The
price that Pakistan is paying for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto is now
evident. The paralysis of the Government in the face of the country’s two
greatest threats – a worsening economy and terrorism – is a sign of lack of
leadership, particularly the charismatic ability to rally great numbers of
people. Bhutto had plans for dealing with both threats, and the capacity
to persuade people to back her, even if her record gave reason to worry that
she would see the plans through.
The
coalition Government looks incapable of providing any leadership at all.
Four months after the elections it is not just grappling with
constitutional issues but struggling to make basic decisions. Many reckon
that it will fall soon.
Anyone
would grant Pakistan some time, in principle, to sort out its Government after
the past nine years under military rule. But it doesn’t have that
leisure. Terrorism is still a threat, even though the religious parties
are waning, while rising food and fuel prices are bringing unrest and wiping
out eight years of economic gain.
Nawaz
Sharif, leader of the conservative Pakistan Muslim League, one of the two main
parties, maintains that a deal has now been struck on restoring the Supreme
Court judges, sacked by President Pervez Musharraf last year. On
Wednesday, in London, he said that he had agreed with Asif Zardari, Benazir
Bhutto’s widower and now head of her Pakistan People’s Party, that all judges
would be restored by May 12.
It
is not that simple. Sharif says, after talks with Zardari in Dubai, that
he is confident that the deal will stick. But many are not. The
date already represents a 12-day extension on the previous deadline that the
Government set itself. It is hard to see how it will meet the new
one. Zardari, no fan of the judiciary after years of imprisonment, wants
its powers curbed. He also wants all the judges appointed by Musharraf to
be kept in place, swelling the Supreme Court from 17 to 26. This would
take a constitutional amendment, and so a two-thirds majority of parliament,
which cannot be taken for granted.
Sharif,
implacably opposed to Musharraf, who deposed him in the 1999 coup, hopes that
the restitution of the judges will get rid of the President, or at least
curtail his power. While careful not to assume that, he asserts that “the
nation will feel very happy that the sanctity of the judiciary has been
restored, that a dictator has been defeated”.
He
has the constitution on his side, but not politics. Zardari, as leader of
the most powerful party, has spent much of April talking with President
Musharraf, about judges and wider cooperation. In being prepared to deal
with Musharraf, Zardari is only following in the footsteps of Bhutto.
Although he has none of her charisma, popularity, or intellectual
sophistication, he has proved much more successful than expected in handling
the intricacies of Pakistani politics. His party has already struck a deal
with the MQM, the secular, Karachi-based party, as well as making overtures to
a splinter of the MMA, the group of religious parties, and the Awami National
Party in the North West Frontier Province. The outlines of a coalition
that would accommodate Musharraf, but shut out Sharif, are visible.
A
year ago, in a
Times
interview in London, Sharif was bitter, preoccupied with revenge against
Musharraf. In an interview in September he was ebullient beyond restraint
at the prospect of returning from exile – but Musharraf deported him to Saudi
Arabia as his aircraft landed. This month, he is careful and muted, and
still fixed on Musharraf. “The mandate given to us by the people of
Pakistan was a mandate for change.” The elections, just weeks after the
assassination of Bhutto, gave her party and Sharif’s a huge boost while
humiliating Musharraf’s party. “They do not want the same old faces,” he
says, without irony, although as a twice-former Prime Minister he counts as one
of the old faces, in a country that badly needs new ones.
But
while he makes a better speech about democracy than Zardari – or Musharraf – he
is vague on what he thinks should be done about schools, or rising fuel costs
(and rising budget deficits as the Government subsidises the cost). His
son Hasan fills in detail of the economic achievements of past Sharif
governments; as well as explaining the difference between texting and e-mailing
to his father. He says that his past Government should be enough of a
guide. But no politician can afford such glibness: in Sharif’s case, it
risks making him obsessed with the past at the expense of the future. The
risk for him is that if this coalition fails, there are many who would formally
try to consign him to the past.