International
Australia's Shame over East Timor
By Daniel Flitton, Age (Oz) 15/7/08
Jul 16, 2008 - 9:05:39 AM

THE sorry history of violence in East Timor did not begin with the militia rampage following the 1999 independence ballot. For more than two decades after Indonesia's 1975 invasion, the Timorese suffered. Thousands needlessly died. And all the while, the tiny country's powerful southern neighbour did worse than stand idly by - instead, successive governments in Canberra supported Jakarta's illegal occupation.

Australians are rightly proud of the tremendous role played in establishing and leading the international peacekeeping force deployed in September 1999. Alexander Downer, foreign minister during the Howard years, ranks it among his greatest achievements. But none of this absolves Australia of the responsibility of pursuing a shameful and ultimately self-defeating policy over many years, one that valued close ties with Indonesia ahead of human rights for the Timorese.

Both sides of politics share responsibility for this mistake, and the lessons should not be ignored.

Australia was so eager to maintain good relations with Jakarta, that the Howard government refused to acknowledge what was plain in the run-up to the independence ballot and has once again been demonstrated by the official inquiry into the episode - the Indonesian state "organised (a) campaign of violence" to intimidate the local people.

When that effort failed, and the East Timorese voted bravely for independence, the military-backed militias forced thousands of people across the border.

The signs of this impending violence were clear to the Australian government months before, as was the complicity of the Indonesian military.

As early as March 4, 1999, the Defence Intelligence Organisation sent a confidential report, warning "the (Indonesian) military in East Timor are clearly protecting, and in some instances operating with the militias". It went on to claim the military "will continue to support intimidation and violence, or at least won't prevent it". A few days later, Downer defended Australia's refusal to push for international troops to protect the Timorese, saying: "We hope that there won't be a need for a peacekeeping force because if you need a peacekeeping force, you need a peace to keep and peace first has to be negotiated and we hope that when the peace is negotiated it will be a peaceful peace that won't require a peacekeeping force."

The Australian government put its faith in the Indonesian military to provide security, even though it knew those same forces - local commanders with the tacit support of senior Indonesian generals, according to DIO - were orchestrating a campaign of violence in Timor.

An Australian parliamentary inquiry in late 2000 drew similarly damning conclusions: "Until the latter part of 1999, all governments have publicly played down reports of human rights abuses in the territory. They were prepared to accept Indonesian Government assurances and explanations, and support them, even in the face of other contradictory evidence."

Downer often cites a letter John Howard sent to Indonesian president B. J. Habibie in late 1998 as the turning point in Australia's approach to East Timor. This is a partial reading of history. For years, successive Australian governments defended inaction on East Timor by claiming it had very little influence in Jakarta on the issue, so the significance of the letter is debatable. Indeed, the letter actually pushed for an entirely different outcome - autonomy for East Timor, under formal Indonesian sovereignty.

In other words, Australia still hoped East Timor would remain part of Indonesia. It was Habibie's impulsive gesture to offer the Timorese the choice of independence or autonomy almost immediately, a decision that shocked Australia.

Howard has previously defended his government's approach to the independence ballot, claiming to push for early Australian boots on the ground would have been tantamount to an invasion of Indonesia. No doubt this was a delicate situation, and in the aftermath of the ballot when the militias unleashed their fury, Australia was a leader in putting together a quick response. But the genesis of Australia's flawed approach to Timor lay much earlier, in the recognition of Indonesia's illegal takeover and occupation of East Timor.

In this, the Australian government was out of step with Australian public opinion. More importantly, it ignored the will of the Timorese peopl



Source: Ocnus.net 2008