CFA, the devil is in the details”, Ruth Nabakwe, “New African” 7/02
[vii]
Celestin Monga,
The Franc Zone : Macroeconomics or Masochism, Billets d'Afrique N°
173, October 2008
[x]
Standard
and Chartered Global Focus
op cit,
[xii]
"Common African Currency in
2010", Afrol News 29/11/08