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Last Updated: Aug 27, 2008 - 10:47:27 AM |
Despite gaping legal loopholes and text some consider contradictory,
the statement seems to have placated all Lebanese parties and sets a
tone of conciliation for the new government prior to parliamentary
elections in 2009.
However, the statement potentially places the new government on
unstable ground with Israel, the United Nations and the international
community by virtue of a clause that seemingly overlooks key objectives
of Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. The former called for
the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, while the latter ended the
2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel.
The main problem with the policy statement is defining “resistance”
against Israel, and who has the right to defend Lebanon. Article 7,
paragraph one allows the Lebanese state resistance, and the people the
right to defend the country.
In addition to the international considerations, the policy statement's
wording has triggered domestic dissention.
Human rights advocate Wa’il Kheir argues that, “This is a
contradiction. Lebanon is a democracy. The Lebanese people elect
representatives who act within the Constitution as the state. The
resistance is not defined.”
One American University of Beirut student points out the absurdity of
the law, jesting, “If any Lebanese citizen can legally go to war with
Israel, can we also legally arrest other Lebanese acting as policemen?
I want to arrest all of the politicians for corruption.”
What is most worrying is that the policy statement could be construed
as a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 and 1559.
According to Lebanese Renaissance Foundation analyst Elie Fawaz, “The
policy statement is an agreement here, but is not clear to those
abroad. This is important. The Lebanese government is now in
contradiction of both 1701 and 1559. Israel is ready, but there won’t
be war. You have 1701, 1559, UNIFIL and Israel standing alert. Lebanon
and Israel both have elections coming up and Hizbullah understands that
if there is a war, it will destroy all of Lebanon.”
“There is room to make that accusation [that the policy statement is a
violation of 1701], but I don’t see any player other than Israel that
would be willing to make that accusation. I think Hizbullah recognizes
that there is 1701, and that Hizbullah must be more respectful or more
acknowledging of 1701,” argues Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie
Middle East Center.
Some leaders see the policy statement positively. The vague language of
the document can be interpreted in many ways, and thus means that the
party to properly define the statement can interpret its meaning for
itself.
The vociferous debate in the Lebanese parliament over approval of the
policy statement indicates that, despite the vague language in the
statement, the Lebanese government is not in violation of 1701.
The argument holds that domestic and international courts generally
interpret vague laws by trying to understand the spirit of the law,
which is often elucidated or defined during parliamentary debate.
That spirit, they say, is supported by the many pro-Western Lebanese
leaders who registered their reservations about the policy statement
and verbally battled with Hizbullah parliamentarians during the debate.
The Christian Kataeb Party vice president Salim al-Sayegh contends
that, “The debate that occurred in the Lebanese parliament [regarding
the resistance] is progress from the previous ministerial declaration
of 2005 when that right [to resistance] was expressed in absolute
terms.
“In the press we have intensively been stating our explanation of the
[policy statement] text. All of this is a kind of security and safety
net. If one day Hizbullah decides to say they have the ‘right to
defend,’ then we can say half of Lebanon said, ‘No!’”
As written the policy statement’s clauses on defense remain vague and
indefinable, and thus prevent either the pro-Western March 14 Coalition
or Hizbullah and its allies from defining Lebanese defense policy. In
effect, a stalemate has been reached.
A top priority now for both factions is to define the relationship
between the Lebanese state and the “resistance,” a term Hizbullah
appropriated to define itself, but which has historically been used by
many groups fighting Israel.
Sunni March 14 parliamentarians argue that Hizbullah does not have the
right to monopolize the resistance, an exclusive privilege given to
them by the Syrian regime when it controlled Lebanon.
Hizbullah explicitly states it will not give up its weapons. However,
March 14 politicians argue that the Lebanese state must have full
control and sovereignty over the country.
Al-Sayegh says: “We are not against Hizbullah. We want the Lebanese
state, the logic of statehood to face the logic of anti-statehood; this
means militias, private security, so-called resistance. We don’t
[explicitly] name it, the resistance, in our political discourse.”
However, given Hizbullah’s desire to retain their weapons and
statements saying that any force interested in disarming them is
against them, Al-Sayegh’s statements are interpreted by Hizbullah as
explicitly hostile.
A March 14 fear is that Hizbullah wants to position itself as a group
similar to the Iranian Basij Resistance Force – a group whose
Kalashnikov-adorning flag is strikingly similar to Hizbullah’s – which
is under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The Basij and IRGC fight on behalf of the Iranian regime and for the
regime’s ideology, but have a unique inter-relationship with the
Iranian state. The Iranian state under the president and parliament
does not control these entities.
The Basij and IRGC work alongside the state, and according to some
March 14 analysts, this is what exists de facto between the Lebanese
state and Hizbullah.
The Lebanese state does not espouse the same ideology as Hizbullah, but
it cannot oppose the group, thus allowing the semi-governmental
Hizbullah to operate in tandem with the sitting government.
Nadim Koteich, host of Future Television’s political crossfire program
Beit el Yeik, argues: “Hizbullah is the only successful export of the
Iranian revolution, but Hizbullah is not the Iranian Basij. The Iranian
government and the Basij have the same objective and ideology. This is
not the case with Hizbullah and the Lebanese government. In Lebanon the
state and Hizbullah have opposing job descriptions.”
Koteich contends that Hizbullah still threatens other political faction
and the entire Lebanese state.
“The capital is still under occupation. The moment they decide to
repeat May 7, they can do it. The people are still there. The buildings
are filled with weapons.”
Wael Kheir maintains that, “Ultimately, you have the moqawama
[resistance] blocking the cabinet.” He notes increasing threats and
censorship of statements of which Hizbullah does not approve.
“If parliamentarians cannot speak freely, who can? It is pure
intimidation.”
However, the very fact that Hizbullah and the March 14 Coalition are
governing together and managed to pass a controversial, contested, yet
accepted policy statement supports the argument that Lebanese
politicians have agreed to disagree and will settle their ideological
battles in the election booth.
The Doha Accords, the composition of the current cabinet, and the
policy statement all indicate that Lebanon is in a transition period.
“All of this is in preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections,”
argues Lebanese American University professor Imad Salamey.
The policy statement “brings Lebanese factions back together after what
happened in May,” when Hizbullah and its allies took over Beirut and
went to war in the Druze mountains overlooking the capital, he says.
Salamey contends that there are currently “multiple guardianships over
Lebanon. The questions of peace or war remain in the domain of
undefined groups.”
The policy statement does not bring unity, but according to Salamey,
“It’s the best thing they could get so far.”
Despite all the pessimism about the defense clauses of the policy
statement, the vast majority of the document offers positive indicators.
The social and economic clauses of the text adopt the positions of the
previous, highly contested Siniora government. From December 2006 until
May 2008, the Hizbullah-led opposition claimed they would overturn the
policies of the previous government; this and the instability it would
have caused have been avoided.
The policy statement acknowledges U.N. Security Council Resolution
1701, approves of the U.N. Tribunal investigating the assassination of
former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, and approves of the
economic package agreed to in the Paris III Accords.
According to Al-Sayegh, “In the past the opposition has expressed its
reservations of the spirit and the content of these. They have accepted
this, which is progress for March 14.”
In the end, the policy statement says little about how the Lebanese
government will actually govern.
“It’s long and involved and has a lot of theater attached to it. Few
policy statements have had much of an impact, per se. They are a good
barometer, but they do not have much of an impact,” argues Carnegie’s
Salem.
“It has no direct bearing on what’s going to happen. [That] depends on
the dynamics between Hizbullah and other actions, or
Hizbullah’s
dynamics itself.”
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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