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Last Updated: May 13, 2008 - 9:02:06 AM |
- At least 27 people were killed in four days of fighting,
after which the government backed down. (Subsequent reports indicate 44 have
been killed and 128 wounded in Beirut and other areas since last Wednesday.)
The Iranian-led regional bloc, in which Hezbollah is a key player, scored a
significant victory.
- Events highlighted the limits of Hezbollah's present ambitions as much as
the extent of its military capacity. For the time being, Hezbollah leader
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has no appetite to oust the western-backed regime
headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, as long as it does not make further
attempts to interfere with Hezbollah's military infrastructure.
- As well as being a terror group, it is important to recall that Hezbollah
is the authentic representative of Lebanese Shiites, which form the largest
ethnic community in Lebanon. As such, Nasrallah has calculated that his
interests are best served by exploiting the weak democratic institutions of a
Lebanon that is mired in political and social discord, in order to act
independently as ‘a state within a state'.
- Hezbollah's undermining of Lebanese sovereignty, growing military and
operational capacity, and determination to spread radical Iranian ideology is
deeply troubling for moderate Arab states in the region. Iranian domination
of the Levant would take those fears to unprecedented levels.
Introduction
Aside from the tragic loss of innocent life resulting from the sectarian
fighting which broke out, the events in Beirut last week highlight the nature
of Hezbollah's grip on power in Lebanon. Lebanon has been characterised
by political stagnation since November 2006 (when six pro-Syrian ministers
quit the cabinet) and the presidential crisis persists.[i] The violence
embroiled Beirut in the worst hostility since the civil war and waned after
four days only because the Lebanese army rescinded two government resolutions
intended to weaken Hezbollah's military infrastructure. Hezbollah made
clear that it would not accept having its autonomy diminished. Its
actions represented a victory for the Iran-led regional bloc and are a source
of consternation for moderate Sunni Arab states.[ii] Short term
ramifications may prove to be low key, but Hezbollah's growing confidence
presents a long term regional threat. This briefing examines the
context in which events erupted in bloodshed last week, and stresses Lebanon
's strategic importance in light of current developments.
The context of
factional fighting
The fresh outbreak of violence which began on 7 May took Lebanon one step
closer to the widely predicted return to civil war. According to
security sources, 44 people were killed and 128 wounded since last
Wednesday.[iii] Following a government attempt to rein in Hezbollah chief
Hassan Nasrallah's terror organisation, Hezbollah militants used machine
guns, RPGs, mortars and sniper fire to seize rival strongholds in mixed
Sunni-Shiite neighbourhoods of Beirut.[iv] Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and
other pro-western coalition leaders, including Saad al-Hariri, son of the
assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and present leader of the
Sunni faction's Future Movement, and incumbent Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,
required heavy personal protection as militants closed in on West
Beirut. Hezbollah's military supremacy in Lebanon, well-documented even
prior to these events, was conclusively reaffirmed.
The fighting was triggered by two Lebanese cabinet resolutions with wh ich
Hezbollah was at odds. The first was to close down Hezbollah's military
telecommunications network, which was deemed a threat to state
security. Notably, the pro-government al-Mustaqbal newspaper and other
local press reported a link-up with Syria's communications systems, enabling
Syrian intelligence to operate freely in Lebanon.[v] The second was to
dismiss the security chief of Beirut international airport, Major General
Wafiq Shukeir, who has close ties to Hezbollah. He was accused of
spying for them and assisting with weapons transfers.[vi] Whilst scenes
on the ground of fighters destroying cars and buildings may have seemed
anarchic, Michael Young of the Lebanese
Daily
Star asserted that blocking the airport road was a calculated
plan by Hezbollah to reverse the Shiite security chief's
expulsion.[vii] Aggression diminished only after Prime Minister Siniora
handed over the decision on both matters to the army, which refrained from
involving itself directly in the fighting, and abruptly revoked the rulings
in order to restore relative calm.[viii]
Hezbol lah's red
lines revealed
On the surface, it may seem puzzling that Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah risked
further alienating himself through the actions he ordered. Hezbollah
was accused by the March 14 coalition leadership,[ix] the religious head of
the Sunni community Grand Mufti Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, Lebanese media and
major Arab states, of staging a coup d'état.[x] Yet whilst Nasrallah has been
committed to undermining the pro-western Siniora administration since its
inception, last week's events highlight the limits of his present ambitions
as much as the extent of Hezbollah's military capacity. For the time
being, Nasrallah has no appetite to usher Hezbollah into power by
force. He is content to allow a relatively weak leadership, being
propped up by the west, to manage the affairs of state, on the proviso that
it does not interfere with his organisation.[xi]
The flipside of Hezbollah's power is the relative stranglehold in which the
Lebanese government is situated vis-à-vis this terror organisation. The
March 14 coalition's decision to act agai nst Hezbollah at this juncture was
all but required of it due to concerns that Hezbollah is planning attacks -
to be launched imminently against Israeli targets - as retribution for the
assassination in February of their deputy commander, Imad Mughniyeh.[xii] It
is of little significance that no evidence has been presented which links
Israel with the killing; the Lebanese government is keen to avoid another
round of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah on its soil, as occurred in
the July 2006 Second Lebanon War. This scenario would almost inevitably
follow renewed Hezbollah belligerence against Israel.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, is unwilling to accept a subservient role in
Lebanon in which its military infrastructure is constrained. It
reserves the right to go to war with Israel at a moment of its choosing, as
per the model of ‘resistance' in which it was conceived, and for this it
seeks to maintain utmost flexibility, strong intelligence, and intact
military communications. As such, the Lebanese government's
resolutions, which may have appeared relatively innocuous to a casual
observer, crossed red lines for the Hezbollah chief.[xiii] They
instigated him to make a rare press statement from a secret location,
despatched by videolink, in which he castigated the Siniora government for
"declaring war" on his group on the behalf of Israel and the
US.[xiv]
Hezbollah's security chief Wafiq Safa and the party's international relations
official Nawaf Moussawi reportedly stated that "anyone who touches the
[communications] network would be treated the same way we treat the Zionist
enemy."[xv] Nasrallah proclaimed, "Those who try to arrest us, we
will arrest them. Those who shoot at us, we will shoot at them.
The hand raised against us, we will cut it off."[xvi] As subsequent aggression
showed, Nasrallah was willing to enter into a civil war in order to protect
Hezbollah's autonomy as ‘a state within a state'.[xvii]
Strategic fallout: a
victory for the Iran-led bloc
Although the situation still remains very fluid, it is unlikely that the
short term fallout will be all that far-reaching. For its part, Israel
has been observing devel opments in Lebanon very closely since the war almost
two years ago. Its defence establishment is acutely aware of Iran's
increasing influence along its southern and northern borders, through Hamas
and Hezbollah respectively, and the reality of prospective conflict on both
fronts at some point in the future. Israeli intelligence shows that
Hezbollah's rocket supply has tripled and that arms have flowed in
continuously across the Syrian border since the 2006 war.[xviii] Contrasted
against just light weapons supplied by the US to the Lebanese government
(largely because of Israeli concerns that military hardware would fall into
Hezbollah's arsenal), last week's show of strength was of no real
surprise. Aside from some precautionary IDF realignments in northern
Israel in the face of a volatile situation across the border, Israel is
unlikely to take further action at present. However, briefly looking at
Hezbollah's position within Lebanese society, and its broader Iranian- and
Syrian-sponsored agenda, reflects more complex long run concerns for Israel,
moderate Arab states, and the international communit y, for which there are
no straightforward solutions.
Israel's veteran international affairs correspondent and author, Pinhas
Inbari, argues that Lebanon can be considered to encapsulate perhaps the most
significant existential threat facing the Arab world today: ‘resistance' (
muqawama) to the
foundations of normal statehood, in which Lebanon essentially serves as a
tool for achieving Hezbollah's radical Islamist ends.[xix] Nasrallah's
disinclination to oust the coalition government last week should not be
interpreted as any less of a desire on his part to acquire more political power
in the long run. It is important to recall that, in parallel to
providing consent for terror activities, Nasrallah leads a political
opposition party with deep roots in the Shiite community. As Professor
Eyal Zisser, a Lebanon expert at Tel Aviv University, explains, Shiites
comprise almost half of Lebanon's population and depend heavily on Hezbollah
for welfare services, from schooling to pension funds. Hezbollah is the
public face of many Shiites who feel discriminated against by the politi cal
establishment, an anti-Syrian alliance of Maronites, Sunnis and Druze, who
coalesced in the spring 2005 Cedar Revolution (or ‘Independence Uprising') in
order to stave off Shiite domination following Syria's formal retreat from
the country. In short, Hezbollah is the authentic representative of the
largest ethnic community in Lebanon.[xx] As such, Nasrallah has calculated
that he can best serve his own (as well as Iran's and, to a lesser extent,
Syria's) interests by exploiting the brittle democratic institutions of a
weak Lebanon to achieve power encroachingly and as the country's demographic
balance continues to drift in his favour. This is the context in which
he has repeatedly called for early parliamentary elections.[xxi]
Conclusion
In the broadest analysis, Hezbollah's victory in Beirut represented a
milestone for Iran in its active pursuit of regional hegemony and defiance of
western demands. Whilst Syria is keen for the constitutional gridlock
preventing the appointment of a new president to continue, Iran is providing
weapons and i nvesting heavily in bolstering Hezbollah as part of a game plan
which is not intended to further destabilise Lebanon at this time.
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that Iran does not monopolise radical
influence in Lebanon: it is increasingly being exploited by various jihadist
groups of both Shi'a and Sunni descent, not least because the government has
western backing, UNIFIL troops are stationed in the south and, as defence
experts point out, from a jihadist perspective, it is a handy "staging
ground to the Palestinian and European theatres."[xxii] Leading Arab
states, most importantly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, used an emergency meeting of
the Arab League in Cairo on Sunday to express concern about the growth of
Iranian and other radical influences in Lebanon. The bottom line is
that Hezbollah's growing capacity, manoeuvrability, and confidence to spread
Iranian ideology within the weak shell of an Arab state is deeply troubling
for them. Iranian domination in Lebanon would take such fears to
unprecedented levels.
[i] The country has been unable to appoint a new president
since Emile Lahoud&# 39;s term expired almost six months ago. There
is agreement in principle on the appointment of army commander Michel
Suleiman to replace him, though his appointment has been repeatedly postponed
for nearly 18 months. As of March, speaker Nabih Berri had cancelled
more than a dozen parliamentary sessions to elect a new president. See,
for instance, ‘Shaping Lebanon's Future', Bilal Y. Saab, Saban Center for
Middle East Policy,
Brookings
Institution, 19 March 2008.
www.brookings.edu; ‘Gloves off in Lebanon',
Economist Intelligence Unit,
9 May 2008.
www.economist.com; ‘Lebanese gov't bends to
Hezbollah demands', Yoav Stern and Barak Ravid,
Haaretz, 11 May 2008.
[ii] Israel's President Shimon Peres observed, "It is a new chapter of
the battle led by Iran to control all of the Middle East." ‘Israel
accuse s Iran of igniting violence in Lebanon',
Now Lebanon, 9 May 2008.
www.nowlebanon.com
[iii] Lebanese clashes shift to mountains', Nada Bakri,
International Herald Tribune,
12 May 2008.
[iv] ‘Lebanese gov't bends to Hezbollah demands', Yoav Stern and Barak Ravid,
Haaretz, 11
May 2008; ‘With 18 dead thus far, leaders call for unlikely dialogue',
Now Lebanon, 10 May
2008.
www.nowlebanon.com
[v] ‘Syria's Intelligence Operates Through Hizbullah Lebanon Communications',
Naharnet, 6
May 2008.
www.naharnet.com
[vi] Walid Jumblatt accused Shukeir of providing sensitive information about
pro-government politicians and foreign dignitaries to terrorists and
collaborating with Iran's su pply of weapons to Hezbollah via the terminal.
‘Lebanon tensions rise in clash with Hezbollah', Yoav Stern and Avi
Issacharoff,
Haaretz,
9 May 2008.
[vii] ‘Heading toward a Lebanese divorce', Michael Young,
Lebanon
Daily Star, 8 May
2008.
www.dailystar.com
[viii] Further violence has since spread to the Chouf Mountains and the
northern city of Tripoli. ‘Lebanese clashes shift to mountains', Nada Bakri,
International Herald Tribune,
12 May 2008.
[ix] The March 14 movement is named after the date of the Cedar Revolution
marking demonstrations - the largest in Lebanese history - which followed
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination on 14 February
2005. Its membership consists of anti-Syrian members of the Lebanese
majority coalition.
[x] As an online Lebanese editorial put it in the aftermath, "Let us be
under no illusions: this is a coup d'état, and Hezbollah has sh own its true
colors." ‘The new rules of the game',
Now
Lebanon, 9 May 2008.
www.nowlebanon.com; ‘Mufti Qabbani fears
civil disobedience',
Lebanon
Now, 10 May 2008.
www.nowlebanon.com; ‘Lebanon prime minister
accuses Hezbollah of staging coup',
Haaretz,
10 May 2008.
www.haaretz.com; ‘Arabs hold crisis talks on
Hezbollah ‘coup' in Beirut', Uzi Mahnaimi,
The
Sunday Times, 11 May 2008.
www.timesonline.co.uk
[xi] ‘Analysis: The question of power', Jonathan Spyer,
The Jerusalem Post, 10 May 2008.
www.jpost.com
[xii] ‘Gloves off in
Lebanon', Economist Intelligence Unit, 9 May 2008.
www.economist.com
[xiii] ‘Analysis: The
question of power', Jonathan Spyer, The Jerusalem Post, 10 May 2008.
www.jpost.com
[xiv] ‘Hizbollah ‘ready
for war' in Lebanon', Damien McElroy, Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2008.
www.telegraph.co.uk
[xv] Syria's
Intelligence Operates Through Hizbullah Lebanon Communications', Naharnet, 6
May 2008.
www.naharnet.com
[xvi ] ‘Lebanon tensions
rise in clash with Hezbollah', Yoav Stern and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz, 9 May
2008.
[xvii] Hezbollah's is
politically, militarily and economically disaggregated from the rest of
Lebanon. It participates in the democratic process to the extent that
it can further its own power ambitions, but executes separate policies and
makes independent decisions which undermine Lebanese sovereignty. See
‘Hezbollah's Endgame?', Lee Smith, Middle East Journal, 8 May 2008.
www.michaeltotten.com
[xviii] ‘Not only
Lebanon's problem', Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz, 11 May 2008.
[xix] ‘The Arab World's
Political Dilemma: Between Islamic "Resistance" and the Western
State System', Pinhas Inbari, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 6.,
No. 17, 17-18 January 2007.
www.jcpa.org
[xx] Eyal Zisser (2007,
‘The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War', in S.
Brom and M. Elran (eds), The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives (Tel
Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies).
[xxi] See, for instance,
Arab Election Watch
www.intekhabat.org
[xxii] For current
analysis, see ‘What Ayman al-Zawahri's Words Really Mean for Lebanon and the
‘War on Terror'', Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, Saban Center for Middle
East Policy, Brookings Institution, 5 May 2008.
www.brookings.edu
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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