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Last Updated: Oct 14, 2008 - 7:37:24 AM |
The inquiry, conducted by the parliamentary foreign relations committee
and headed by government MP Laurie Chan, commenced hearings on
September 24 and is scheduled to report its findings to parliament by
November 14. The review marks the first time that the intervention
force’s operations and legal underpinnings have been assessed by a
Solomon Islands’ body.
In July 2003, just four months after the US-led invasion of Iraq, the
former Australian government of Prime Minister John Howard dispatched
more than 2,000 soldiers, federal police, and officials to the
Solomons. While cloaked in humanitarian rhetoric about the need to
rescue a “failed” or “failing” state, the intervention was driven by
Canberra’s concern to maintain its long-standing dominance amid
heightened great power rivalry in the region. The Howard government
openly dispensed with concerns for international law and national
sovereignty, just as the Bush administration had done in Iraq, and the
Solomons takeover was heralded as a new model for potential
interventions in neighbouring Pacific countries.
The United Nations never endorsed the RAMSI intervention. Its purported
legality rested on a treaty agreement signed by the governments of the
Solomons and Australia, together with those of New Zealand and other
Pacific states which contributed forces to RAMSI. In addition, the
Facilitation of International Assistance Act—which was drafted in
Canberra ahead of RAMSI’s deployment and then approved by the Solomons’
parliament—effectively overrode the country’s national sovereignty,
constitution and laws.
The Facilitation Act and the international treaty are extraordinary
legal documents. RAMSI personnel enjoy immunity from Solomons’ criminal
and civil law, including customs and immigration controls, are exempt
from the country’s taxation system, and have the right to use any road,
bridge, port or airfield, and water, electricity and other public
facilities free of charge. RAMSI headquarters and camps are
“inviolable” and “subject to the exclusive control and authority” of
the intervention force; no Solomon Islander, including police or other
authorities, may enter the premises without RAMSI’s permission. RAMSI
personnel have the right to confiscate all firearms from Solomon
Islanders —including those legally purchased and maintained—without
compensation. RAMSI soldiers and police also have the right to “use
such force as is reasonably necessary”, including lethal force, to
maintain “law and order in Solomon Islands”.
The neo-colonial character of these provisions was clear from the
outset of the intervention. That they are only now being reviewed is an
expression of the escalating opposition to RAMSI among ordinary Solomon
Islanders and its pale reflection within sections of the ruling elite.
Five years after the initial deployment of Australian forces, the
“humanitarian” pretext has been exposed before broad layers of the
local population. Hundreds of millions of dollars in so-called “aid”
have been poured into inflated Australian Federal Police salaries,
while a pittance has gone to basic health and education services.
High-paid Australian officials have driven up inflation through the
creation of a “bubble economy” in Honiara, the Solomons’ capital, while
rising fuel and food prices have further impoverished local people.
Within the political establishment, certain elements have bristled as
RAMSI assumed control of the key levers of the country’s state
apparatus, including finance, the courts, police and prisons.
In May 2006, Manasseh Sogavare became prime minister and drew
Canberra’s ire after initially attempting to reduce RAMSI’s control of
the country’s finance department. A vicious and protracted regime
change operation ensued, with the Howard government launching a series
of dirty tricks and provocations, including the attempted extradition
of then Attorney-General Julian Moti on bogus statutory rape charges.
This campaign culminated in Sogavare’s ousting last December through a
parliamentary vote of no confidence.
The parliamentary review currently underway was first proposed by the
former Sogavare government. Sogavare had planned the review to be
conducted with an element of public participation—nation-wide
discussion forums involving ordinary Solomon Islanders. The proposed
inquiry was adamantly opposed by the Australian government and senior
RAMSI officials, who responded by stepping up their attacks on Sogavare.
Prime Minister Derek Sikua, who replaced Sogavare, made his
government’s top priority the re-establishment of close relations with
Canberra. Its official policy statement released earlier this year
raised the possibility of Australia maintaining a “permanent military
and police presence” in the Solomons after “RAMSI completes the work it
was requested to do”. Sikua has also refused to release, most likely at
the Australian government’s request, the final report issued by the
Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 riots which destroyed much of
Honiara. The report, which was finalised in April, will likely
recommend that RAMSI’s legal immunity be revoked.
Sikua scrapped Sogavare’s proposal for the parliamentary review into
RAMSI to involve national forums and lavished fulsome praise on the
intervention force in his presentation to the review committee. He felt
compelled to warn, however, that if RAMSI personnel continued to be
perceived as unaccountable to the Solomons’ government, “it will be
difficult for RAMSI to maintain the support and consent of the local
population and its leaders, a situation that Solomon Islands cannot
afford.”
RAMSI in violation of Solomons’ constitution
Several submissions issued to the parliamentary foreign relations
committee demonstrated the illegality of the Facilitation Act and
therefore the RAMSI intervention as a whole.
Frank Ofagioro—chairman of the Solomons’ Law Reform Commission and
former attorney general and High Court judge—told the parliamentary
committee that he regarded the Facilitation Act as “constitutionally
defective”. He added that he only decided against mounting a legal
challenge after concluding that RAMSI’s work was benefitting the
country.
Ofagioro explained that section 31(1) of the Solomons’ constitution
only allows the governor-general to act with the authority of the
cabinet or a minister of the crown, and that this appears to contradict
section 3 of the Facilitation Act, which authorised the
governor-general to issue an “international assistance notice” formally
inviting the intervention force.
“If indeed this is the case,” he continued, “then obviously everything
that has been done or is being done under the authority of the
Facilitation of International Assistance Act, 2003 is unconstitutional
and therefore null and void under section 2 of the Constitution.” He
added: “Section 3 of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act,
2003 is the king-pin of the validity of the whole operation of RAMSI in
Solomon Islands. Once this king-pin is removed, the whole RAMSI
operation would collapse with its consequences.”
In his submission, Governor-General Nathaniel Waena noted that the
Facilitation Act refers only to the “visiting contingent”, not RAMSI,
making the latter an “illegal entity”. He similarly observed that the
international treaty covering the intervention nowhere refers to the
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the regional body which Canberra insists
is responsible for overseeing RAMSI. In reality the Forum is nothing
but a fig-leaf for Canberra’s control.
The governor-general also condemned an extraordinary provision in
section 24 of the Facilitation Act which bars the Solomons’ parliament
from passing any subsequent legislation that can be interpreted as
“amending or repealing, or otherwise altering the effect or operation
of, this Act”. Waena noted that this clause contradicts the
constitutional right of the parliament to “make laws for the peace,
order and good government of Solomon Islands”, and therefore renders
the Facilitation Act “legally questionable”.
Former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s submission contained some of
the sharpest attacks on RAMSI.
“RAMSI intervention is guided by the objectives of protecting the
narrow strategic, national, and commercial interests of Australia and
therefore it failed miserably to address the real issues that matter to
the country’s peace process,” he wrote. “A RAMSI arrangement is
hopeless when it comes to restoring democracy, an institution that
Australia and the western world, especially USA and Great Britain
advanced as the reason for their interventions in selective spots
around the world. In fact it is becoming clearer that restoring
democracy is just a cover up of their real agendas, which is to protect
their narrow national interests.”
Sogavare repeatedly referred to Australia’s “re-colonisation” of the
Solomons and characterised RAMSI as an “occupying force”. He added:
“The crude fact [is] that Australia is the authority behind RAMSI and
camouflages itself under the pretext of helpim fren [‘Help a Friend’;
RAMSI’s pidgin slogan] to exercise legitimate authority over the
government system of this country.”
All of these points are entirely accurate. Sogavare’s submission made
clear, however, the conditional and unprincipled character of his
differences with Australian imperialism. “Despite the nationalistic
stand taken in this paper on our relationship with Australia, it has to
be appreciated that Solomon Islands has no real problem with the
military agenda of Australia in the Pacific,” he wrote. And: “As far as
RAMSI is concerned, again the problem is not RAMSI per se, but the way
the intervention was undertaken to protect and advance Australia’s
national interests, which reflects on the legal framework that governs
its presence and operation in the country.”
Sogavare’s strategy is to manoeuvre with Australia’s rivals to secure a
more favourable position for the Solomons’ elite in relation to
Canberra. His submission urged that Japan, Taiwan, and “other Asian
countries” be invited to participate in RAMSI, in order to “instil some
form of discipline on RAMSI to behave like a true collective member of
the region”.
The opposition leader proposed a long list of amendments to the
Facilitation Act to make RAMSI and its personnel subject to the
country’s laws, but did not call for the legislation to be revoked. He
rather tentatively concluded: “The Committee [needs] to seriously
consider the question as to whether there is still a need for RAMSI
style intervention to consolidate the achievements of RAMSI.”
Canberra responds
Submissions from Australian and New Zealand officials—including
Australia’s acting high commissioner to the Solomons Alison Duncan, New
Zealand’s high commissioner Deborah Panckhurst, RAMSI special
coordinator Tim George, and RAMSI police chief Peter Marshall—rejected
outright any alteration to the Facilitation Act or to RAMSI’s
operations.
“The Australian government considers that the FIA [Facilitation of
International Assistance] Act which underpins RAMSI’s presence and
activities in Solomon Islands remains appropriate and consistent with
standard international practice,” Alison Duncan declared.
“It is important that RAMSI personnel continue to have immunities as
provided under the FIA Act. These immunities exist to help the mission
run smoothly by insulating RAMSI personnel from the threat of
individuals bringing vexatious legal claims which could distract from
their core objective of assisting Solomon Islanders.”
The real purpose of RAMSI’s immunity is to give its personnel a free
hand in implementing Canberra’s dictates.
The Australian high commissioner challenged the need for the
parliamentary review by insisting that the 2007 Pacific Islands Forum
Task Force Review into RAMSI was sufficient. Canberra initiated the PIF
review in an attempt to undercut Sogavare’s preparations for a
parliamentary review; predictably, it rubber stamped RAMSI’s
operations. Duncan cited the 2007 report’s assertion that “any
unilateral amendments to the FIA Act would inevitably have serious
implications for the willingness of participating nations to continue
contributing to RAMSI”.
She added: “Any amendment to the RAMSI Treaty to mirror changes to the
FIA Act would require fresh agreement by the fifteen contributing
Pacific islands countries.” The legal veracity of this assertion is
questionable, but its meaning is clear—any amendment to the
Facilitation Act may result in RAMSI’s withdrawal. And together with
RAMSI goes Australia’s aid money; limited and distorted as these funds
are, they remain vital for the impoverished Pacific country’s economy.
The threat of a general Australian withdrawal is especially directed
towards Prime Minister Sikua and others in his government who may
prefer to adjust certain aspects of the Australian intervention, but
not if that means risking RAMSI. There is no shortage of
parliamentarians in Honiara whose political and financial interests are
bound up with the ongoing presence of the Australian occupying force.
It remains to be seen whether the parliamentary inquiry simply ignores
the submitted evidence of RAMSI’s illegal character and endorses its
activities, or whether it will propose some form of amendment to the
Facilitation Act. But given the Sikua government’s close alignment with
Canberra, any legislative changes made will almost certainly be nothing
more than cosmetic alterations intended to prevent any constitutional
challenge to RAMSI’s presence while preserving all its critical powers.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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