International
Central Asia: Great Game or Graveyard?
By Jon Haron-Feiertag, Diplomatic Courier 1/7/09
Jul 2, 2009 - 9:32:03 AM

Awash in oil and gas. Congested by the traffic of diplomats. The scene of endless intrigue. Great powers rival for influence. No this is not an essay on the Middle East but rather Central Asia. Draw a circle around the Caucasus states, the seven Stans, Turkey, and Iran and you capture much of the action in international affairs today. Could it be that the Great Game Rudyard Kipling described a century ago in Central Asia is back?

It is not hard to think why. The diplomacy of gas is itself a game of its own. Swings in allegiance, pipeline explosions, invitations to outsider powers—these are all the hallmarks of classic real politik. The contest for control and transit of gas out of Central Asia, particularly around the Caspian Sea, has come to rule regional politics. Putin made it a first priority to lock-in neighboring states, and create a Caspian gas monopoly. The targets of his policy were principally Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Gazprom, at the behest of Russia, paid high prices to secure Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan's gas supplies. Azerbaijan held out. Now with the world economy sinking, and Russia reeling from the financial crisis, the Central Asian states are nervous Russia can't pay the high price it offered for their gas. Kazakhstan has turned toward China. Turkmenistan is in a furor, and has quickly sent negotiators to Iran and Europe to look for alternate buyers. It looks as though Putin's gas monopoly is coming undone, and a window is opening for U.S., European, and Chinese infiltration.

The gas diplomacy is exhilarating, but focus on that would only tell part of the story. The raging war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has become a feature of its own. No one knows where this war is going, or what will be the consequences in the aftermath. But it is already having major effects in the region. Pakistan's star is perceived to be receding. Other states that had been checked by Pakistan, like India and Iran, may now have an opportunity to exercise new influence. It could be that the old Pashtu policy of Pakistan will give way to the new designs of the Hindus and Persians in Asia's heartland. Be that as it may, in the near term the U.S. has been compelled to create a Central Asian policy—it never had one before. The U.S. first relied on bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to support the Afghan War. First the Uzbeks forced the U.S. out, then followed the Kyrgyz—in exchange for Russian money. Since then the U.S. has labored hard to reacquire bases. Base agreements imply political agreements. And negotiations with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and perhaps others, all suggest possible future allies of the US in Central Asia.

Gas and the Afghan War explain most of Central Asia's politics today. But it would be remiss to omit the Russia-Georgia War from the summer of last year. The War was swift, the military outcome decisive, but the political consequences are still uncertain. President Mikheil Saakashvili has survived in power in Georgia, despite all the efforts and intrigues of the Russians to undermine him. As a price for his defeat, two important regions in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were allowed to secede under Russian protection. The result was a humiliation for Georgia. The violent partition has caused Europe to recoil in horror at the thought of enlarging NATO to the Caucuses. But the consequences may be greater than just Georgian integrity. Europe's modern economy is dependent on foreign oil. States like Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, et al, are all very reliant on gas imports. Pipelines that traverse their way through Georgia, from Azerbaijan, into Turkey, now appear a risky venture. The stakes do not only include Europe's energy independence, they also implicate the orientation of the Caucasus states and the direction of Turkey. Azerbaijan is vulnerable to Russian coercion just like Georgia. It has a mutinous district, similar to South Ossetia, under the protection of Armenian influence, a state in close alliance with Russia. Turkey has tried to negotiate a resolution to the impasse, but so far without avail. The Georgian War may have reversed the drift of these small Caucasus statelets toward the West.

Central Asia therefore is alive with politics and diplomacy. That said, does it really resemble the Great Game of yester year? The answer is, not quite. Consider a few reasons.

Then, the locus of conflict was centered in Afghanistan. The slow creep of empires had slowly brought the outer borders of the British and Russian empires into contact. The North Western Frontier, as the British named it was the main place for confrontation. The British had conquered the Sindh in 1847 and the Punjab in 1849. But the Tsar's armies were coming closer. They captured Samarkand, then Bokhara, and then Merv. The old Khanates, which had been the buffer between the two were nearly gone, only the Afghan emirate remained. India, the crown jewel of the empire, was in jeopardy. A policy of "masterly inactivity" would no longer suffice. The British took action. They first captured Quetta, then Kabul. This was the Great Game at its zenith.

The British strategy then was essentially one of denial: protect the mountain passes that lead into India; keep the Russians at bay. But the conflicts today seem to be the opposite. They are not characterized by denial so much as control—control of pipelines, control of the gas supply, control of territory against insurgents. And the conflicts are no longer centered in the Afghan emirate, they have diffused. Georgia has become a war ground. So has Pakistan.

The geopolitics are different too. The Great Game, like the Scramble for Africa, and the Far Eastern Question, were all the unintended consequence of a static peace in Europe. Bismarck had orchestrated one of the great bargains in the history of diplomacy. The Russo-Ottoman War, which ended decisively for Russia and had threatened to upset the delicate balance of power, was parlayed masterfully into a comprehensive peace. Nearly every major state of Europe received a slice of territory from the moribund Ottoman Empire—all but for France. At the Berlin Conference of 1878, Bismarck essentially fixed the map of Europe until the First World War. The ambitions of the European states were cast outward, in Africa, China, and Central Asia. That was then. Now things are different. Central Asia has not two great powers jousting for influence, but three—Russia, the US, and China. Central Asia has not had united rule since the age of Tamerlane and his Timurid Empire. The fractured politics of the region draw gas-hungry outside powers into the divide. Central Asia is not the only such place in the world, but it does possess a lot of gas.

It is interesting then to ask why some states are lured in, while others remain out. The U.S., Russia, and China clearly are large and growing players for influence in the region. But that doesn't explain why other states, like India, Iran, Turkey, and Ukraine are not. These are large and influential states within their own regions, each with history of dominance across the vast Steppes. Why not them? The reasons can only be speculative.

Indian identity has been scarred by her colonial experience. The leadership of Gandhi and Nehru both espoused that India not indulge in the vulgar imperial ambitions like those of the British. India rather should mark out a different way. She would keep herself unaligned and distant from vain-glories of empire. In any case, India has found another route to the Caspian: Iran. She has maintained the policy of content customer for Persian oil, and so far shown no desire to rule the routes herself. Why pay more when you can pay less? Besides, the conflict with Pakistan effectively checks India's influence into the region. And in the past, Pakistan has out-played India in Afghanistan.

Of course that was then, this is now. And nothing is changing today so much as the circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But even supposing the rosiest scenario, it's hard to imagine how India could leapfrog Pakistan into Central Asia.

Iran more than India is the truly odd case. Iran would seem the country most suited to rule the inner Asian oases. Why doesn't it? The Safavids and the Sassanids commanded wide swathes of Central Asia—both the Caucasus and the watersheds of the Oxus. Conquerors into Central Asia, like Alexander the Great, passed first through Persia. Conquerors out of Central Asia, like the Turks and the Mongols, made Iran their point of debut. She, before anyone seems the prime contestant for influence. Perhaps once. But Russia has affected a change of mind. Led by Peter the Great, Persia was driven from the Caucasus. Later she would lose control of Ashgabat, the last outpost before the abyss of the Karakum desert. As Russian power multiplied she was forced from the Caspian, and her northern reaches were occupied by Russian troops. Concessions, capitulations, occupations. Some Azeri districts were nearly severed from Iran at the end of the Second World War. Iranian foreign policy has been disfigured ever since. Her attention now focuses on the Gulf and Middle East. Russia it appears has permanently bent Iran away from the center of Asia.

What does it all mean? Some say the Great Game in Central Asia is a fools errand. The region has been the graveyard of empires, not the secret source of riches. It is a really a poisoned chalice, they say. These arguments have merit to them, but they are also half wrong. Britain and Russia were surely distracted by their voyage into inner Asia, but they were not ruined by it. It is doubtful states will be again. But that does not mean the intrigues and combative diplomacy are prudent, or the Great Game in Central Asia is really a game that can be won. Nevertheless the regions located at the intersection of empires eventually draw into them all the force that powerful states can deploy. The situation was similar with the Balkans at the turn of the 19th century, or the Middle East at the latter of the 20th. The stress applied by great powers is tremendous. The outcome of their efforts is often the splintering of states. Because Central Asia sits atop an ocean of oil and gas, the stakes are too high for outside ambitions to relax.

Expect the diplomacy to intensify. Already Georgia may have had to two districts carved away. Azerbaijan seems to have lost a province. Afghanistan and Pakistan look suspiciously fragile. Watch for splits in the other Stans.

Source: Ocnus.net 2009