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Editorial Last Updated: May 17, 2021 - 10:48:16 AM


Israel v. Hamas in a Nutshell
By Dr. Gary K. Busch, 14/5/21
May 15, 2021 - 2:02:36 PM

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In brief, this is a problem which has gotten out of hand on all sides.
The initial moves, in challenging the occupation in Jerusalem of houses owned by Palestinians, by the Ultra-Right Haredim (the Jewish Taliban), gave Netanyahu a chance to move. He had failed in forming a new government and the President had asked Naftali Bennett to try.
The only way that anyone could form a coalition of parties with 65 members of the Knesset was by attracting and agreeing a coalition with the Israeli Palestinian parties. Bibi saw that if he could provoke a small crisis with the Palestinians he could stop the merger and, thus, retain power.
He directed the High Court to examine the case. There was no guarantee that the Jews would win, but there was the promise of conflict, which would stop the merger of the opposition parties.
On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and the West Bank (Abbas) had just decided to postpone the elections for the Palestinian self-government. Abbas was weak and threatened by Dahlan for the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and stopped the election in its tracks.
That opened the way for Hamas (in Gaza) and their competitor there, Islamic Jihad, to launch a campaign against the Israelis over the Jerusalem issue.
The Jewish Taliban called on its supporters to activate their campaigns for expanding the settlements. Abbas couldn't or wouldn't resist or confront the Israelis.
Hamas then tuned up the heat when Netanyahu escalated the conflict by calling in extra reinforcements in the reserve units. Hamas then saw it could gain the support of the Palestinians in the West Bank by being the only ones to protest against the Israelis. They began to send rockets into Ashkelon, and later closer to Tel Aviv.
Israel responded by shooting down rockets and by target bombing Hamas centres in Gaza. The Jewish Taliban used that to press forward their putative claims against the Palestinians across Israel and attacked local Palestinians in almost every town and village.
This escalation was largely beyond the control of the Netanyahu Government but it assured Bibi that no Palestinian Israeli would join the coalition for the Knesset and that an election would be required.
The Opposition to the Likud was hampered by the need to have a strong military response to Hamas. Unfortunately, the Minister of Defense is Benny Gantz, the last opponent of Netanyahu in the last election. He had to use the might of the IDF, but was fully aware of the political consequences. The only winner, here, is Hamas.
There won't likely be a winning coalition to oust Netanyahu. The Jewish Taliban has increased its power with many wavering zealots returning to the Netanyahu coalition. The "Abraham Accords" are severely weakened by the Israeli response in Gaza.
All in all this is what you might called the Hebrew FUBAR. In this, everybody loses. The scorpion and the camel win again.


Source:Ocnus.net 2021

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