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Last Updated: Aug 19, 2008 - 12:47:24 PM |
Despite the fact that the EU, on August 13, unanimously decided to
deploy a yet-to-be-defined "peacekeeping force" to the region, it again
appears to be divided into a bloc of old Western nations more willing
to accommodate Russia and a Central and Eastern European bloc of new
members that are aggressively voicing their concern over Russia's
"neo-imperial strategy."
So the answer to the question might seem very well to be "yes." But
what's much more important is that no matter how divided Old and New
Europe might appear, they are united in powerlessness. And what's more,
the United States is part of this coalition of the impotent as well.
Immediately after the fighting commenced, it became clear the West was
unable to do much to stop the conflict or even influence the Russian
military and political course of action. The Georgian president hastily
signed a unilateral cease-fire when it became clear that he had
committed a strategic blunder of enormous proportions. And Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev did not sign this document because of French
President Nicolas Sarkozy's skilful diplomacy, but because by then his
country had achieved all its strategic goals. European peace plans and
U.S. statements had nothing to do with this.
The real division in Europe and across the Atlantic lies in the way the
two factions deal with their powerlessness. The Old Europe group of
countries long ago silently accepted that leverage over Russia is
limited and dependency is high. Consequently, it prefers moderate
statements and mediating diplomacy, thereby appearing impotent,
cynical, and even appeasing.
The New Europe bloc, riding high on the old neoconservative assumption
of political and military omnipotence, chose to use the elevated
register of values and morals, as if that alone meant anything. It
thereby poisoned the diplomatic atmosphere without gaining any
political advantage.
The problem is that both sides are right, but that being right won't
make them less impotent. It will only result in perpetual infighting
and -- possibly -- a profound and perhaps permanent weakening of the
West.
Newest World Order
This is of immense importance because when applied to the global
situation, Western powerlessness goes by another, much scarier name:
multipolarity. The Georgian-Russian war was the first war of
multipolarity, becoming the first visible sign of the new times. The
war has shown the limits of U.S. power, the inappropriateness of
policies founded solely on the basis of Western values, and the utter
futility of soft strategies solely based on multiple forms of
"dialogue."
It has shown that the division between Old and New Europe pales in
comparison with the divisions that have opened up while the West was
still basking in its post-Cold War glory. Robert Kagan, in his latest
book, is right to blame the West for having failed to see the new
threats to liberal democracy. But his further analysis is deeply flawed
because it rests on the assumption that U.S. power is still limitless,
and its capacity to promote Western values anywhere in the world will
remain unchecked. The Georgian-Russian war is also a reminder that
Kagan's neoconservatism is a spent force. If the West wants to retain
its influence and further its values, a return to realism is necessary.
The first step for the West to reestablish a realistic approach to the
region is to acknowledge that in the short run, it is condemned to be a
passive bystander. Military actions against Russia are not an option
(unless it is your goal to unleash World War III). Diplomatic measures,
such as suspending Russian membership of the Group of Eight or
canceling combined military exercises will not achieve anything except
a further freezing of the situation.
Given that Russia will be needed on all kinds of hugely important
issues -- ranging from Iran to energy to nuclear proliferation -- this
would be foolish, to say the least. The West needs to acknowledge its
powerlessness as a prerequisite for deep-rooted reforms of its Russia
policies. In the long run, Western strengths vis-a-vis Russia,
specifically in the energy sector, will give the West significant
leverage over Russia -- if it is ready to use these strengths in a
realistic way.
Secondly, the West must be ready to equally distribute the blame for
the ugly situation in the Caucasus. Both Georgia's unnecessary
provocation and Russia's willful escalation were politically hazardous.
So was the slightly naive Western support for Georgian nationalism.
Thirdly, the West finally needs to frame a serious common strategy for
constructive cooperation with Russia. It should be based primarily on
(a) interests and (b) what can possibly be achieved. In short, in
foreign policy, what we need is a return of the "art of the possible,"
no matter how frustrating, tedious, and morally unsatisfying this might
be on occasion.
And, by the way, this reevaluation of policies must necessarily include
a sober look at the real value of NATO's famed Article 5 and NATO
expansion. If this cornerstone of the Pax Americana is to mean
anything, its guarantee should dispersed with the greatest caution.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008
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